superior principles in the nature of man: because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated, but becomes unsuitable if either of those are." Throughout this treatise our inquirer, it will be recollected, having shaken off the tyranny of passion, has been engaged in considerations of his happiness and his duty.

Smith, as quoted by Stewart, observes: "The moral faculties carry with them the most evident badges of their own authority, which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions; to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites; and to judge how far each of them was to be either indulged or restrained. Our moral faculties are by no means, as some have pretended, upon a level in this respect with the other faculties and appetites of our nature, endowed with no more right to restrain these last, than these last are to restrain them. No other faculty or principle of action judges of any other. Love does not judge of resentment, nor resentment of love." As from our observation of the powers of the eye and the ear we infer that they were intended to see and to hear, so we conclude that the conscience which judges was intended to judge.

Reid even explicitly declares, "The authority of conscience over the other active principles of the mind, I do not consider as a point that requires proof by argument, but as self-evident." At all events we may consider that such authority is now fully acknowledged by our inquirer.

CHAPTER II.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE MANNER OF DEALING WITH THE INSTINCTIVE MOVING PRINCIPLES. CERTAIN TRAITS IN THEIR CHARACTER AND HABITS.

IN the Gospel of St. Matthew we read of a centurion, a man under authority, who having soldiers subject to him, was accustomed to say to this man, Go, and he went; and to another, Come, and he came; and to his servant, Do this, and he did it. The centurion therefore, comprehending the nature of government, and knowing what miracles had been performed by Christ, inferred that a power of government was in His hands; and that if He but spoke the word, his servant should be healed.* Accordingly, it is sometimes asked by those who like the centurion ascend to a consideration of the principles of government, How can any one command others who is not able to rule himself? On the other hand, if a man is able to rule others, it is pretty

* Matth. viii. 5, et seq.

clear that he possesses an aptitude for government, and it may be well hoped that he has the power of governing himself.

The mental condition then of our inquirer, and his views with regard to the discipline of the instinctive moving principles, may I think be illustrated by reflections upon the position of the master of a large household; who, taking a review of the state thereof, purposes not indeed to break up his establishment, and dismiss his servants; but to make changes in his arrangements, and to obtain an improved tone in the character of his family.

With these ideas therefore he will proceed to examine the general conduct and the claims of a number of old servants, as well as the character and pretensions of various candidates for admission into his service; and judging with just authority and superior power, will determine what course of conduct is to be pursued.

No doubt, our householder has certain main objects to accomplish; to which, in the consideration of details, his mind has a constant reference: and he judges how far it is likely that his purposes will be carried out by the capacity and zeal of each individual servant. If he has already any old retainer of a perverse and malevolent disposition, he may perhaps dismiss him; and

P

will certainly not receive any new candidate whose character is wholly opposed to the promotion of his own chief designs. It will be a matter of importance too to determine how much power shall be entrusted to every one, and of what nature shall be the responsibility; whether some shall be subordinate to others, and if so, to what degree.

The main objects then of our inquirer being such as have been previously represented, if the instinctive moving principles are to be considered as servants, they can only be so esteemed as they further these objects. If they neither promote nor hinder them, they are justly liable to be ejected as unprofitable, occupying time and place to no purpose. If they actually hinder them, they are of course still more resolutely to be expelled. They are then but as fraudulent

It may perhaps be objected to this idea of expulsion, If God has implanted instinctive moving principles, why should man eject them? But we are considering the case of one whose mind has been undisciplined, who may have indulged affections or desires fixed on improper objects, who is now sensible of his errors, and is applying a remedy.

In general, though God has made men susceptible of affection and desire, still they may fix their love on wrong objects. From such perverted love they ought of course to free themselves, though love rightly directed be right. The scriptural idea is that of crucifying bad feelings. "They

enemies, seeking an abode in the heart of him whom they mean ultimately to injure or destroy. But in regard to the lower propensities that may with propriety be allowed, and of which the general character and tendency are approved, there is still necessity for the most serious consideration. The manner in which they are to be permitted to move, the intensity and the time* of their operation, their relation of subjection or superiority to each other, are all questions of high importance. In short, since it behoves our inquirer to govern,† i. e. to check, to make the

that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts." (Gal. v. 24.)

St. James warns us, "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God.......But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed."

*If revenge follows just resentment, the revenge is nevertheless sinful. "Be ye angry and sin not: let not the sun go down upon your wrath." (Eph. iv. 26.) If a malevolent feeling is treasured up, it assumes a new character and is called by a different name:

Εἴπερ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ,

̓Αλλά γε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον.—Hom. Il. Α.

† Butler, after the example of ancient philosophers, illustrates his idea of self-government by that of civil government: "Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a natural part of our nature, but not the whole: add to these the superior faculty whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them; and take in this, its natural superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature. And as in civil government