near Villa-franca. They were already in motion, and, by a singular coincidence, at a moment that the French were deploying from their tete du pont, the Austrians effected their passage to Borghetto. A sharp but indecisive action took place on the plains of Roverbella, and the loss of both armies was considerable. The French claimed the victory, but it is clear that the Austrians maintained their ground; and although the former professed to have recovered the line of the Mincio, we soon after find Bellegarde in undisturbed possession of both banks of the river. Besides the action of Roverbella, several bloody skirmishes took place between the contending armies. The Neapolitans began to appear on the field. A skirmish took place betwixt Murat's troops and the French-Italians of Beauharnois near Reggio, to the disadvantage of the latter, and shortly afterwards, in a succession of actions, the Neapolitans forced the passage of the Taro, and advanced upon Placentia. But these conflicts were of little consequence, and only served to swell the general sum of slaughter, without producing any material effect on the affairs of Europe. It is enough to say, that Beauharnois, driven back upon the line of the Adige, was in a very critical position when he received news of the Treaty of Paris. It is to the credit of this general, that, although personally more deeply affected by the downfall of Buonaparte than almost any one else, he did not, like other French officers in a similar situation, attempt to gratify his spleen by an useless continuation of hostilities. By a military convention, entered into between him and General Bellegarde, the French troops under the command of Eugene Beauharnois were to be sent back to the kingdom of France, and the fortresses of Osopo, Palma-nova, Venice, and Legnago, were to be delivered up to the Austrians. The Italian troops

of Beauharnois changed masters, like their country, and were withdrawn to supply the Austrian garrisons in Germany. This convention closed hostilities in Italy.

The English forces had not been inactive in aiding the emancipation of Italy. An attempt had been made to surprise Leghorn so early as the middle of December, 1813, Dec. 13. by a body of the Italian levy, as it was called, and of English marines, disembarked from on board the Edinburgh ship of war. They obtained possession of the suburbs, and repelled with loss a sally of the garrison. But the fortifications being found too strong for a coup-de-main, the troops were re-embarked. Leghorn fell into possession of Murat on his advance to the north of Italy, and soon afterwards an English fleet landed in that city an army of eight thousand men, commanded by Lord William Bentinck. Learning that Genoa was occupied by a garrison of only two thousand men, the English general formed the plan of possessing himself of that important city, with its harbour and fortresses. Having occupied April 6. Spezzia as a point of retreat, if necessary, he moved rapidly for ward, although he had learned that, in the interim, the garrison of Genoa was augmented to five or six thousand men. Lord William Bentinck manœuvred with such success that he drove all their advanced posts before him out of the strong country around Sestri, Mount-Fascia, and Nervi, and pushed the enemy under the walls of Genoa, where they took up a formidable position. With a April 17. motley army, composed of Greeks, Calabrians, Italian insurgents, and Croats, mingled with English, Lord William Bentinck succeeded in carrying the strong forts of Richlieu and Tecla, which covered the enemy's left wing, while General Montresor's

division, after hard fighting, in an intersected and difficult country, surmounted the resistance of their right, and drove them into Genoa in confusion. The French commandant shewed less obstinacy, and more sympathy for the inhabitants of Genoa, than might have been anticipated; and Lord William Bentinck, still more anxious to save the city from the horrors of a bombardment, entered into a capitulation, by which the French were al lowed to evacuate the town. This important acquisition was made with very inconsiderable loss on the part of the British.

The final destiny of Genoa seems not to have been determined when the English general took possession of the city. In a proclamation by Lord William Bentinck, he held out to the Genoese a prospect of the restoration of their former independent government, with its ancient rights and privileges. Accordingly, it was for some time governed by a provisional administration upon these principles. We have nc doubt his Lordship thought, that in doing so he spoke the intentions of his government. Indeed, in a dispatch from Lord Castlereagh to Colonel Dalrymple, he expresses his regret that the separate existence of Genoa could not be preserved, while he informs him of the resolution of the allies, that Genoa should make part of the dominions of the King of Sardinia, as the best way of providing for the tranquillity of that city. This change of intention has been urged as a breach of faith on the part of England; but it must be observed, that the promise of Lord William Bentinck, being gratuitous, and altogether unmerited by any exertion which the Genoese had made, either to free themselves or to assist the British, cannot in any sense be strained beyond an annunciation by the British general of what he believed to be the purpose of the allies towards Genoa. He was not empowered, nor did

he pretend, to bind these powers to such a line of conduct, nor were the Genoese called upon to do any thing in consequence of this flattering prospect, in order, by a fulfilment of the contract on their part, to tie down the British nation to a guarantee of their independence. Genoa was simply occupied as a military station after an action, in which her citizens were passive, and by a convention to which they were no party. Whatever their disappointment might be, the proclamation of Lord William Bentinck cannot be wrested farther than as extending a hope which circumstances did not admit to be fulfilled. The question, therefore, concerning the fu ture destination of Genoa remains open to be determined on its own merits.

The restoration of an independence which she is now unable to maintain, would have been a gift now of little consequence to this once famous republic. Genoa's age of commerce and splendour had long passed away,-her golden book, once so famous, had been reduced to ashes by the hand of foreigners, her merchants were no longer among the mighty of the earth,-and to give her independence without power to maintain it, was laying her at the mercy of the first belligerent power who chose to violate her neutrality. While we reprobate and deplore the destroying, or dismembering such states, as, from their size and strength, are capable of making integral parts of the commonwealth of Europe, we would deprecate, on the other hand, the restoration of the numerous petty sovereignties, both in Germany and Italy, which, under the semblance of independence, must always be the passive tools of their nearest or most powerful neighbour. It were another question, whether the Congress ought to bereave, even of that semblance of freedom, any state, however small, whom they shall find vested with it. But in the case of Genoa, Venice, and other ancient govern

ments of Italy, the overwhelming tide of revolution has long since merged them with other states; and, after so many changes, they retain as little sense of their original independence, as their ancient coin, after many years currency, presents marks of the emblems of sovereignty with which it was impressed during their splendour. The other powers of Europe, therefore, are in no shape obliged to restore to such states a nominal, or, at best, a precarious independence, when it is evident that their consolidation with some more powerful neighbour may contribute to mutual defence and mutual happiness. We, therefore, approve of the policy which has eventually adjudged Genoa to Savoy, as it united Geneva with Switzerland. It furnishes the King of Sardinia with a noble harbour, extends his dominions to the sea, and closes on all hands the road by which the French may again propose to invade Italy, of which, by force, or influence, they would have always be. come masters had Genoa retained a separate sovereignty. The Austrian troops, shortly after the capture of Genoa, and the general pacification, evacuated Turin, and the other districts of the kingdom of Savoy, so that his re-establishment in his ancient kingdom must be considered as completed.

But if Austria resigned the provinces adjacent to the Alps, it was with the view of reserving to herself a rich indemnification in another quarter. A proclamation of Field-Marshal Bellegarde announced to the Italians, that Lombardy, Mantua, Brescia, Bergamo, and Cremona, were definitively united to the Austrian empire. Parma, Guastalla, Placentia, nominally governed at present by the Archduchess Maria Louisa, must be reckoned possessions of Austria, and Florence is nearly in the same situation. This was but a small part of the acquisitions of Austria. She has reco

vered the mountains of the Tyrol and Voralberg, with their high-spirited, warlike, and invaluable population. She has regained Venice, Carniola, all the sacrifices which had been rent from her in Carinthia, and Istria, and the whole tract of Dalmatia, with the Adriatic islands. She is mistress of the sea-coast of the Adriatic from the mouth of the Po to that of the Cattaro, a tract inestimable for the commerce of the Mediterranean. In a word, her power is immense, and would be formidable to the liberties of Europe, were it not qualified by the slowness, hesitation, and, to speak truly, by the unambitious moderation which has hitherto characterized her councils, United with Prussia, with whom she has no longer jarring interests, Austria must be regarded as the natural counterpoise to the more enterprizing power of Russia, and we cannot, therefore censure the policy which has augmented her power and revenues. We trust, however, that, taking warning by the spirit of the times, a more mild and beneficent spirit will mark her Italian government in future, and that the cities of these annexed states will not be considered as mere garrisontowns, or subjected to commandants who know no law but that of arms. The humiliation of being the subjects of strangers, whom they account inferior to them both in talents and taste, is sufficiently galling to the Italians, even if that power should not be exercised capriciously, or with rigour. The north of Italy is by far too good a country to suffer under such harsh and iron government, and if its rulers refuse to do justice to the inhabitants, they will one day do justice to themselves.

Murat, aware of these discontents, and not feeling sufficiently the disadvantages of his own situation, appears early to have entertained hope of one day uniting the various states of Italy into one kingdom. This is evident from

the singular tone of his proclamations as he marched to the northJan. 17. ward. In one of them he announced, that he had surrendered three islands in the Bay of Naples, and his whole fleet, but that he was to receive an ample compensation, and that he was to take posses sion of the south of Italy as far as the right bank of the Po. The phrase was studiously obscure, but the most obvious sense impled, that he was to take possession of them in sovereign. ty. Such were his expectations in consequence of the aid which he rendered to Austria, They were as vain as those of Esop's crane, who, demanding a reward for having pull. ed a bone out of the fox's throat, wag answered by the patient, she might be thankful he had not bit her head off. The allies, in like manner, seem to have thought the suffering Murat to remain sovereign of Naples, was a sufficient reward for his exertions, nor does it appear that they ever encouraged him to expect much more. He was, therefore, compelled to disgorge his easy conquests, and Rome, in particular, was soon delivered up to the

pope.

No part of Buonaparte's violence had more injured his cause through the catholic countries of Europe, than his wanton and injurious treatment of Pius, an aged and venerable priest, the sovereign pontiff of the religion which he himself for the present pro. fessed. The steadiness with which the pope sustained both insult and imprisonment had raised him high in the eyes of Europe. The provisional government of France, almost immediately upon their apApril 2. pointment, took the merit of decreeing the liberation of his holiness, and appointed him to be conveyed with due honours to his own territory. When the pontiff reached the outposts of Murat's army,

he was received with great reverence, and escorted to Rome, where his entry was the signal for general rejoicing.

While we do just honour to the firmness with which the pontiff supported adversity, and risked the uttermost of Buonaparte's wrath, rather than comply with demands which he regarded as unjust and sacrilegious, we regret that his conduct, since his restoration, does not appear to have been marked by a sense of the present state of Europe, or the lights which general education have afforded to its inhabitants. The reverse of wrong is not always right, and though we can pardon the attachment of an old man and a priest to forms and observances rendered yet more dear by their contrast with the disregard paid to religion by the atheists of France, we deeply regret that the government of the church of Rome had not, at this period, been in the hands of a man of bolder and more liberal spirit, who might have ventured to get rid of a part, at least, of her superstitious formalities, and bring her rites and doctrines more near to a level with these enlightened times. The pope's first ordinances, however, were of an unexceptionable and moderate tendency; for, while he took measures for reclaiming the allegiance of those Italians who had submitted to Buonaparte, and resuming the domains of the papal see, which had been alienated during the French usurpation, he qualified those necessary and just measures, by prohibiting all enquiry into the conduct of individuals during these troublesome times, when assailed by temptations arising out of cir cumstances so uncommon as those which have lately convulsed Europe. But when the pope began to re-establish every usage and rite, however ridiculous and trivial, which had the sanction of antiquity, wise men jud. ged him more likely to hurt than te