The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical EssaysThis volume is a collection of thirteen seminal essays on ethics, free will, and the philosophy of mind. The essays deal with such central topics as freedom of the will, moral responsibility, the concept of a person, the structure of the will, the nature of action, the constitution of the self, and the theory of personal ideals. By focusing on the distinctive nature of human freedom, Professor Frankfurt is ale to explore fundamental problems of what it is to be a person and of what one should care about in life. |
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Page viii
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Page ix
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Contents
Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility | 1 |
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person II | 11 |
Coercion and moral responsibility | 26 |
Three concepts of free action | 47 |
Identification and externality | 58 |
The problem of action | 69 |
The importance of what we care about | 80 |
What we are morally responsible for | 95 |
Necessity and desire | 104 |
On bullshit | 117 |
Equality as a moral ideal | 134 |
Identification and wholeheartedness | 159 |
Rationality and the unthinkable | 177 |
Common terms and phrases
acting freely actually agent alternate possibilities Anthony Kenny atheism avoid behavior believe benefit bodily movements bull session bullshit cares causal causal theorists causally determined cerning characteristics circumstances claim coerced coercion coercive concept concerning condition conflict consciousness consider construe counterexamples decide decision difference economic egalitarianism effective egalitarianism entail essential external fact false feeling first-order desires free action free volitional needs freedom Gowran harm higher-order volition humbug identify intention Inwagen judgment kind less matter means merely moral responsibility motive nature necessarily nonetheless notion Nozick occur offer otherwise passion penalty perform the action performing an action person Peter van Inwagen prefer principle of alternate proposal question rational reason regard require respect satisfaction satisfied second-order desires second-order volitions sense simply situations of Type someone sort suppose take the drug Terence Penelhum things threat threatened tion unthinkable unwilling addict utilitarianism utility virtue volitional necessity wanton Wittgenstein