CHAPTER V.

FURTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF OUR PRINCIPLES.

HAVING thus considered a possible objection, let us revert to our original principle; i.e. in cases involving conduct obedience to the law of highly probable evidence is right, and ordinarily leads to truth.

It may be well to obtain further illustration on the subject.

To this end let us take into consideration the question of confidence between man and man.

I am ill (suppose), and ignorant of the remedies by which my disorder may be removed. I have access to a physician, of whose skill much has been told me by persons, on whom reliance can be placed as competent and honest judges: and I am therefore led to consult this physician. Consider now the position. In the first place, if what has been said above* be true, my judgment is marked with a seal of authority.

* See p. 73.

In consequence of my need of a physician, I am authorized, nay compelled to judge. When we eat and drink to preserve our lives, we fulfil the intentions of the Creator, and are so said to act to the glory of God,* who is glorified when His purposes are carried out in like manner, do we not also honour God, when we take means to avail ourselves of medicines, which He has ordained as a remedy for diseases? But again, in regard to the physician, I proceed upon evidence. His reputation proves his skill: not indeed in the manner of mathematical demonstration: still sufficiently. It is my duty therefore to confide in him, to take the medicines he prescribes, to obey the restrictions he imposes. I am justified in my belief, that he knows what is good, as well as what is bad for my complaint. His power over me continues as long as my need of a physician and my confidence in him remain. It is true that this trust, as indeed all trust in man, is of a limited and restricted kind. If he is discovered (a supposition however most improbable), nevertheless if he is discovered in attempting something monstrous, if he tries unjustifiable experiments on my constitution, or exhibits some extraordinary and manifest incapacity

in judgment, my confidence is shaken or destroyed. Say, if you please, generally, that in the progress of our intercourse, stronger evidence is at any time given for the withdrawal of confidence, than has originally been afforded for reposing it: why then, no doubt, I must obey the more weighty and later evidence, as containing a new indication of the intentions of the Lawgiver to whom I am answerable. Nevertheless my former trust has been right, no less than my latter withdrawal. In either case I have acted agreeably to the law to which I am subject, that of receiving highly probable evidence in cases where I am authorized to judge.

In the supposition that has been made above, we have taken into account an exception to a general rule. It is manifest that the pressure of difficulties is removed, if we reflect that the events of things are in the hands of a wise, powerful, just, and benevolent God, who overrules all things for the ultimate good of those who trust in Him.

For further illustration of the question of confidence between man and man, take the case of a comparatively ignorant and illiterate person, brought up (let us suppose) in the doctrines of Christianity. To him probably such a book as Paley's Evidences is wholly unknown; would, if

known, be extremely difficult if not utterly unintelligible. Nevertheless he has been educated in the religion which is that of his parents and country, and is recognized and approved by all those, for whose characters he entertains respect. He attends probably to the instructions afforded by the minister of his parish, and observes that the things taught are suitable to his own sense of right and wrong, to his natural perceptions of truth, justice, benevolence. He has then a body of evidence; of which the reception of a considerable portion implies his acquiescence in the authority of others. Nevertheless in thus deferring to the conclusions of other men, he in no way surrenders or tampers with his duty of private judgment. His mind is exercised in determining, what sort of confidence (for confidence in man admits innumerable degrees), what amount of respect is due to this authority of others. On the whole, he finds that the combined effect of all his evidence put together, is such as to justify and force a belief that Revelation is true, and that his conduct must be regulated by the precepts therein delivered. Not only is the duty of private judgment incumbent upon him: but in his own case he is a judge of the very highest authority* and responsibility;

* See above p. 73.

since his conduct as a servant of God must depend upon his judgment, and since no less a question is at stake than that of his welfare, as a being destined for immortality.

It will be but a sequel to the considerations we have been pursuing, if we observe how monstrous is that dogma, by which men have dared without proof to require others to esteem them as infallible. In many relations and circumstances of life, high respect is of course due to the judgments of other men, especially, we may remark, of parents, or of those who are in loco parentis if however evidence be that which is to guide conduct, and we plead authority as our justification in any given case, we are still open to the question, Had we evidence sufficient to warrant us in receiving the authority? If we had, then of course we are justified: if not, the authority is unsatisfactory and valueless. In either case the law of evidence is a principle anterior to and stronger than the respect due to authority; and the duty of private judgment is vindicated and established. Accordingly we find that our Saviour, who really was infallible, appeals to the Jews to recognize the proofs of His authority: "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me."* So again, in

* John x. 25.