FREE TRADE CONVENTION.

Mr. MITCHELL, of South Carolina, offered the follow-members. ing resolution:

Resolved, That the Federal Committee do inquire into the expediency of recommending the abolition of specific and minimum duties, and the substitution of the ad valorem duty on an all imports.

Which resolution was, on motion of Mr. Mitchell, referred to the General Committee.

Mr. JONES, of Georgia, offered the following resolution:

Resolved, That this Convention accepts, with thankful acknowledgment, the copies of Mr. Cambreleng's Report on Commerce and Navigation, presented by John I. Mumford, for the use of the Convention.

The PRESIDENT stated, that one of the members of the General Committee had informed him, that the AdMr. STEVENS, of New York, moved to amend the dress to the People of the United States, reported yessame by striking out the name of Mr. Cambreleng, so terday, would not be ready until 12 o'clock, and he subas to make it read "Report of the Committee on Committed to the Convention, the expediency of a recess merce and Navigation;" which was not agreed to, and then the resolution was adopted.

Mr. PRESTON, of South Carolina, offered the follow-vention there to be assembled on the 26th of the preing resolution:

In a short time, Mr. Preston, from the Committee last appointed, reported: That they had waited upon the General Committee, and received from the Chairman information that the Committee would be ready to report in a few minutes, or to ask further time. Mr. BASSETT, of Virginia, offered the following reso-bers of the Anti-Tariff Convention af Philadelphia," lution:

The Hon. Judge Baldwin, of the Supreme Court of following resolutions: the United State.

The Hon. Judge Morgan, of Philadelphia.
Gen. Preston of Virginia.

The Hon. Warren R. Davis, Representative in Congress, from South Carolina.

The Hon. Mr. Johnston, a Senator from Louisiana. Mr. BERRIEN, from the General Committee, reported the draft of an Address to the People of the U. States;

upon the address' to the people of the United States;
which was agreed to.

The PRESIDENT appointed Mr. Sedgwick, of Massa-
chusetts, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, but
Mr. Sedgwick not being at that moment present,
Mr. BANKS, of Virginia, was appointed, and the
President left the Chair.

After a short period, the President resumed the Chair when Mr. Banks reported that the Committee of the Whole had had under consideration the Address to the People of the United States, committed to them; that they had made some progress in the same, and had instructed their Chairman to ask leave to sit again. Upon the question of granting leave to sit again, it was unanimously agreed to.

The following names were announced by the President during the day, of gentlemen invited by him to take seats within the bar of the Convention:

Mr. Ingham, late Secretary of the Treasury.
Mr. Saul Alley, of New York.

Mr. William D. Shepherd, of North Carolina.
Mr. John Hare Powell, of Philadelphia.
On motion of Mr. Berrien, of Georgia, the Convention
adjourned.

[To be Continued.]

Reported for the Pennsylvania Inquirer,

BREACH OF PROMISE.

[NOVEMBER

from church, and again repeated the objection of his
sister-in-law, and in the course of the conversation
which ensued, told her not to write to him or expect
him any more; she complained of his treatment, and
received the cavalier reply, that she could do just as
she pleased." He came once afterwards and remon.
strated with her for going to law, observing that it
would be a disgrace; to which she replied, that it would
be no greater disgrace than to be slurred by the neigh
bours, as she now was.
He said she was plenty young
enough to get somebody, and what one did not want,
another would be glad to get, and then took his leave;
he never asked the parents' consent, wishing the mar
riage to be done slily. The plaintiff is now in her
twenty-first year, is a milliner, in the Northern Liber.
ties, where the defendant, who is a comb maker, also
resides.

Several other witnesses were called by plaintiff, who proved that they had often seen defendant at plaintiff's house.

The defendant declined examining any witnesses, and the respective Counsel addressed the Jury, a full review and recapitulation of the evidence being taken pro and con.

For the plaintiff it was contended that the case was fully made out, as laid in the declaration, that there were two requisites to be established to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, viz:-1st, that there was a contract of marriage; 2dly, if there was such a contract,

District Court, Nov. 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th, before Judge that it was broken by defendant. It was argued that

Hallowell and a Special Jury.
Anne Rees vs. Jacob Rudy.

these were fully made out, and that the plaintiff was entitled to heavy damages for the injury sustained to her health, her reputation and to herself; that an extraordinary and aggravated case had been presented against the defendant, without the slightest extenuation or justification on the part of the defendant; it was also remarked that the defence was conducted in a novel style, as witnesses were in court, and yet none examined in defendant's behalf, that its extraordinary charac ter was only equalled by the novel and unusual style of wooing practised by the defendant.

This was an action brought to recover damages for a breach of promise of marriage, and the circumstances and commencement of the acquaintance of the parties, as detailed in evidence, appeared as follows: Miss Catharine Rees, sister to the plaintiff, testified, that in August, 1829, while she and her sister were taking a walk out Fourth street, they were accosted by the defendant and another gentleman, who joined them; that the defendant inquired where they resided, and on their reply, informed them that he was a near For the defendant, it was contended that the case neighbour; that they stopped at the College Garden, was not of the aggravated description represented by and got some refreshments, he remarking that there the plaintiff's counsel; that the defence did not require was no harm in it, as he was a neighbour; at this gar- the examination of any testimony, as had been at first den the other gentleman left them, when the defend- anticipated, the plaintiff's case being weak and not reant observed that the reason of his leaving them, was, quiring any defence; that the principal and only imthat he did not think it right to accompany them as he portant witness on the behalf of the plaintiff was her was a married man, adding, so was I once, but I buried sister, liable to a prejudice and bias, created by affection my wife, and always thought I would wait a year, but and the ties of nature, from which the purest could not (addressing the plaintiff,) I have fallen in love with protect themselves; that the case showed an almost uniyou and changed my mind. When they arrived home ty of existence between the sisters; who were always he requested permission to visit them, which was grant- together, on every occasion alluded to; that the testied; his visits became frequent and uninterrupted, hemony of the principal witness could not be correct; and the plaintiff going out to take a walk or ride on that however pure she be, yet it is the fallacy of opindifferent occasions; one evening he came in and handed ion to which all human nature is liable that persuades a a letter to plaintiff, saying he would make her a pres- belief of things, existing only in imagination, in which ent of it, and immediately he went out: on reading it, a witness has an interest, strong in passion and feeling; plaintiff exclaimed, "my God, what have I done, that that the whole affair was a foolish transaction, (as love any one should write so against me," 'twas an anony- affairs generally are) approaching almost to childishmous letter, addressed to plaintiff, and signed "A wellness; that the damages (if any) should be merely comwisher," stating the plaintiff to be of a very violent temper, totally unfit to succeed the wife he had lost; this was accompanied by a note from defendant to plaintiff in German, the translation of which is as follows: "This letter is plainly written, and convinces me His honour, Judge Hallowell, charged the Jury that of its truth; I have therefore changed my mind, and the case was fully made out by the plaintiff; that an endon't intend to come again." Plaintiff wrote to de-gagement and promise of marriage, and subsequent fendant, who replied in writing; he afterwards came again as usual, remarking that the neigborhood had tried hard to break the match, but he did not intend they should glory in it; his visits were constant for some length of time, till one evening, when he told plaintiff that his sister in law objected to his marrying her, and therefore he could not do it. Plaintiff afterwards wrote to defendant, who replied, telling her to meet him at church, which she did; he went home with her

pensatory, and only to such amount as the plaintiff had sustained injury, and that, as the case presented itself, no great injury accrued to the plaintiff, either to her health, her reputation, or her future prospects.

breach by the defendant, were clearly established, and the defendant should answer in damages, the measure of which was the peculiar province of the Jury.

On Monday, the Jury returned with a verdict for plaintiff, with three hundred and fifty dollars damages. For plaintiff.-John M. Scott and S. Keemle, Esquires.

For Defendant.-George M. Dallas and S. Rusb, Esquires.

HAZARD'S

REGISTER OF PENNSYLVANIA.

DEVOTED TO THE PRESERVATION OF EVERY KIND OF USEFUL INFORMATION RESPECTING THE STATE.

EDITED BY SAMUEL HAZARD.

VOL. VIII.-NO. 22. PHILADELPHIA, NOVEMBER 26, 1831. NO. 204.

ADDRESS OF THE

FRIENDS OF DOMESTIC INDUSTRY, Assembled in Convention at New York, Oct. 26, 1831,

TO THE

PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

FELLOW CITIZENS:

A numerous delegation from several states in the Union have convened in the city of New York, representing great national interests, which they are anxious, by the most efficient but peaceable means, to defend and support. In addressing themselves to the people of the United States, they invoke their candid attention to several topics of great national importance, without assuming any authority ultimately to decide them; conscious that their reasonings and opinions can have, and ought to have, no other influence or force than belongs to their truth and soundness.

true character will either appear on their face, or may be made to appear by stating the facts which fasten that character upon them. And if the motives which are supposed to have influenced Congress in their enactment, are not facts which may be properly inquired into to give them this character, the reason is, not that Congress has executed an unlawful power, or veiled an unlawful purpose under a general law, but that the general power being given to Congress to pass such laws, the purpose of the law, like its occasion, its duration, or any other part of its character, is constitution. ally referred to the discretion of Congress.

The present constitution has been in operation (with a success not more gratifying to ourselves than surprising to the rest of the world) for forty-two years. Twenty-one different Congresses, regularly elected and appointed by the people, and their agents, and the state legislatures, have successively assembled to enact laws under its authority. Seven distinguished individuals have been called by the voice of the country to the

A system of laws imposing duties for the encourage-chair of the Chief Magistracy, all holding, and some of ment and protection of domestic industry, upon the faith of which a large portion of the people of this country have invested their property, and given a new direction to their labor,and with a continuance of which are completely identified all their hopes of maintenance for themselves and their families,has been recently denounced as "distinguished by every characteristic which may define a tyranny, the most odious." The entire aboli-judgment on the constitutional extent of the power of tion of this system, vitally involving the interests of Farmers, Mechanics, Manufacturers, Merchants, and all the laboring classes, has been demanded in a tone that offers no hope of condition or compromise. A submission to such a demand, with or without the consent of those who must be the victims, would be marked by such scenes of ruin and despair, as no one, not blinded by the strongest passions of our nature, could witness without compunction.

We address ourselves, then, to the enlightened patriotism of our fellow citizens in every part of the Union; and we earnestly entreat them to accompany us in the examination which we propose to make of arguments and statements recently put forth; appealing to their clear discernment of truth, their high sense of duty, and their calm moral courage, to avert the evils that now seem to threaten the prosperity and peace of the country.

Of these topics, the first in order and the gravest in character, respects the constitutional power of Congress to pass the laws which are the subject of complaint.

them on various occasions, having exercised the pow er of giving a negative to such acts of Congress as, in their opinion, transcended the just limits of legislative authority. During the same period a Supreme Judicial Tribunal has existed, not less distinguished for purity and talent than for dignity and importance, whose high function it properly is to pronounce its solemn Congress whenever any exercise of their power is complained of, and the case brought duly before it. Most of these successive Congresses have passed laws similar in character, in design, and in effect, to the acts now complained of;and all of them have unequivocally sanctioned their principle. Ail these Chief Magistrates, in like manner, have, without doubt or hesitation, recognised the existence of the power, and no question of its validity has been revised in the Judicial Tribunals. It is under this weight of authority, and this length of practice in its favor, and after the investment, upon the faith of it, of a capital probably amounting to two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, that a disposition has now sprung up to deny the power altogether, and to propose, if its exercise be persisted in, a resort to such means of redress as threaten the Union.

We cannot but persuade ourselves that before the American People abandon a system of laws, now of long continuance, passed at different times, by the constituted authorities, with the full approbation of the whole country; and especially, before they break up their Government and return to a state of anarchy, on the As a constitutional question, the inquiry is not wheth-ground that such laws are unconstitutional, they will er the laws are wise or unwise, whether in their ope- give to that question a very careful and serious considrations they are always equal, or sometimes unequal, or eration. whether individuals may not think them so wide a departure from a just administration of the powers of the government, as to be, in an indefinite and loose sense, inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution. The true and real question is, do they exceed the power of the law giver, and do they, for that reason, fail to be obligatory?

We dissent from the notion that laws plainly unconstitutional may yet be so framed as to escape the animadversion of the courts of law. If unconstitutional, their VOL. VIII.

43

Before proceeding to express the general views entertained on this important subject, by the members of this convention, it is not altogether uninteresting to in. quire how far admissions or concessions have been made by those who deny the existence of the power, notwithstanding the general and positive terms in which that denial is expressed.

It seems to us, indeed, that the plain object of the constitution, and the strong reason of the case have driven those who deny the power, even upon their own

ADDRESS OF THE TARIFF CONVENTION.

1831.]

ADDRESS OF THE TARIFF CONVENTION.

any manner, to that exercise of the power which is now under consideration. Neither of them, nor any other clause or word in the whole constitution, manifests the slighest intention to restrain the words so far as to prohibit Congress from laying duties for protection. The attempt is nothing less than to add a restriction which the constitution has omitted. Who has authority to add this? If other restrictions had been intended, they would have been expressed. When the business of limitation was before the convention, what was omitted was as much an exercise of intention as what was expressed. It stated all the restraints on Congress which it intended, and to impose others now, would be, not to interpret the constitution, but to change it; not to construe the existing instrument, but to make another.

The words of the grant being general, to lay duties and to regulate commerce, their meaning is to be ascertained by reference to the common use and import of language. No unusual signification is to be given to the terms, either to restrain or enlarge their import. Congress,in its discretion, is to lay duties and to regulate trade for all the objects and purposes, for which duties are ordinarily laid, and trade ordinarily regulated. If such a thing was never before heard of as laying duties and regulating trade with a view to encourage manufactures, then it might be said that the Convention did not contemplate such an exercise of the power by Congress. But it was perfectly known to the convention, and to the people of this country, that one leading object with all governments, in laying duties and regulating trade, was, and for a long time had been, the encouragement of manufacturers. This was emphatically true of England, whose language the convention spoke, and whose legal and legislative phraseology was theirs also. Every leading state of Europe was, at that moment, regulating its commerce for a purpose of this nature. Such a purpose, indeed. had been long sought to be accomplished by some of the states themselves, by their own regulations of trade. Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York had attempted it, and we believe other states had done the same. How ineffectual all their attempts were, for want of union and a general system, was soon seen, and felt, by the whole country; but they shew to what ends, and to what uses the power to regulate trade was understood to extend. But not only in other nations, and in the states, before the adoption of the present constitution, as we shall have occasion to show hereafter, but in the United States since, and in the administration of this very constitution, regulations of trade have been made, in almost innumerable instances, with no view to revenue, but with a sole and exclusive regard to protection.

339

founded in national policy, and that it is essential to national defence and national independence, we admit it, but we answer in the first place, that Congress could not exercise a power not granted, merely because it might be useful or necessary; and, in the second place, we say that the same remark is true of the policy of protecting manufactures. That policy, also, is essential to national independence. Iron, hemp, and clothing for sailors and soldiers are not less indispensable to national defence than ships and seamen. Not only in the general use of language, then, does the power of laying duties and regulating trade extend to the protection, by the use of such means, of domestic manufactures, but such has been the constant interpretation of the constitution itself.

We think, indeed, that when a general power is gi ven to Congress by the Constitution of the United States, in plain and unambiguous words, their acts are constitutional and valid, if they are within the scope of the granted power; and that, in considering the validity of the law, the motives of the legislature can never be investigated. Having granted the power, with such limits expressed as were thought proper, its exercise, within those limits, is left to the discretion of Congress.

What is the true character of the opposite doctrine? It is, that the constitutionality of the law depends, not on its provisions and enactments, but on the motives of those who passed it. Is not such a notion new? How are we to ascertain the motives of a legislature? By private inquiry; by public examination; by conjecture? The law may be passed on mixed motives: some members voting for revenue; some for protection; or one house may act with one view, and the other house with another. What will be the character of such a law?

According to this new theory, if the motives be constitutional then the act is: if the motives be unconstitutional, than the act is unconstitutional also. It follows, therefore, that a law passed by one Congress may be constitutional, which, if passed by another, though in the same words, would be unconstitutional. Besides, on this theory, a law may be unconstitutional for its omis sions as well as its enactments; because in laying duties, articles may be omitted as well as articles inserted, from design to favour manufactures.

a

We may pursue this inquiry a step further.

In order to ascertain whether an act were passed primarily for revenue, the construing power must be authorized to inquire whether the revenue be necessary. For if it be conceded that Congress has a constitutional power to raise an indefinite amount of revenue, such a concession will cover any system of impost that may ever be adopted. The right to raise more revenue than the expenses of government requires implies, the exercise of a power to tax under circumstances in which the raising of revenue cannot be a primary purpose, but in which a purpose to protect industry, or, in other words, what has been called the incidental object, may be rendered, in effect, the principal object of the tax, although veiled under the revenue power. For these reasons we say it follows as an inevitable consequence, under this view of the source of the protective power, that the constitutionality of any system of imposts, professing to be directed to revenue, must depend upon the fact, whether that revenue be necessary to the government or not.

If our understanding of the Constitution, be not according to its true meaning, that instrument has been grossly violated from the beginning. What are all the registry acts; what the bounties on the fisheries, but so many avowed efforts to protect American Industry, under the power of regulating trade? On what foundation does the whole system of the coasting trade stand? The American ship-builder, and ship-owner has enjoyed, from the first, and we think properly, not only protection in that trade, but the monopoly of it. He shuts out all foreign competition,and he does so on the ground that the public good is promoted by giving him this advantage. We think he is right in asking this, and the government right in granting it. Yet this is not free trade: it is preference; it is protection;and protection of a manufacture under the power to regulate trade. The laws giving this protection to the manufacture, and the use of ships, may be wise, and laws protecting other manufactures may be unwise. But the first cannot be constitutional, and the latter not constitutional. If there be power for one, there is power for both. Both are drawn from the same grant, both operate by the same general means, and both regard the same object, the protection, namely, of American labor and capital, against foreign competition. If it be said that the navigation act is To determine whether any proposed amount of re

The statement of such a consequence is sufficient to show what endless difficulties must embarrass the operations of the government in defining the limits of this incidental protection, which has been alledged to be the only protection that the constitution allows, and of itself affords, what we conceive to be, an unanswerable argument against referring the right to protect industry exclusively to that clause of the constitution which authorizes Congress to lay imposts, for the purposes of revenue.