CHAP. 8.] PLACEMEN AND PENSIONERS. 289 own judgment in opposition to his patron's. There the elector's opinion is to prevail: else the representative is not a man of honour!-else, he does not fulfil the condition on which he was appointed! At the contemplation of such things common sense is confounded, and purity turns away her eyes !* Among the extraordinary doctrines which have arisen out of the impurity of political transactions, that of the "constitutional propriety of a systematic opposition" is one. To assert this is to exhibit the political disease, as he who has got the gout manifests the disorder to his visiters by his swathed and cushioned leg. You cannot frame a more preposterous proposition than that good government ought to be systematically opposed. If a government ought to be opposed, it is only because it is not good. If, being good, it is systematically opposed, there is viciousness in the opposition. In whatever way you defend an organized opposition, you assume the existence of evil. The motives in which the systematic opposition of some men is founded correspond with the pervading impurity. Although there is reason to be assured that of some the very frequent opposition to a ministry is the result of political integrity, of others it cannot be doubted that the motives are kindred to those which are intimated in the humiliating note below.t [The invective, and the ridicule, and retort, and personality which are frequently indulged within the walls of parliament, and from which much amusement appears to be derived to the members and to the public, imply, to be sure, a sufficient degree of forgetfulness of the purpose for which parliaments meet. A spectator might sometimes imagine that the object of the assembly was to witness exhibitions of intellectual gladiators, rather than to debate respecting the welfare of a great nation. Nor can it be supposed that if this welfare were sufficiently, that is to say, constantly, dominant in the recollection, there would be so much solicitude to expose individual weaknesses and absurdity, or to obtain personal triumph.] Much is said about "the exclusion of placemen and pensioners from parliament," the propriety or impropriety of which is to be determined by the same rules as the question of political influence. If influence is necessary to the existence of the present form of government, and if that influence is necessary in parliament, I see little ground to declaim against the admission of placemen. In a purer state of society they would no doubt be improper members, because then none ought to be members who have any inducement to sacrifice the interests of the public to their own. By the act of settlement indeed it was provided "That no person who has an office or place of profit under the king, or receives a pension from the crown, shall be capable of serving as member of the House of Commons." The spirit of this provision is practically superseded, though its letter so far operates that a king's counsel who receives a few pounds a year as a salary from the crown is incapable of possessing a seat. However, subsequently to the act of settlement various attempts were * Some members who have owed their seats to patronage have, I believe, had the virtue to stipulate for the freedom of their votes. Of this number it is said that the late Lord-chancellor Eldon was one. + Opposition "had received a mortal wound by the death of the late Prince of Wales, some of whose adherents had prudently sung their palinodia to the ministry, and been gratified with profitable employments; while others, setting too great a price upon their own importance kept aloof till the market was over, and were left to pine in secret over their disappointed ambition."-Smollett's England, v. iii. p. 391. T 290 CONCLUSION. [ESSAY III. made really to exclude the possessors of offices and pensions. Bill after bill actually passed the House, but the measure was rejected and again rejected by the lords. To pass such a bill in the present day, and to act upon it, would probably be tantamount to an overthrow of the constitution. It has sometimes been a subject of wonder to the writer, when reflecting upon the anxious solicitude of men for posthumous celebrity, that this single motive has not induced more vigorous attempts on the part of a minister to regulate his measures by a stricter regard to the dictates of everlasting rectitude. I have wondered, because it is manifest from experience that posterity will and does regard those dictates in its estimate of the honours of the dead. A very few years dismiss much of the false colouring which temporary interests and politics throw over a minister's conduct. It is ere long found that he obtains the largest share of posthumous celebrity who has most constantly adhered to virtue. I propose not the hope of this celebrity as a motive to the Christian; he has higher inducements: but I propose it to the man of ambition. simple love of fame would be, if he were rational with respect to his own interests, a sufficient inducement to prefer that conduct which will When we for ever recommend itself to the approbation of mankind. shall see the statesman who has, in private and in public, but one standard of rectitude, and that one the standard which is proposed in the gospel; the statesman who is convinced, and acts upon the conviction, that every thing is wrong in the minister which would be wrong in the man; we shall see a statesman whom probably the clamour of to-day will call a fool or a traitor, but whom good men now, and all men hereafter, will regard as having attained almost to the pinnacle of virtue and honour,and whom God will receive with the sentence of Well done. The In concluding these brief disquisitions upon the British government, I would be allowed to state the conviction, and to urge it upon those who complain of its defects in theory or in practice, that there is nothing in that theory or in that practice which warrants the attempt at amendment by any species of violence. I say this, even if I did not think, as I do, that violence is unlawful upon other grounds. There are no evils which make violence politically expedient. The right way of effecting amendments is by enlightening the national mind, by enabling the public to think justly and temperately of political affairs. If to this temperate and just judgment, any part of the practice or of the form of our government should appear clearly and unquestionably adverse to the general good, it needs not to be feared that the corresponding alteration will be made,-made by that best of all political agents, the power of deliberate public opinion. "The will of the people, when it is determined, permanent, and general, almost always at length prevails."* And if it should appear to the lover of his country, that the prevalence of this will is too long delayed, let him take comfort in the recollection that less is lost by the postponement of reformation, than would be lost in the struggle consequent upon intemperate measures. CHAP. 9.] MORAL LEGISLATION. 291 CHAPTER IX. MORAL LEGISLATION. Ir a person who considered the general objects of the institution of civil government were to look over the titles of the acts of a legislature during fifteen or twenty years, he would probably be surprised to find the proportion so small of those of which it was the express object to benefit the moral character of the people. He would find many laws that respected foreign policy, many perhaps that referred to internal political economy, many for the punishment of crime, but few that tended positively to promote the general happiness by increasing the general virtue. This, I say, may be a reasonable subject of surprise, when it is considered that the attainment of this happiness is the original and proper object of all government. There is a general want of advertence to this object, arising, in part, perhaps, from the insufficient degree of conviction that virtue is the best promoter of the general weal. To prevent an evil is always better than to repair it: for which reason, if it be in the power of the legislator to diminish temptation or its influence, he will find that this is the most efficacious means of diminishing the offences and of increasing the happiness of a people. He who vigilantly detects and punishes vicious men does well; but he who prevents them from becoming vicious does better. It is better both for a sufferer, for a culprit, and for the community, that a man's purse should remain in his pocket, than that, when it is taken away, the thief should be sure of a prison. So far as is practicable, a government ought to be to a people what a judicious parent is to a family,-not merely the ruler, but the instructer and the guide. It is not perhaps so much in the power of a government to form the character of a people to virtue or to vice, as it is in the power of a parent to form that of his children. But much can be done if every thing cannot be and, indeed, when we take into account the relative duration of the political body, as compared with that of a family, we may have reason to doubt whether governments cannot effect as much in ages as parents can do in years.-Now, a judicious father adopts a system of moral culture as well as of restraint: he does not merely lop the vagrant branches of his intellectual plant, but he trains and directs them in their proper course. The second object is to punish vice,-the first to promote virtue. You may punish vice without securing virtue; but if you secure virtue, the whole work is done. Yet this primary object of moral legislation is that to which, comparatively, little attention is paid. Penalties are multiplied upon the doers of evil, but little endeavour is used to prevent the commission of evil by inducing principles and habits which overpower the tendency to the commission. In this respect, we begin to legislate at the secondary part of our office, rather than at the first. We are political surgeons who cut out the tumours in the state, rather than the prescribers of that whole 292 EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE. [ESSAY III. some regimen by which the diseases in the political body are prevented. But here arises a difficulty:-How shall that political parent teach virtue which is not virtuous itself? The governments of most nations, however they may inculcate virtue in their enactments, preach it very imperfectly by their example. What then is to be done? "Make the tree good." The first step in moral legislation is to rectify the legislator. It holds of nations as of men, that the beam should be first removed out of our own eye. Laws, in their insulated character, will be but partially effectual, while the practical example of a government is bad. To this consideration sufficient attention is not ordinarily paid. We do not adequately estimate the influence of a government's example upon the public character. Government is an object to which we look up as to our superior; and the many interests which prompt men to assimilate themselves to the character of the government, added to the natural tendency of subordinate parts to copy the example of the superior, occasions the character of a government, independently of its particular measures, to be of immense influence upon the general virtue. Illustrations abound. If, in any instance, political subserviency is found to be a more efficient recommendation than integrity of character, it is easy to perceive that subserviency is practically inculcated, and that integrity is practically discouraged. Among that portion, then, of a legislator's office which consists in endeavouring the moral amelioration of a people, the amendment of political institutions is conspicuous. In proportion to the greatness of the influence of governments is the obligation to direct that influence in favour of virtue. A government of which the principles and practice were accordant with rectitude would very powerfully affect the general morals. He, therefore, who explodes one vicious principle, or who amends one corrupt practice, is to be regarded as among the most useful and honourable of public men. If, however, in any state there are difficulties, at present insurmountable, in the way of improving political institutions, still let us do what we can. Precept without example may do some good: nor are we to forget, that if the public virtue is increased, by whatever means, it will react upon the governing power. A good people will not long tolerate a bad government. Among the most obvious means of rectifying the general morals by positive measures, one is the encouraging a judicious education of the people. Upon this judiciousness almost all its success depends. The great danger in undertaking a national system of education is that some peculiar notions will be instilled for political purposes, and that it will be converted into a source of patronage. In a word, the great danger is, that national education should become, like national churches, an ally of the state; and if this is done, the system will inevitably become, if not corrupt, lamentably alloyed with corruption. It does not seem as if the people of this country would countenance any endeavour to institute an education like this, because an attempt has been made, and the public voice was lifted successfully against it. A government, if it would rightly provide for the education of the community, must forget the peculiarities of creeds, political or religious. It must regard itself, not as the head of a party, but as the parent of the people. We know that schools exist which impart an important and valuable CHAP. 9.] THE BIBLE SOCIETY. 293 education to the poor, and to which men of all principles and all creeds are willing to subscribe. Here is effected much good with little or no evil. The great defect is in the limited extent of the good. The public cannot, or do not, give enough of their money to provide education for all. Is there then any sufficient reason why a government should not supply the deficiency; or why it should not undertake the whole, and leave private bounty to flow in other channels? The great difficulty is to provide for the purity of the employment of the funds for this employment may be made an ally of the petty politics of a town, as the whole institution may be made an ally of the state. However, as the annual grants to almost all such institutions would be small, it might perhaps escape that universal bane. One thing would be indispensable,-to provide that the authority by which appointments to masterships, &c. are made should be studiously constituted with a view to the exclusion of every motive but the single object of the institution. Whether it is possible to exclude improper motives may be doubted; but it is perhaps as possible to exclude them from those as from the many institutions which the public money now supports. There is one way indeed in which education may be promoted with little danger of this petty corruption, by the purchase of land and erection of school-houses. This, together with the supply of books and the like, forms a principal item in the expense of these schools; and it might be hoped that if the government did this, the public would do the remainder. But you say, all this will add to the national burdens. We need not be very jealous on this head, while we are so little jealous of more money worse spent. Is it known, or is it considered, that the expense of an ordinary campaign would endow a school in every parish in England and Ireland for ever? Yet how coolly (who will contradict me if I say, how needlessly?) we devote money to conduct a campaign!-Prevent, by a just and conciliating policy, one single war, and the money thus saved would provide, perpetually, a competent mental and moral education for every individual who needs it in the three kingdoms. Let a man for a moment indulge his imagination,-let him rather indulge his reason, in supposing that one of our wars during the last century had been avoided, and that, fifty years ago, such an education had been provided. Of what comparative importance is the war to us now? In the one case, the money has provided the historian with materials to fill his pages with armaments, and victories, and defeats; it has enabled us To point a moral or adorn a tale : —in the other, it would have effected, and would be now effecting, and would be destined for ages to effect, a great amount of solid good; a great increase of the virtue, the order, and the happiness of the people. I suppose that the British and Foreign Bible Society, during the twenty or thirty years that it has existed, has done more direct good in the world, --has had a greater effect in meliorating the condition of the human species, than all the measures which have been directed to the same ends of all the prime ministers in Europe during a century. But suppose much less than this,-suppose it has done more good than the moral measures of any one court, and will not this single and simple fact prove that much more is in the power of the legislator than he is accustomed to think; and prove, too, that there is an unhappy want of advertence among the conductors of governments, to some of the most interesting |