340 ADDRESS OF THE TARIFF CONVENTION. [NOVEMBER eign industry, under any possible necessity to exercise it than upon a similar power to encourage and protect our own. We think we have said enough to indicate the pernicious tendencies of the doctrine, sustained by many eminent citizens of our land, which inscribes the right to protect domestic manufactures, solely to the revenue power conferred by the constitution upon Congress; and have demonstrated that this error, if adopted, must lead the public functionaries into practical embarrassments entirely irreconcilable with a wholesome administration of the laws. With a view to show that the protection of manufacturing industry is mainly referable to the power to regulate commerce, and was intended to be embraced by the clause of the constitution that invests the supreme legislature with the power, in addition to the sugges tions that we have already made, we deem it not unprofitable, briefly to recur to the history of the country, from which we shall derive lights, that may guide us to the most unerring conclusions, in confirmation of our doctrine. The narrative of events from 1783 to 1787, the circumstances attending the adoption of the constitution and the range of its early operations, whilst yet in the hands of its authors, afford a mass of testimony that Congress has but responded to the expectations of the country in so regulating trade as to furnish the requisite protection to the expansion and growth of our own labour. venue be necessary would, in a great number of cases, prove a fruitful source of vexatious and unprofitable controversy. One party-conceiving it wise to improve the face of their territory, with expensive roads and canals, to provide fortifications and munitions of war, and accumulate treasure in the expectation of national difficulties would find good reason to maintain that a large revenue was indispensable to the nation. With this party a high and burdensome rate of imposts, fully adequate to the most extensive protection of manufactures that has ever been asked for, would be a constitutional application of the revenue power. Another party, more thrifty in their policy, holding that the expenditures of the government should be graduated to the lowest practicable scale of economy, would contend that nothing should be raised by duties above the ordinary supplies necessary for the pay of the public agents. With this class all the excess, above the sum that they might hold to be necessary, would be the fruit of an unconstitutional tax. Who should judge between these conflicting opinions? If such were the limits upon the power of Congress, it would be true, as has been said, that there might be acts in violation of the constitution, which would elude the notice of the judicial tribunals; but the evident absurdity of subjecting the right to exercise fundamental powers to so vague and intangible a standard of interpretation, furnishes one of the most satisfactory proofs, that no such intention existed in the minds of those who framed our constitution. Pursuing the investigation, it will be found that the The regulation of commerce was not a new term difficulty attending this notion of the source of the pro-invented by the framers of the constitution. It tecting power does not end with the impracticability of was at the time of the adoption of that instrument determining upon the necessity of revenue. It goes by the people a term familiar to their apprehension and still deeper. It is affirmed, and no doubt with truth, impressed upon their understanding, by the strongest that a reduction of duties upon the necessaries or cus- comments that the history of oppression could furnish. tomary luxuries of a nation frequently increases the The war of the revolution, that had just closed, revenue. In such an event the defenders of the position sprang out of the conflicts in which the subject had that the power of Congress is limited to the supply of been presented in the countless forms which an engrossa necessary revenue, will find themselves unexpectedly ing topic of complaint may be supposed to assume in put in possession of a surplus income which, according the discussions of an excited and rebelling people. The to the assumed principle, they had no right to raise; same subject had been canvassed in the British Parliaand it will be apparent that the people will be even ment, until argument and declamation were exhausted. more taxed than they were before; for the duty having The mother country had regulated the commerce of been rendered productive of a larger amount of reve- the colonies, through a series of odious and unfeeling nue to the government, a greater aggregate sum will restrictions, for more than a century, until the phrase have been taken from the pockets of the people; and it had acquired the notoriety of a hateful grievance. She will then be found that Congress, instead of lessening had fettered their trade by cruel prohibitions, and conthe public burthens by their reduction of duties, will trolled their labor by systems of denial that reduced have only been encouraging the consumption of a great them to the lowest state of suffering; yet it is remarker quantity of the taxed article. A large consumption able, that, deeming this oppressive policy a lawful exwith a small tax being, in this case, more than equiva-ercise of the prerogative of regulating commerce, the lent to a small consumption with a large tax. And thus, colonists submitted to these evils with a resignation in spite of all the the precautions which the most scru- that indicated their sense of the duty of obedience to an pulous guardians of the constitution may exercise, the acknowledged though misused power. All manufactures public functionaries, against their will, and with the calculated to bring wealth into the country, were strictmost conscientious desire to avoid infractions of the ly forbidden; the erection of forges, for example, was law, will oftentimes be fated to discover that they have denounced as a nuisance, and these establishments were produced unconstitutional results. The only remedy liable to be abated by that name; it was declared unfor which would seem to be to abandon this intractable lawful to export the simplest fabrics, even of shoes or mode of taxation by imposts and resort to direct taxes hats, from one province to another. Still the people upon the people. did not deny the legality of these attempts to regulate commerce, But when the right was assumed to collect revenue in the colonies for the benefit of the mother country, the first assertion of such a principle was met by open rebellion. The distinction was palpable enough, to every man, between these two pretensions of authority. It is worthy of remark, that Lord Chatham, in 1765 in the British House of Commons, distinctly defined the two branches of power, in terms that literally apply to the subject we have been discussing, and which show how clearly they were brought to the notice of the country; 'there is a plain distinction,' in his language, 'between taxes levied for the purpose of raising a revenue and duties imposed for the regulation of trade, for the accommodation of the subject; although in the consequences, some revenue might incidentally arise from the latter.' Indeed, the whole tenor of the As long, however, as such results may follow the reduction of duties, it will be seen that a system which merely increases the consumption of imported commodities without diminishing the revenue, will be, in effect, the adoption of a policy for the encouragement of foreign industry. And we might here pause and ask, whether it can be supposed that the founders of our government intended to give a power to Congress to adopt a scheme of policy directed to the encouragement of foreign labor by a scale of low duties, without also allowing to that body a right, when they found it convenient to encourage domestic industry by a higher scale of duties? Let those who answer this question in the affirmative, show some reason for the opinion that the convention which framed the constitution should set more value upon a power to encourage for 1831.] ADDRESS OF THE TARIFF CONVENTION. 341 ted by all. Some articles were taxed for revenue only; some for protection only; and some for both. The published debates show all this, and, we have already said, every Congress, from that day to this, has recog nized the same power. Every President, beginning with him who is justly esteemed the Father of his Country, has sanctioned it, and most of them have recommended its exercise, in earnest terms. Indeed, it has been constantly exercised; protection has been given by the registry acts; it has been given by the tonnage duty acts; it has been given by the acts regulating the coasting trade; it has been given to the fisheries; it has been given to the cotton of Carolina; to the coal of Virginia; to the hemp of Kentucky; to the lead of Missouri and Illinois; to the sugar of Louisiana, to the iron of the middle, western and southern States; and it has been given to the various artizans, mechanics and manufacturers. It is now forty-two years since this system of protection began, and it has never been intermitted or suspended, with regard to many commodities, for a single hour. Is all this legislation now to be deemed unconstitutional? Are all these interests to be brought into jeopardy, and perhaps to ruin, upon this modern construction of the constitution? public discussion on those subjects, so rife at that period throughout England and America, furnishes the most conclusive evidence that a specified idea was attached to the phrase incorporated into our constitution, and that its scope was to include the idea of levying duties in such a form as to encourage and protect, or, at least, to control and direct the growth of domestic industry. The complaints against the articles of confederation, for which the constitution was substituted, embraced, among other things, an objection to the forms by which the legislation in reference to the regulation of commerce was impeded; and it was a prominent design of the new constitution to remedy this defect. The right to lay even prohibitory duties was freely admitted in the discussion upon the constitution; and we may safely affirm that the whole nation, at that day, regarded such a power as one of the necessary conclusions from the grant that had been made. The subsequent action of the government corroborates this idea. The first approaches of the people to their new rulers were made in behalf of the exercise of a protecting power in favor of their industry. They spoke of the injury they had sustained under the former order of things; of the ruinous competition to which the policy of the mother country bad exposed them; and demanded the establishment Not only has Congress thus constantly exercised this of a system of measures that should accomplish their fa- power, but it has thought itself, from the first, under vorite purpose of creating a vigorous domestic manufac-peculiar obligations to exercise it. It has considered ture. The unrestrained admission of British goods had re- that it would be guilty of a plain breach of duty if it duced our manufactures and artizans to absolute want: should not exercise it; and so it was declared in its first thefree entry of British shipping had expelled our ves- session. This policy was more earnestly enforced upon sels from the ocean. From Charleston to Boston this con- Congress because the States had surrendered their dition of things was the subject of one loud and continu- whole power on this question, and were themselves, ed remonstrance; and the remedy for it was a promi- prohibited from exercising it by the constitution itself; nent object in the establishment of a new general gov- since as they could not, as separate states, exercise it ernment. The ship-builders and the ship-owners com- well, it was taken away from them and vested in the plained that foreign bottoms brought to the country all national legislature. It was said, therefore, and said that was imported, to their ruin; and they besought truly, that it would be a fraud upon the States, if Contheir fellow citizens to join them in measures of pro- gress, now the sole possessor of the power, should retection. The manufacturers and mechanics declared fuse to exercise it. The constitution had declared, that that it was of little importance to them in what bottoms no State should lay any duty except for the mere purarticles were imported, since this unrestricted importa-pose of enforcing its inspection laws. Is it conceivable, tion, in whatever bottoms, threatened to reduce them to starvation. Both had applied to their own state governments for redress, but these governments, from want of concert, could give no effectual relief. Attempts had been made to amend the articles of confederation for the very purpose of conferring this power upon Congress; but these attempts had failed. Hence it was that the establishment of the present government was hailed with the utmost enthusiasm and celebrated in the principal cities, by all classes, with manifestations of hope and joy. The earliest legislation of the new government avows and adopts the principles for which we have been contending. The first important act on the statute book contains the following preamble;- Whereas it is necessary for the support of government and the encourage ment and protection of manufactures that duties be laid on goods and merchandize.' This preamble was writ. ten, supported and passed by those who had come recently from the convention where the Constitution had been formed. They were carrying into effect their own instrument. They seem, indeed,-for preambles are quite unusual,-to have introduced this for the purpose of shewing the country that its expectations would be fulfilled, and that the manufactures of the nation would be protected. If, therefore, the existing laws violate the constitution, the original act violated it. If this character of right be marred now, it was marred then, and marred by those who made it. that the people would agree to deprive their own state governments of the power of protecting manufactures, by suitable regulations of trade, without consent of Congress, for any other reasons than because this power was intentionally transferred to the general Government? The doctrine now advanced, imputes the strongest absurdity, both to the framers of the constitution and to the people. It supposes them, instead of creating a new remedy for acknowledged evils, to have for ever abolished the poor but only remedy which already existed. It supposes, that instead of giving to Congress, as was their avowed design, effectual power, to protect manufactures, they did no more than prohibit the States from exercising that power, and existinguish it as a thing to be deprecated everywhere and altogether. It supposes them to have imposed new shackles on their own limbs, and to have surrendered themselves, thus voluntarily bound, to the mercy of their foreign competitors and rivals. We cannot yield our assent to opinions which ascribe purposes like these, or a policy like this, either to the Convention, or to the people. It only remains for us to add, that the public judgment has, at all times, affirmed the existence of this power, and approved its exercise. Even at this moment, there is no reason to doubt that nine-tenths of all the people hold the power to be constitutional. It is therefore, not only against the words of the constitution, against the manifest design of the nation in establishing it, against the uniform sense of Congress in passIf protection be unconstitutional, this law carries un- ing laws under it, against the practice of forty years, constitutionality in its front; and yet not one member never stayed or suspended, against the opinion of of the first Congress appears to have thought in uncon- every tribunal in the country, as far as we are informed; stitutional. In the whole course of the debates, pro- but it is also against the entire conviction of a vast matracted through several weeks, no one expressed a jority of the people themselves, that these new, and doubt of the power of Congress to lay duties for protec- what we think dangerous opinions, are now brought tion; we may therefore affirm that the power was admit-forward as the true doctrines of the constitution. 3421 TRADE OF THE SUSQUEHANNA. [NOVEMBER of that nature. That consent, therefore, is intended to be given, if it be ever asked, from a conviction of the beneficial effect expected to be produced in the state that levies the duty or in other words, of its value as a protection to state labor. With such a power on the part of Congress to permit a protective system to be enacted in the states severally, it would seem to be a solecism to suppose that the exercise of a similar power was intended to be denied to the national legislature itself, to whom has been emphatically entrusted the whole complicated and interesting concern of regulating commerce. It is an error to suppose that the regulation of commerce should necessarily imply the denial of a right to restrict, diminish or prohibit any particular branch of it. The suppression of any trade, injurious to the community, is as much a national concern, and as valuable an exercise of power, as the encouragement of other branches; and, indeed, in practice it must often occur that the conferring of special advantages upon one branch of trade may operate partially to the disadvantage of ali others. Such is often the effect of treaties that reserve to the vessels of particular nations free entry to our ports; the commerce with such nations is promoted to the diminution of trade with others not embraced in the privilege. This, however, is a lawful, just and profitable regulation of commerce. Commerce includes all kinds of traffic, whether sustained upon the ocean in ships, or transported upon roads, rivers or canals: whether it belong to the system of domestic exchanges, or is conversant with the occupations of foreign countries; and it is the appropriate function of Congress to regulate it in such a manner as their wisdom may dictate, unlimited by any restraints except those which the constitution imposes on the power over the domestic inter-modification, nor qualification, but demands an entire course of the states. The regulation of our commerce with the Indian tribes has subjected the traffic, from time to time, to all such restrictions as the national legislature found it prudent to adopt; and yet this right of regulation has passed unquestioned, though it has been directly exercised to the diminution of any species of traffic that has been considered hurtful. It is nothing more than a regulation of commerce to shape our policy, in reference to our intercourse with foreign nations, by such rule as shall increase the products of our own labour to any amount that may render them also the subjects of a foreign trade, and thereby extend our commerce to new regions, and give it new accumulations of commodities. The agricultural products of a nation are not the only elements of its trade; its manufactures may be as desirable to foreign communities, and their transportation and exchange may become fully as valuable foundations of a rapid, enlarged and profitable commerce. Why, then, should the power to regulate commerce be supposed to be arrested at that middle point between the prosecution of an old trade and the commencement of a new one that may eventually, be rendered more expansive, useful and productive than any other? Such a restraint would seem to be utterly incompatible with the genius and character of any vigorous community, but especially with that of a young and healthy nation. Before we leave this branch of our inquiry, we are anxious to present the constitutional question in one more point of view. The best expositor of the constitution is that instrument itself. The tenth section of the first article of the constitution provides that "no state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws." The limitation which is here set upon the legislation of the states is within the controul of Congress. The consent of that body releases any state from the restriction expressed in this clause; and consequently Congress may permit either or all of the states separately, to levy such duty upon imports as they may think convenient: it may allow the state of South Carolina, for example, to enact a tariff of the highest rates of duties, directed exclusively to the protection of any branch of industry that she may wish to foster. It will be observed that the terms of this clause of the constitution absolutely forbid the idea that such a power is to be exercised for revenue. The state that imposes the duty is inhibited from taking the avails into its own treasury, but must pay them over to the general government; whilst that government, on the other hand, has the fullest power to levy and collect its own revenues, and consequently cannot be presumed to yield its consent to the state enactment upon considerations In dismissing this review of the principles and prac tice of our government in their relations to an important constitutional right, we take the occasion to say that we contemplate the character of the present opposition to what we have endeavoured to exhibit as the legitimate powers of Congress, with regret; and if we could persuade ousrelves that it was destined to command the assent of any large portions of our population, we would say that we view it not without alarm. This opposition appeals not to the discretion of Congress; it seeks no and absolute surrender of the principle. It is for the SUSQUEHANNAH TRADE.-That a vast proportion of the product of that extensive, rich and densely popul ted district of country bordering on the Lakes in the neighborhood of the sources of the Susquehanna in the state of New York, is destined to be rendered tributary to the market of Philadelphia by the immediate completion of the great connecting link, the Central Rail Road, will be strikingly obvious on the slightest inspec tion of the map of that region, and a brief consideration of the advantages of transporation which will then be afforded. The Chemung Canal and Ithaca and Oswego Rail Road, connecting Seneca and Cayuga Lakes with the Susquehanna, will perfect the links of intercommunication with that magnificent stream whose waters will roll the products of the adjoining territory, accumulating as they advance to the point of debarkation, whence they are to be conveyed to Philadelphia. Already are the inhabitants of the neighborhood of Ithaca endeavoring to anticipate this obvious result. A meeting has been recently held in the aforesaid place and resolutions adopted expressive of the propriety of constructing a rail road from Ithaca to the North River, called an extension of the Ithaca and Oswego rail road. Should this design prove successful, their intercourse with the city of New York will be established on a footing superior not only to their present circuitous medium, but also to any which can hereafter be offered to another market. Now is the period for exertion on the part of those who are interested in securing the commerce of that region. The local advantages now in possession of our state metropolis must be immediately brought into practical operation or partially relinquished forever. The alternate is one which should waken our energies. The ever restless and enterprising disposition of the inhabitants of our sister state is too well known to prevent us to doubt the seriousness of their intentions or the resources which may be called into action for its accomplishment. Their capabilities, judging from the past, are limitless. Miner's Journal PROCEEDINGS OF FREE TRADE CONVENTION. (Continued from page 261.) Sixth Day-Friday, October 7th, 1831. At 10 o'clock, the President took the Chair, when the minutes of the preceding session were read. The Hon.C.C. Cambreling, and Mr. Wm. B. Lawrence, were invited to take seats within the bar of the Convention. The President then announced the order of the day to be, that this Convention do resolve itself into a Committe of the Whole, for the purpose of taking into consideration the Address to the People of the United States, reported from the General Committee. Mr. Berrien of Georgia, moved that the Committee of the Whole be discharged from the further consideration of the said Address; which motion was seconded by Mr. Cheves of South Carolina, and on the question being taken, was agreed to. The President then stated that the Address to the People of United States was before the Convention. Mr. Gallatin, of New York, moved to amend the said Address, by striking out that part thereof which commences with the words, "In justice to that body," in paragraph fifth, and which terminates with the words, "stand upon our chartered rights?" at the end of the eighth paragraph. Upon this motion, the yeas and nays were called by many members, and were as follows. YEAS: Massachusetts-Theodore Sedgwick, Joseph Ropes. New York-Jonathan Goodhue, Thomas R. Mercein, John A. Stevens, Isaac Carow, John Constable, James Boorman, George Griswold, Benjamin L. Swan, George T. Trimble, Zebedee Ring, Albert Gallatin, Jacob Lorillard, James G. King, Charles H. Russell, Isaac Bronson, James Heard, Silas M. Stilwell. New Jersey-C. L. Hardenbergh, J. C. Van Dyck, Maryland-George Hoffinan, John J. Donalson. NAYS: Maine-Joshua Carpenter, Charles Q. Clapp, S. H. Mudge. [NOVEMBE Banks, William H. Roane, James Lyons, John Tabb, North Carolina-Joseph B. Skinner, Louis D. Wil- South Carolina-Zachariah P. Herdon, James G. Spann, F. W. Davie, James Cuthbert, Thomas Pickney, T. D. Singleton, William Butler, Joseph W. Allston, Henry N. Gruger, Charles Macbeth, Henry C. Young, A. P. Butler, H. A. Middleton, Thomas R. Mitchell, W. Wilkinson, Philip Tidyman, Stephen D. Miller, William Pope, Job Johnston, John D. Edwards, John Carter, Langdon Cheves, Joseph E Jenkins, Hugh Wilson, J. H. Glover, T. Pickney Alston, Edward Richardson, William Harper, William C. Preston, Daniel E. Huger, Hugh S. Legare, John Taylor, Thomson T. Player, J. Berkley Grimball, James Rose, William Smith, Thomas Williams, Jr. Thomas Flemming, John Fraser. Yeas 35-Nays 159. So the motion to strike out was not agreed to. Mr. JOHNSON, of South Carolina, then moved to amend the Address, by striking out from the seventh paragraph, these words "they admit the power of Congress to lay and collect such duties as they may deem necessary for the purposes of revenue, and within these limits, so to arrange those duties as incidentally, and to that extent, to give protection to the manufacturer. They deny the right to convert what they denominate the incidental, into the principal power, and transcending the limits of revenue, to impose an additional duty, substantively and exclusively for the purpose of affording that protection." Mr. WATERS, of Alabama, moved to amend the amendment, so as to strike out only the words "30 to arrange those duties as"--which would leave the language Massachusetts-Henry Lee, T. S. Pomeroy, Samuel of the Address thus: "They admit the power of ConSwett, Gideon Tucker, John L. Gardner, George Pea-gress to lay and collect such duties as they may deem body, Pickering Dodge, Isaac Newhall, Henry Williams, Edward Cruft, William Goddard, Ebenezer Breed, Thomas P. Bancroft, John Pickens. New York-Preserved Fish, John Leonard, Edwin Bergh, H. Kneeland. New Jersey-John Potter. Pennsylvania-Joseph R. Evans, George Emlen, Clement C. Biddle, J. M. Barclay, E. Littell, Samuel F. Smith, Isaac W. Norris, Richard Price, Henry R. Watson, John A. Brown, Philip H. Nicklin, Condy Raguet, William McIlhenney. necessary for the purposes of revenue, and, within these limits, incidentally, and to that extent, to give protec tion to the manufacturer." Some debate having arisen on this amendment, Mr. Edwards, of South Carolina, asked if it would be in order to call for the previous question, but the Presi dent decided that, according to Parliamentary proceedings, such a motion would not be in order, although it would be in order according to the rules of the House of Representatives of the United States. Mr. EDWARDS then moved that the rules of Congress should be adopted for this occasion; but the President decided that no question not immediately relating to the subject of the Address, could now be submitted, without a departure from Parliamentary order. Mr. LYONS, of Virginia,'then moved to lay the amendment, with the Address, on the table, for the present, Which motion was not agreed to. Maryland-William W. Handy, Arnold D. Jones. Virginia-Philip P. Barbour, Henry E. Watkins, Richard Booker, James M. Garnett, Samuel L. Venable, Thomas R. Dew, Walker Hawes, Philip A. Dew, John Brockenbrough, Thomas Miller, William G. Overton, George C. Dromgoole, Randolph Harrison, Charles Yancey, Robert Hurt, Ferdinand W. Risque, Malcolm Macfarland, Thomas W. Gilmer, Burwell Bassett, H. Mr. JOHNSTON then stated that, as he had accomplishR. Anderson, Josiah Ellis, Charles Everett, Alex. Gor-ed his object by having his motion recorded on the don Knox, George M. Payne, James S. Brander, Willi-journal, he would now withdraw it; and this having am Maxwell, Benjamin F. Dabney, R. O. Grayson, S. accordingly been done, the amendment proposed by A. Storrow, Charles Cocke, John W. Jones, William Mr. Waters was no longer before the Convention. O. Goode, William Townes, John Dickinson, William B. Rogers, William P. Taylor, John H. Bernard, Linn The question having been put by the President, |