The reason, assigned in Watt's case, is, that the witness would receive a benefit from the verdict; and it has been suggested, (1) that he is interested to procure a conviction, on the ground that a conviction would have the effect of inducing a forfeiture, and thus defeat every legal claim or security, which the prisoner might have upon the instrument. On the other hand, it may be said, if the party, by whom the instrument purports to be made, were admitted a witness, he would not be allowed afterwards to produce the record of conviction in a civil suit for the purpose of proving the supposed forfeiture, because the conviction must have proceeded partly upon his own testimony. (2) And if he would be precluded from using the record of conviction against the prisoner, and might therefore be admitted to give evidence on the trial consistently with the general rule; still less reason is there for excluding him in those cases, where the instrument purports to be made for the benefit of a third person, or where it has since become a third person's property, in either of which cases it would not be liable to forfeiture. With regard to any probable advantage, which the witness may be supposed to receive from a conviction, by the prisoner's being disabled from giving evidence in any future suit, or from the great probability of his failing in an action in consequence of the discredit which a conviction must throw upon the instrument, (3) these are circumstances, which a jury would be directed to consider as forming a strong bias on the witness's mind, but which cannot render him incompetent. Upon the whole, the most intelligible reason, which has been assigned for the prevailing rule, is, because the indictment, in a prosecution for forgery, may be considered in some degree as a proceeding in rem, and a conviction would warrant a judicial cancellation of the forged writing. (4)* But the exception is manifestly anomalous and inconvenient; and requires the interference of the legislature. (1) (1) 2 East, P. C. 994. (2) Vid. infra, part 2. ch. 2, sect. 3. (3) See 2 East, P. C. 994. * By the law of Scotland, such an objection to a witness, in a prosecution for forgery, is never allowed. See Burnett's Criminal Law of Scotland, p. 444. SECT. VII. Of certain Exceptions to the general Rule on the Subject of Interest. Ir has been before stated as a general rule, that all persons, who gain or lose directly by the event of a cause, are incompetent to give evidence. There are, however, several exceptions to this general rule: some by act of parliament, as, where informers and the inhabitants of parishes or other districts are admitted; others from necessity (m) or a principle of public policy, (n) as, where evidence is received from persons who are entitled to rewards on convictions, or from agents, factors, or servants. Objections on the ground of interest proceed upon the supposition of too great a bias in the mind of the witness, and on the public utility of rejecting partial testimony. The presumption of bias may be taken off, by showing that the witness has as great or greater interest the other way, or that he has given up what interest he has: and the presumption of public utility may be answered, by showing that it would be very inconvenient, under the particular circumstances, not to receive such testimony. (1) First, as to the evidence of informers: By the common law, informers, who are entitled under penal Informers. statutes to part of a penalty, are not competent witnesses. (2) (0) But, by the particular provisions or policy of several acts of parliament, they may be admitted. Where a statute can receive no execution, unless a party interested be a witness, there he must be allowed, says Ch. B. Gilbert; for the statute must not be rendered ineffectual by the impossibility of proof. (3) Thus, by stat. 2 G. 2, c. 24, s. 8, against bribery at elections, the legislature, in giving an indemnity and discharge to any person offending against the act, who shall discover any other offender so that he may be committed, must also have intended, that he (1) By Lord Mansfield, 1 Burr. 422. Piercy, Andr. 18. R. v. Blaney, Andr. Stone, 2 Ld. Raym. 1545. R. v. R. v. (m) See Note 237, p. 253. (n) See Note 238, p. 253. (o) See Note 239, P. 254. Inhabitants. County bridge. 1 Ann. st. 1, e. 18. Action against Overseer. should be competent to give evidence at the trial; and, therefore, in an action for penalties he has been admitted. (1) In a prosecution on stat. 21 G. 3, c. 37, against exporting machinery, the informer is competent. (2) So, on a prosecution for penalties under stat. 9 Ann, c. 14, s. 5, the loser of money at cards may prove his loss. (3) And, on a prosecution under stat. 23 G. 2, c. 13, s. 1, for seducing artifices to go out of the kingdom, the prosecutor is a competent witness, although entitled to a moiety of the penalty. (4) There is no express provision in either of the three acts of parliament last mentioned, for admitting the evidence of the party interested. In the act of the 32 G. 3, c. 56, for preventing counterfeited certificates of servants' characters, there is a clause by which the evidence of the party aggrieved is rendered admissible; (5) and a similar provision is made by the act, (st. 33 G. 3, c. 75, s. 17,) which regulates hackney coaches. In prosecutions for all offences punishable on summary conviction under stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29. s. 64, the evidence of the party aggrieved is admissible. Secondly, as to the evidence of the inhabitants of a parish or other district. On an indictment against private persons or corporate bodies for not repairing a public bridge or the highway adjoining, the inhabitants of the county, town, riding, &c. in which the bridge is situated, are competent witnesses on the trial of such a prosecution, by the 1st Ann, stat. 1, c. 18, s. 13. Even before this statute, such evidence had been thought admissible from necessity. (6) In actions against churchwardens or overseers of a parish, for the recovery of money mis-spent by them, inhabitants of the parish (1) Bush v. Railling, Say, 289. Mead v. Robinson. Willes, 425. Heward v. Shipley, 4 East, 182. (2) R. v. Teasdale, 3 Esp. N. P. C. (3) R. v. Luckup, Willes, 425. (c) who do not receive alms or any gift out of the parochial collection, are made competent witnesses by stat. 3 W. 3, c. 11, s. 12. 3 W. 3, c. 11. dred. In an action against a hundred by a party who has been robbed, Against hunthe inhabitants of the hundred may be witnesses for the defendauts, by stat. 8 G. 2, c. 16, s. 15. Before this act passed, they 8 G. 2, c. 16. were not competent, because any one of them would have been liable to pay the debt, in case of judgment against the hundred. (1) The party robbed, though clearly interested, is yet competent to prove the robbery and the extent of his less. (2) By the general rule of law, the inhabitants of a parish indicted Highways. for not repairing a highway, are not competent to give evidence for the parish. (3) But on trial of offences committed contrary to the highway act, it is provided, that any inhabitants of any parish, township, or place in which such offence shall be committed, shall not be deemed on that account an incompetent witness. (4) And by 4 G. 4, c. 95, s. 84, it is enacted, that no person shall be deemed incompetent to give evidence in any action, suit, prosecution, or other legal proceedings to be brought or had in any court of law or equity, or before any justice or justices of the peace, under any act for making or maintaining any turnpike road, or under the act of 3 G. 4, by reason of being a Trustee cf trustee or commissioner of such road, or a mortgagee or creditor, of the tolls thereof, or a farmer, lessee, or collector of such tolls, or a treasurer, or clerk, or surveyor, or other officer under such act. road. penalty. Where pecuniary penalties are directed to be applied to the Pecuniary use of the poor, or for the benefit and exoneration of the parish or other place, the inhabitants are rendered competent witnesses on the trial of the offender, by stat. 27 G. 3, c. 29, provided the 27 G. 3, c. 29. penalty, imposed by the act of parliament, does not exceed twenty (1) R. v. Carpenter, 2 Show. 47. 2 Hale, P. C. 280. R. v. Kirdford, 2 East, 561. (2) See ante, p. 70. (3) 1 Barn. & Ald. 66. 15 East, 474. But see st. 54 G. 3, c, 170, be- rates. (4) 3 G. 4, c. 126, s. 137. 54 G. 3, c.170. Rated inhab itants. pounds. (1) And by st. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 64, the evidence of any inhabitant of the place, in which offences punishable on summary conviction under that act have been committed, shall be admitted, notwithstanding any penalty or forfeiture incurred by the offence may be payable to the general rate of the place. It has been lately provided by stat. 54 G. 3, c. 170, s. 9, that no inhabitant or person, rated, or liable to be rated, to any rates or cesses of any district, parish, township, or hamlet, or wholly or in part maintained thereby, or executing or holding any office thereof or therein, shall be deemed on such account an incompetent witness, for or against such district, parish, &c., in any matter relating to such rates or cesses, or relating to the boundary between such district, parish, &c., and any adjoining district, &c., or in any matter relating to any order of removal to or from such district, or to the settlement of any pauper in such district, or touching any bastards chargeable or likely to become chargeable to such district, or touching the recovery of any sum for the charges or maintenance of such bastard, or the election or appointment of any officer, or the allowance of the accounts of any officer of any such district. (p) The words of the clause above mentioned, which provide, that no such inhabitant, as is there described, shall be deemed incompetent in any manner relating to the rates or cesses, are very general, and have received a large and liberal construction, although they are followed by other terms of a more particular and specific kind. In the late case of Meredith v. Gilpin, (2) an action of trespass against the overseers of a township, where the principal point was, whether the lands in question were vested in the overseers under a local act of parliament, the Court of Exchequer determined, that a rated inhabitant of the township was not an incompetent witness on the part of the defendants, although the lands in question, if vested in the defendants, would be vested in trust for the township and in aid of the poor-rates. The court considered the matter in issue to relate to the rates. (1) R. v. Davis, 6 T. R. 177. Before this stat. of 27 G. 3, an inhabitant, rated to the poor, would have been incompetent. Portmen v. Ökeden, Sayer, 179. (2) 6 Price, 146. See Rhodes v. Ainsworth, ante, p. 58. |