III. THE SCIENCES THAT GIVE LAWS TO RHETORIC. 16. The scientific principles that underlie the rules of Rhetoric come from (1) Grammar, the Science of the Sentence, (2) Logic, the Science of Thought, (3) Esthetics, the Science of Beauty, and (4) Ethics, the Science of Morals; the four sciences nomothetical, or law-giving, to Rhetoric.1 The first two contribute most largely to the theory of the art; but the principles furnished by the others are of no less value, and cannot properly be left out of sight. Though in no sense a part of Rhetoric, these sciences stand in such close relations to it, that at least some knowledge of them is essential to any one who would comprehend the subject on its theoretical side. Exactly what these relations are will appear from the following considerations. 17. (A) The writing of a composition involves (1) the finding of something to say-the Matter, or Content, of DiscourseThought; (2) the embodying of this "something to say" in a correct Form, or Style; and (3) the adapting of the whole work (and its every part) to its Purpose, or End in View. But, (1) the science of Thought is Logic. (2) Form is either (a) outward and bodily-in Discourse, the language used to convey thought-or (b) inward and spiritual-that something which appeals to our sense of Beauty." The principles of language are taught by Grammar: the science of the Beautiful is Œsthetics. (3) "Discourse is more than mere thought, more than mere 1 The Greek nomothetes was not only a proposer of a law, but also (and primarily) a law-giver, like Solon or Lycurgus. Hence, nomothetical may properly be used in the sense of law-giving. 2 Compare Spenser, An Hymne in Honour of Beautie, 11. 89 and 132: "Confesse it then, That Beautie is not, as fond men misdeeme, An outward shew of thinges that only seeme. So, Robert Browning, Old Pictures in Florence, 11:— thought uttered or formed; it is thought communicated, implying a mind addressed in the communication."1 Hence, in every rhetorical process, a mutually related speaker and hearer,2-a speaker and a hearer, whose relations to each other are, of course, moral. The science of Morals is Ethics. 18. (B) These underlying principles are not discovered or discoverable by Rhetoric; nor can their truth or falsity be determined by it. They form parts of four great systems of truths, constructed each by itself and for its own sake, and brought into relation to Rhetoric, only when the latter, having formulated its rules for art-work, presents these rules to the sciences for explanation or justification. Further, the evidence by which the laws of Rhetoric are established is peculiar in each case to the science from which the underlying principle comes; and with this evidence, therefore, Rhetoric has nothing whatever to do. "When Greek Art ran and reached the goal, Thus much had the world to boast in fructu- Which the actual generations garble Was re-uttered,-and Soul (which Limbs betoken) And Limbs (Soul informs) were made new in marble."* *For this confirmation of Spenser the author is indebted to Mr. Mark Wilks Collet, of Germantown, who was already a reader of Browning in his Sophomore year. 1 Day, The Art of Discourse, 24.-The italics are inserted here. 2 Or writer and reader. For brevity's sake, only one pair of these terms (which must occur incessantly) will commonly be written. 3 Appendix, p. 333. IV. FUNDAMENTAL MAXIMS. 19. The sciences nomothetical to Rhetoric furnish it with four Dicta, or fundamental maxims, which serve as guides throughout the course. They set forth in miniature the whole body of scientific truths on which the rules of Rhetoric depend. They are, I. THE DICTUM OF GRAMMAR. -The writer must conform to the usage of the language he employs. II. THE DICTUM OF LOGIC.-The thought communicated must be genuine. III. THE DICTUM OF ESTHETICS.-The Composition must appeal to and stimulate the sense of Beauty. IV. THE DICTUM OF ETHICS.—Discourse must proceed upon moral principles,—those which control the relation of man to man. The full meaning of these rules will appear hereafter. Dicta II., III., and IV., however, need a few words here, by way of special explanation. 20. First, 'genuine thought," like genuine money, is exactly what it seems to be. Spurious thought, on the contrary, has all the forms of genuine thought, but as little as may be of its matter. The mind of man, by virtue of its own constitution, acts normally in certain ways, according to certain laws. These laws have been discovered and codified by Logic; so that normal mental action is also logical. Hence, when the writer, for whatever reason;—whether because he is fundamentally incapable of thinking clearly, or because, in his anxiety to express himself well, he forgets to have something worthy to say, or even, perhaps, because he actually desires to deceive his reader; when, from whatever cause, he violates the laws of Logic, he becomes a mere counterfeiter, a companion (in some sense) of the coiner of spurious gold. For example, he may use language that seems to convey thought, while, in fact, it only covers with a cloud of words the mere pretence of thinking,- -a pretence that, if exposed nakedly to other minds, would be at once detected; and he may do this consciously or unconsciously. Or he may maliciously choose such forms or such matter of discourse as shall deceive the unwary reader. In any case, he is dealing unfairly both by himself and by his reader as rational beings; he is violating both his own and his reader's mental constitution. This method of discourse is sometimes contemptuously spoken of as "rhetorical," in opposition (expressed or implied) to the "logical" method; but as here defined,—truly rhetorical discourse is logical, and the shrewdest logician (as does every thinker) finds discourse impossible, except in conscious or unconscious obedience to the laws of Rhetoric. The question whether such an illogician' errs wittingly or not, belongs to Ethics, is one with which the Dictum of Logic does not and cannot concern itself. Its business is only with the genuineness or the spuriousness of thought; its duty, only to remind the writer that, in the same sense in which noble birth or good breeding puts a man under special bonds to discharge his whole duty in every walk of life, so the rationality that constitutes man's distinctive mark among animals demands from him special fidelity to the laws of his intellectual nature. 21. Secondly, “beauty" is a relative term, and the standard of taste has varied in different ages and different lands. Hence, though it cannot be true that "there is no disputing about tastes,❞—in the sense, at least, in which this proverb is commonly quoted,—yet it is true that the beauty of plainness or even of ruggedness, as well as the beauty of grace, of polish, or of inherent loveliness, is intended by the term as used in the dictum, and that, for certain purposes in Composition, conformity to the dictum may lie in the acceptance of a standard of taste different from that of either our own day or our own nation.? 22. Thirdly, the meaning of the Dictum of Ethics is not that, in order to success in Composition, the writer must teach only what is true, but that, in every communication of thought, no matter what its subject or its purpose, he must proceed upon principles discovered by Ethics to be laws of the moral nature of man. The rhetorical methods are unfortunately, as applicable to apologizing for wrong as to championing the right, to If this word is "made to order," it is certainly no worse a term than unfriend, and is certainly quite as useful. The phrase ill logician expresses a far different thought. 22340 below. lying as to truth-telling; but, in whatever application, they are powerless when used in forgetfulness or in contradiction of the fundamental relations of men to each other. The dictum is not a table of the Ten Commandments, but a warning that all attempts to address men in violation of the fundamental principles of their nature must fail. For example, it is a wellknown truth that ruthlessly to assail the prejudices of men is not commonly successful as a means to persuasion. Hence, should an orator wish to influence the voters of a certain election-district, or to induce men to abandon certain bad habits, Rhetoric will warn him that he must approach his subject warily, carefully finding his way through his listeners' prejudices, and opening his battery of arguments against the favorite candidate or the allowed bad habit, only when he feels the ground thus made firm under his feet.1 No Morey Letter, even when issued as a "Last Card to the Voter," ever, perhaps, changed the vote of a fair-minded man; no Counterblast to Tobacco, even though from a royal pen, ever cured excessive smoking; no unsympathetic denunciation of intemperance ever won the drunkard from his evil ways. Discourse is a communication of thought from man to man; and hence, if it is to achieve its purpose, it must be guided at all points by those ethical truths which unfold the nature of the relations of men to each other. 18430, below. |