The British and German Naval Situstion in 1910

II.-THE NAVAL QUESTION

Canadian politics and the Naval question in Parliament were so closely associated with the general situation in Great Britain that some consideration must be given to the latter subject here. The proposed construction of a Canadian Naval force arose primarily out of the German war menace or alleged menace of 1909; the Opposition policy of a direct contribution to the Royal Navy was based upon the assumption that a real crisis existed in the relations of Britain and Germany; the subsidiary controversy in Quebec turned largely upon how such a situation—if it existed -would affect Canada.

As officially stated (Oct. 14, 1910) the net naval expenditure of Great Britain in 1906-7 was £31,472,087, in 1909-10 the estimated total was £35,851,800 and in 1910-11 £40,603,700. Meanwhile that of France and Italy slightly increased by two or three millions each and that of Russia very slightly; that of Japan had risen from £3,952,311 to £7,202,823 in 1909-10 and a similar figure in 1910-11; that of Germany had increased from £12,005,871, in 1906-7 to £19,538,188 in 1909-10. The estimate for 1910-11 was £21,662,000 and, according to the press at the close of the year, this total would be increased to £23,000,000 in 1911-12. The British Naval estimates of £40,000,000 in 1910-11 included £13,279,830 for new construction (exclusive of the Australian and New Zealand contributions) and the Conservative Standard of Mch. 14th stated that this provision for ship-building was insufficient while there was still no adequate protection for trade routes and no provision for restoring dismantled Naval stations abroad. The tonnage of the British Navy, according to Mr. McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty (Aug. 8, 1910) was 2,046,126 and that of Germany 544,073. Prior to this, on Jan. 13, Dr. Macnamara, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, stated at Hastings that:

In Dreadnaughts we have at present seven against Germany's two and in addition three more are rapidly approaching completion. In April, 1912, the so-called point of danger, we should have twenty Dreadnaughts to Germany's thirteen. At the same date we should have forty pre-Dreadnaught battleships under twenty years of age, with an aggregate displacement of 585,000 tons, mounting 656 guns, from 6-inch to 12-inch, including 152 12-inch guns. At the same date Germany would have twenty pre-Dreadnaughts, under twenty years of age, with an aggregate displacement of 241,000 tons and mounting 384 guns from 5-inch to 11-inch.

In the matter of cruisers, and leaving out the Invincibles which I have counted with the Dreadnaughts, we should have in April, 1912, 35 cruisers of an aggregate displacement of 416,000 tons and mounting 470 guns of from 6-inch to 9.2-inch, while Germany would have eight cruisers, with an aggregate displacement of 78,542 tons and 112 guns of 5.9 inch to 9.4 inch. Of docks big enough to take Dreadnaughts we have to-day twelve in home waters against Germany's six.

Lord Brassey's 1910 Navy Annual gave the modern British battleships completed as 32 and those building as 7, while Germany had 17 completed and 11 building; in Dreadnaughts Britain would have 39 at the end of 1912 and Germany 25. According to a careful writer in the London Graphic the British sailors on active service ratings numbered 131,000 and those of Germany 53,000, while the Reserves showed 58,000 British sailors of 12 years service and Germany with 110,000 of 3 years service. On Aug. 6th the greatest battleship-cruiser in the world, The Lion, was launched at Devonport-the fifteenth British Dreadnaught. The British fleet in the Naval manoeuvres of July included 350 warships of all kinds which had cost £113,000,000 and upon which 17,000 men were engaged. Through the fact of this great force being drawn together from other stations and weakening British naval strength in the Mediterranean and Pacific, Admiral A. T. Mahan, the eminent United States naval expert, drew conclusions unfavourable to the maintenance of British supremacy unless the British democracy woke to the real menace of Germany and to the vital import of its own naval protection. "This is the fundamental condition which the British democracy of to-day have to recognize as regards their national security, upon which their economic future their food, clothing, and housing depends; that they stand face to face with a nation one-fourth more numerous than themselves, and one more highly organized for the sustainment by force of a national policy. It is so because it has a Government more efficient in the ordering of national life, in that it can be, and is, more consecutive in purpose than one balanced unsteadily upon the shoulders of a shifting popular majority." A collateral view of the situation to this was given by the London Times (Jan. 13) as follows:

The plain truth is, that Germany, quite fairly and rightly from her standpoint, stole a march upon us in the matter of construction. All our efforts will be needed to regain and retain that lead which is so essential to us. Otherwise, without firing a shot, without breaking that peace which it is her boast to have preserved, Germany will impose her will upon the British Empire as effectively as she has imposed it again and again since 1870 upon Continental powers. There would be no need of war, or even of an overt menace of war, to achieve this end. We should have to choose between surrender or war.

The strongest warning note of the year-the most "alarmist " indication of the time as many politicians termed it was the appeal by the Imperial Maritime League, backed up by the sig

natures of nearly 500 prominent army and navy officers, for the expenditure of £100,000,000 upon the Navy to be raised by a special national Defence Loan. Lord Charles Beresford earnestly endorsed this call. "I venture," he wrote to the Prime Minister on Sept. 27th," to affirm with such assurance as 50 years of public service may lend to my words that the position of affairs with regard to the Naval defence of the Empire will, three years hence, be fraught with a danger whose gravity I believe it to be difficult to exaggerate." In order that British Naval strength should in 1913-14 be equal to possible demands he considered the laying down in 1911 of 12 Dreadnaughts essential instead of the 5 decided upon. Under existing arrangements and plans he stated that the number of British Dreadnaughts in 1913 would be 25 and those of Germany 21 while Austria and Italy-in alliance with Germanywould have four each. "It is," he added in reference to the Australian ships which were being built, "impossible to include in any practical estimate of Naval force ships which are not under the direct control of the Admiralty." He went on to point out that any existing superiority in heavy ships was neutralized by lack of men, of cruisers, of stores, of docks, of torpedo boats-in all of which the German navy was admirably equipped. As to the existing crisis he was emphatic:

I would here observe that the strength of a fleet can only be rightly measured by the work it is designed to perform. A part of the duty of the British Government is to provide a sufficient naval force to maintain supremacy in home-waters over one foreign Power. Within three years it will hardly be possible to even fulfil that one duty. It is my intention to most earnestly appeal to my countrymen to remember, ere it be too late, that Great Britain is charged with the duties of guarding British interests in Canada, in South Africa, in Australasia, in Egypt, in India and in the Far East, and I shall ask them to insist that those responsibilities be once more adequately discharged. It is essential that a powerful fleet be maintained in the Mediterranean and that a strong Squadron be stationed in the Far East. By 1913-14 two members of the Triple Alliance will together be able to place eight Dreadnaughts in the Mediterranean. At present we have in the Mediterranean six inferior battleships which are unfit to encounter modern heavy ships. It will be the duty of the British Government three years hence to station at least eight Dreadnaughts in the Mediterranean. Under existing arrangements the force of Dreadnaughts in home waters would, therefore, be decreased to 17. We should then have four fewer in home waters than the number owned by Germany. It has also to be remembered that circumstances may arise which will require the despatch of a battleship squadron to the China station. Confronted by these plain considerations how is it possible for any intelligent person to deny the urgency of the present need?

To the London Standard on Oct. 21st Lord Charles wrote declaring that a ship-building programme which would properly enforce British policy, protect British interests, guard British and Colonial trade routes or territory, would involve (1) an immediate constructive programme of 7 battleships, 31 second-class cruisers, 32 destroyers, two floating docks and 4 floating coal depots; (2) replac

ing of dismantled repairing stations abroad, replacing of depleted stores and the increasing of coal reserves by 160,000 tons; (3) the provision next year of 5,000 new men and of 11,000 men every year for six years. He pointed out that in British merchant ships there were at all times and now unguarded, $900,000,000 worth of goods; that British ships in a year carried nearly $6,000,000,000 worth of freight; that in the event of war privateers would be everywhere and the rates of insurance would rise as well as the prices of raw material and of the necessaries of life, in strict proportion to the naval security afforded.

Meanwhile what of Germany? Docks and fortifications on the North Sea were being steadily improved and enlarged and Wilhelmshaven, with its immense dry-docks, was credited with being able in 1911 to take 25,000-ton ships while Emden, Bremerhaven, Brunsbuttel, Cuxhaven, bristled with every kind of new and modern gun with, also, wonderful systems of submarine mines and electric torpedo stations. The Army charges had risen to $250,000,000 and the trained soldiers available at the beginning of 1910 were 4,000,000 with 6,000 field guns. Colonel Gaedke, the German Naval expert, stated on Feb. 24 that the German Government was actually building a fleet of 58 battleships; that " the time is gradually approaching when the German fleet will be superior to all the fleets of the world, with the single exception of the English fleet"; that in the past 12 years Germany had spent on new ships alone £63,200,000 or $316,000,000 and that between now and 1914 she would spend £57,500,000 more or $287,500,000. On Aug. 5th three leading German papers the Vossische Zeitung, the Tagliche Rundschau, the Deutsche Tagerseitung-agreed in declaring that Germany could never accept an arrangement with England as to a limitation of naval armaments, because such an agreement would be incompatible with German dignity and vital interests. On the other hand the Berliner Tageblatt, the Morgenpost, the Neue Freie Presse, and the Socialist organ Vorwarts, favoured some limitation in this respect or criticised the German Government for its stiff policy toward England's proposals.

The annual Report of the German Navy League in April showed a total of 1,031,339 members as against an estimated membership in Britain's League of 20,000. Professor T. Schierman of the University of Berlin, in the New York McClure's Magazine for May clearly stated that Germany would not submit in future to British naval supremacy or to any limitation of armaments. "The claim that one Nation must be the Sovereign Mistress of the. Seas can no longer be defended. The motto of the future runs: The sea is free, free as the air whose highways are equally not to be barred. Equally indefensible is the pretension of one nation to forbid another to decide for itself how strongly it must be armed in order to assure it peace." By the close of the year Germany had far more airships available for offensive operations than any

other nation. In the April manoeuvres large Army airships took part, a special battalion of 1,000 trained officers, engineers, and men was organized during the year and a fleet of at least 14 effective and superior airships was ready for immediate action while still more powerful types were being rapidly constructed. On the other hand Vickers Sons and Maxim were making for the British army the largest airship in the world, a National Aerial League had been organized in London with much support, and the British Admiralty had appointed an expert Committee to supervise further development. British guns of 13:5 inch size (the largest yet in use) were placed on a new battleship in the summer with the prompt comment by the Nachrichten, Berlin, that Krupps had for two years been studying a still larger (14-inch) gun. In September it was announced from Berlin that a new warship was under construction driven by a motor, carrying bigger guns than a Dreadnaught, with 27 knots speed and invulnerable to airships. Toward the close of the year the Persian situation developed a crisis owing to German intervention and readily illustrated the ease with which war might at any time come between the rival Powers. "Once more," declared the Reichsbote, "the peace of Europe hangs by a hair." The Tageblatt announced, on Oct. 28th, that under a new Government Bill three more warships of the most formidable type would be laid down three years earlier than provided by the Naval Act of 1900.

While all this was going on Canada was discussing the situ ation very largely from a party point of view. The Liberals took the British Liberal view that the crisis of 1909 was over and that a comfortable margin of superiority in ships now lay with Britain; the Conservatives took the side of the so-called Alarmist school and re capitulated the speeches of Roberts, Rosebery, Beresford, Milner, &c., with earnestness, as proving an emergency which required an immediate money contribution from Canada to the Admiralty as well as, or in place of, the establishment of a Canadian Navy. Sir Wilfrid Laurier speaking in Toronto on Jan. 5th said: "In 1912 while Britain would have much over 2,000,000 tons displacement, Germany would have a displacement of 1,000,000 tons. The disparity was so great that there could not be an imminent danger from Germany. All the countries of Europe were preparing for war, but he could not believe that they were arming against any one in particular. He did not know what was at the back of the head of the German Emperor, but he doubted if he intended an attack upon the Royal family from which he himself was sprung. He knew something of the German people and he knew that they had no quarrel with England. When Napoleon had over-run Europe, England and Germany had fought together to overthrow him, and he could not believe that that was forgotten by the German people. If Britain were in danger there would be a wave all over Canada which no Government could