though they would not believe Him, believed that it was possible for a person to exhibit such power in attestation of such claims, and yet not be from God. At all events an excessive readiness to believe is a fault, of which the greatness is proportionable to such excess. Say that I am placed in a position to act, and I assume what is not proved by satisfactory evidence, here is clearly a violation of our primary notions of propriety. I practically assert to be true, that which may or may not be so. I cannot now, as before, plead the intimation conveyed by the Lawgiver to the subject: for, by supposition, the evidence is not sufficient to constitute such an intimation. I have not, it may be, distinguished between suspicion and proof. I have therefore virtually made myself answerable, as professing to know what I do not know. But say that I believe and act, not only without but against evidence. Here my conduct is still more reprehensible. For I in effect make myself responsible as knowing that to be true, which there is evidence to teach me is not true. Such considerations bear upon what has recently been the subject of our thoughts, and tend to shew how reprehensible we may sometimes be in placing confidence in men altogether unworthy. We cannot too seri H ously reflect, that because the traitor may deserve higher condemnation, that is no reason why a high condemnation should not fall upon the betrayed. CHAPTER VI. ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS. In illustrating our notions of the law of highly probable evidence, we have taken particular instances of the confidence which man reposes in his fellow-creatures, and have thence ascended to the consideration of the general principle of trust. But we may proceed still further, and assert that there is a multitude of general principles, stored up in men's minds, to be used as occasion requires, which exemplify the operation of the laws of moral evidence. The necessity of men's condition, even their very weakness, forces them to adopt general rules, by which to direct their conduct.* Accordingly it is assuredly the intention of the Creator, who imposed the neces That * This wisdom we may learn from the fable: "A fox (it is said) in traversing the forest, observed a boar whetting his tusks against a tree. 'Why make these martial preparations,' cried the fox, 'since there is no enemy near ?' may be,' replied the boar, but you ought to know that we should scour up our arms while we have leisure. In time of danger we shall have something else to do."" sity that they should do so. Whatever may be the practice of our legislature or courts, observe how wise is the theory at all events of our constitution in this matter. Certain laws are the laws of England, according to which the criminal justice of the country must be administered. Nevertheless it is impossible for those who enact statutes, to foresee all the particular cases that may occur. Nor could the legislature on these occasions interpose its special authority. Such is the weakness, the limited nature and faculties of man. Accordingly much discretionary power is supposed to be entrusted to those who administer the law. A court of justice has two main duties to perform: (1) to determine the question of guilt or innocence; (2) to punish the guilty. Now in order to ascertain the truth of facts, certain great principles are laid down by the legislature. Thus, for instance, though in general testimony is not received save on oath, still the declaration of a man, who in making it knew that he was at the point of death, is admissible: because the solemnity of the circumstances is conceived to have made as strong an impression upon his mind as an oath. Again, the testimony of a convicted felon is of no weight, unless corroborated. Nevertheless, though various rules for guidance are thus established, the jury must ultimately determine the question of guilt according to the whole of the evidence adduced in a particular case. But again, in regard to the conduct proper to be adopted after guilt is proved, certain general maxims are established, and the law in some measure determines the punishment to be assigned. Still much latitude is left to the judge. In cases of manslaughter, which seem to admit almost all shades of guilt, from justifiable homicide up to wilful murder, all sorts of punishments, short of death, are in the power of the judge. Again, it may appear in evidence that one man is urged by hunger to commit a theft: another has no such mitigating plea. The variety of palliating or aggravating circumstances may be endless. Accordingly it is intended that the general rules should be susceptible of modification, so that, if possible, what is perfectly reasonable may be done on each special occasion. If this is accomplished, we have a specimen of the just appreciation of man's position, and indeed, what mainly concerns us, an example for the imitation of each particular person in training and disciplining his own mind. The necessity of general principles is admitted: and the duty rests with the legislature to make such laws as may be consistent with perfect reason. On particular occasions care |