be notified for unlawful use.
The shipments were held by the
carrier for some time pending
directions by the party notified,
who was allowed to determine
time of delivery. Held that,
notwithstanding the interstate
character of the shipments, and
rulings that under the Wilson
act (act August 8, 1890, c. 728,
26 Stat. 313 [U. S. Comp. St.
1913, sec. 8738]), liquors trans-
ported from one State to another
do not lose their character as
an interstate shipment until ar-
rival at their destination and
delivery to the consignee, the
liquors became subject to the
local laws upon retention by the
railroad company for an unrea-
sonable time; it being deemed
on grounds of public policy that
there was a constructive delivery
to the person notified. C. & W.
C. Ry. Co. v. Gosnell (90 S. E.
264), 106 S. C. 84.

5. Act Feb. 20, 1915 (39 St. at
Large, p. 140), rendering it un-
lawful for any person or com-
pany to transport intoxicants
from without the State into it,
except that any person may order
and receive from without the
State not exceeding a gallon a
month, was violative of the Fed-
eral Constitution previous to the
prohibition of the manufacture
and sale of liquors in the State,
as making an unlawful discrimi-
nation against liquors shipped
into the State in interstate com-
merce, in view of the fact that
it was lawful for citizens of
counties having dispensaries to
buy liquors therefrom for per-
sonal use without limit. Bren-
nan v. So. Express Co. (90 S. E.
402), 106 S. C. 102.

6. Act Congress, March 1, 1913, c.
90 (37 Stat. 699 [Comp. St. 1913,
sec. 8739]), known as the Webb-
Kenyon act, divesting intoxicat-
ing liquors of their interstate
character in certain cases, was
not intended to confer, and did
not confer, on any State the
power to make unjust discrimi-
nations against the products of
other States which are recog-
nized as objects of lawful com-

38-S.C.-106

merce by the laws of the State
making such discriminations, nor
the power to make unjust dis-
criminations between its Own
citizens. Brennan v. So. Express
Co. (90 S. E. 402), 106 S. C. 102.
7. Act Congress, March 1, 1913,
known as the Webb-Kenyon act,
divesting intoxicating liquors of
their interstate character when
such liquor is intended to be re-
ceived, possessed, sold, or in any
manner used in violation of State
laws, is not unconstitutional as
attempting to confer upon the
State power to regulate inter-
state commerce, the regulation
being made by Congress itself
in excluding from interstate com-
merce liquor that is intended to
be received, etc., in violation of
State law. Brennan v. So. Ex-
press Co. (90 S. E. 402), 106 S. C.
102.

8. Unless there was a valid State
law which the receipt, possession,
sale or use of intoxicating liquors
shipped in interstate commerce
would violate, act Congress,
March 1, 1913, the Webb-Kenyon
act, divesting intoxicating liquors
of their interstate character
when such liquor is intended to
be received, possessed, sold or in
any manner used in violation of
State laws, does not apply. Id.
9. Act Congress, March 1, 1913,
the Webb-Kenyon act, divesting
intoxicating liquors of their in-
terstate character when intended
to be received, possessed, or sold,
or in any manner used in vio-
lation of State laws, is applicable
to shipments intended only for
personal use, provided such ship-
ments, and the receipt, posses-
sion, or use of the liquors is in
violation of the State law. Id.
10. Act Feb. 20, 1915, declaring
that the unrestricted personal
use of intoxicating liquors is
detrimental to the public wel-
fare, and that their receipt, and
the having in possession of un-
limited quantities, tends to hin-
der and defeat the enforcement
of the laws against their sale,
and limiting the permissible
amount to a gallon a month per

person, is not unconstitutional;
the State having the power to
regulate and control the use of
intoxicants by its citizens. Id.

ISSUE.

1. Construction of term "issue."
See Deeds. Duncan v. Clarke
(90 S. E. 180), 106 S. C. 17.
ISSUES FOR JURY OR COURT.
1. Refusal of charge not respon-
sive to issues. Moseley v. C., C.
& O. Ry. of S. C. (91 S. E. 380),
106 S. C. 368.

2. On allegations of complaint
and answer in action to recover
land conveyed to plaintiff by
trustee, and thereafter conveyed
to defendant by cestui que trust,
the cause was one in equity,
which ought not to have been sub-
mitted to the jury. Middleton v.
Levi (90 S. E. 325), 106 S. C. 32.
8. In an action to recover land,
charge in answer that trustee
had violated the trust and given
plaintiff a deed of trust property
for his own benefit, against the
cestui que trust's rights, was an
issue triable by chancellor. Mid-
dleton v. Levi (90 S. E. 325),
106 S. C. 32.

4. In action to recover land, and
in view of admission of answer
that defendant did not own land
in dispute and that his deed was
made to secure money due him
from cestui que trust loaned to
her without notice of plaintiff's
claim of title, the issue was for
the Judge. Id.

5. A verdict for defendant should
not be directed where there is
evidence sufficient to warrant a
reasonable man in finding for
plaintiff. Callison v. C. & W. C.
Ry. (90 S. E. 260), 106 S. C. 123.
6. The issue of fact as to State or
Federal law governing action for
death of a railroad employee
should be submitted to the jury,
there being evidence susceptible
of reasonable inference that the
train from which he fell was not
engaged in interstate commerce.
Seyle v. Charleston Terminal Co.
(90 S. E. 1016), 106 S. C. 215.
7. In action against oil company
for arrears of rent of land across

which railway was laid, question
whether plaintiff had a right to
lease the land for erection of
buildings, and to rentals until
land was required for railroad
purposes, held for the jury.
Shelton v. Southern Cotton Oil
Co. (90 S. E. 751), 106 S. C. 193.
8. In action for arrears of rent
under alleged lease, the sufficien-
cy of evidence to establish plain-
tiff's claim that defendant was
his tenant, having taken posses-
sion of a lot leased from plaintiff
by defendant's predecessor, and
so liable for rent, held for the
jury. Shelton v. Southern Cot-
ton Oil Co. (90 S. E. 751), 106
S. C. 193.

9. In action by beneficiary to re-
cover on life policy, where insur-
er claimed premium received by
it was paid and applied upon
another policy, evidence held
sufficient to submit the case to
the jury. Stallings v. Atlantic
Life Ins. Co. (91 S. E. 290), 106
S. C. 317.

10. Where there was sufficient evi-
dence to submit case to the jury,
no additional grounds for sus-
taining a directed verdict can be
considered on appeal unless
shown that plaintiff could not in
any event succeed. Id.

11. In an action for the killing of
plaintiff's colt, a letter by the
superintendent of the defendant
railroad company, that investi-
gation disclosed that the colt ran
into the train after the engine
had passed, is sufficient showing
to carry the case to the jury on
the presumption of negligence
arising from the killing, notwith-
standing the negligence
denied. Ervin v. A. C. L. R. R.
Co. (91 S. E. 317), 106 S. C. 354.
12. See Magistrates. Barnes v. C.

was

& W. C. Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 1017),
106 S. C. 227.

13. The force of testimony is for
the jury. Patrick v. English
(91 S. E. 295), 106 S. C. 267.
14. In crossing accident, for the
jury. White v. A. C. L. R. R.
Co. (91 S. E. 323), 106 S. C. 837.

15. In action on insurance policy
for the jury. Baker v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. (91 S. E.
324), 106 S. C. 419.

16. As to application of payments
of the jury. Heyward-Williams
Co. v. Zeigler (91 S. E. 298), 106
S. C. 425.

JUDGMENTS.

See Appeal and Error. Metz v.
Metz (91 S. E. 864), 106 S. C.
514; Adams v. Georgia-Carolina
Power Co. (90 S. E. 702), 106 S.
C. 162; Heyward v. Glover (91
S. E. 316), 106 S. C. 360.

1. Where in an action in the Court
of Common Pleas, the summons
and complaint by inadvertence
bore the name, civil and criminal
Court, a default judgment based
on such summons and complaint
will not, more than two years
after its rendition, be vacated on
account of the mistake, it ap-
pearing that no injury was done
to defendant, who called on
plaintiff's counsel shortly after
entry of the judgment and en-
deavored to make arrangement
to pay it without any question
as to its validity, but the record
will be corrected by striking out
the name of the civil and criminal
Court and inserting the name of
the Court of Common Pleas.
American Funding Corporation
(91 S. E. 315), 106 S. C. 326.
2. Under Code Civ. Proc. 1912,
sec. 218, as to joinder of causes
of action, a Court may in one
decree give judgment for the
amount due on a mortgage, and
also direct a sale of the mort-
gaged property. Barron v. So.
Scale & Fixture Co. (91 S. E.
321), 106 S. C. 342.

3. A judgment may not be given
for an uncertain amount. Bar-
ron v. So. Scale & Fixture Co.
(91 S. E. 321), 106 S. C. 342.
4. Under Code Civ. Proc. 1912,
sec. 304, defining a "judgment"
as a final determination of the
right of the parties, a decree in
mortgage foreclosure, which
after finding defendant owed
plaintiffs a certain sum, directed
its payment on or before a cer-

tain date, and sale in default of
payment, was sufficient as a judg-
ment; the further direction, that
if the proceeds of sale were in-
sufficient to pay such amount the
master should report the deficien-
cy and that plaintiffs should have
judgment therefor, being mere
surplusage. Barron v. So. Scale
& Fixture Co. (91 S. E. 321),
106 S. C. 342.

5. The entry of judgment in the
book of "Abstracts of Judg-
ments" and the making up of the
judgment roll are but ministerial
acts, done for purposes of lien
and notice, and follow the judg-
ment as matter of course. Bar-
ron v. So. Scale & Fixture Co.
(91 S. E. 321), 106 S. C. 342.
6. A judgment in an action by a
property owner, in which some
of the companies insuring the
property were out of the case
by nonsuit and one out by the
unlawful omission of the jury
at the time the verdict was ren-
dered against a railroad com-
pany, is not conclusive as to the
cause of the fire in a subsequent
action by the insurance com-
panies against the railroad com-
pany. Continental Ins. Co. V.
S. A. L. Ry. (90 S. E. 318), 106
S. C. 43.

7. The judgment roll in an action
against an insurance company is
admissible to show the amount
of damage in an action by the
company against its agent for
failure to cancel the policy.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bollin (90 S. E. 327), 106 S. C.

45.

8. Merely because complaint in
partition suit did not state facts
sufficient to constitute cause of
action against absent defendants,
Court did not fail to acquire
jurisdiction of action as to them.
Gladden v. Chapman (91 S. E.
796), 106 S. C. 486.

9. Defect that action for parti-
tion of decedent's land was
brought within 12 months after
his death, and that administrator
was not made a party, as re-
quired by rule 55 of Circuit
Court, was not jurisdictional.

Gladden v. Chapman (91 S. E.
796), 106 S. C. 486.
10. It must be presumed, from
judgment ordering sale of land
for partition, that Court adjudi-
cated regularity and sufficiency
of every step in proceedings, in-
cluding sufficiency of complaint,
issuance and service of process
on defendants, and rights and
interests of parties under allega-
tions and evidence, and, though
conclusions might have been re-
versible on appeal, they would
not make judgment void col-
laterally. Gladden v. Chapman
(91 S. E. 796), 106 S. C. 486.
11. In view of Code Civ. Proc.
1912, sec. 185, judgment in parti-
tion suit and sale made there-
under must be sustained against
collateral attack in action to re-
cover possession of land, unless
it affirmatively appears from
record that Court had no juris-
diction of subject of action and
of parties. Gladden v. Chap-
man (91 S. E. 796), 106 S. C. 486.

JUDICIAL SALES.

See Appeal and Error. Clark v.
Dunbar (91 S. E. 323), 106 S. C.
423.

JURY.

1. Where plaintiff bank mistook
certificate number of a $15 draft
for the amount and paid defend-
ant $528.20, and, upon his re-
fusal to surrender surplus,
brought suit, alleging mistake
and fraud and asking injunction
and recovery, this was an equity
action, and Code Civ. Proc., sec.
312, providing trial by jury in
action for "recovery of money
only," did not apply. Bank of
Williston v. Alderman (91 S. E.
296), 106 S. C. 386.

2. Jury may recommend to mercy
and reduce punishment for mur-
der. State v. Stevens (91 S. E.
302), 106 S. C. 272.
3. Issues out of equity for jury.
Middleton v. Levi (90 S. E. 325),

106 S. C. 32.

LACHES.

1. In such action, where there was
no evidence that the defect was

discovered until after the sale
in a partition suit by grantee's
heirs, and where their action for
the reformation of the deed on
that ground was brought with all
convenient speed, it was not
barred by "laches," which con-
notes not only undue lapse of
time, but also negligence and op-
portunity to have acted sooner.
Byrd v. O'Neal (91 S. E. 293),
106 S. C. 346.

2. A complaint by grantees filed
in 1915, praying the reformation
of a deed on the ground of mis-
take, which alleged that the deed
was executed in 1872, and that
the grantor died in 1901, states a
of action, though not
alleging when the mistake was
discovered or that the agreement
for the conveyance was in writ-
ing. Cook v. Knight (91 S. E.
312), 106 S. C. 310.

cause

3. The defense of laches applica-
ble to a suit for equitable relief
need not be set up specifically,
and if clearly established by the
evidence, relief will be denied by
the Court on its own motion.
Cook v. Knight (91 S. E. 312),
106 S. C. 310.

4. As the defense of laches need
not be formally pleaded and will
be applied by the Court on its
own motion, a complaint seeking
the reformation of a deed on the
ground of mistake is not subject
to a motion to make more definite
and certain, though not averring
when the mistake was discovered
or that the agreement for the
conveyance was in writing. Cook
v. Knight (91 S. E. 312), 106
S. C. 310.

5. The length of time which will
justify a Court of equity in re-
fusing relief on the ground of
laches depends upon the facts of
the particular case; laches con-
noting not only undue lapse of
time, but also negligence and op-
portunity to have acted sooner.
Cook v. Knight (91 S. E. 312),
106 S. C. 310.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. In action against oil company
for arrears of rent of land across

which railway was laid, question
whether plaintiff had a right to
lease the land for erection of
buildings, and to rentals until
the land was required for rail-
road purposes, held for the jury.
Shelton v. Southern Cotton Oil
Co. (90 S. E. 751), 106 S. C. 192.
2. In action for arrears of rent
under alleged lease, the sufficien-
cy of evidence to establish plain-
tiff's claim that defendant was
his tenant, having taken posses-
sion of a lot leased from plaintiff
by defendant's predecessor, and
so liable for rent, held for the
jury. Shelton v. Southern Cot-
ton Oil Co. (90 S. E. 751), 106
S. C. 192.

3. Under a rental agreement for
a period agreeable to the land-
lord, the tenant must vacate
when requested. Saine v. Hert-
zog (91 S. E. 859), 106 S. C. 501.
4. Manner and time in which land-
lord may terminate a lease for
a period agreeable to landlord
is not dependent upon his ten-
ant's reputation for chastity. Id.
5. One thousand dollars damages,
reduced by the trial Court to
$500, held not excessive where
plaintiff tenant was wrongfully
ejected by her landlord. Saine
v. Hertzog (91 S. E. 859), 106
S. C. 501.

See Charge to Juries. Saine v.
Hertzog (91 S. E. 859), 106 S. C.
501.

LIMITATIONS OF ESTATES.
See Deeds. Duncan v. Clarke (90
S. E. 180), 106 S. C. 17; Bank of
Prosperity v. Dominick (90 S. E.
264), 106 S. C. 120; Holder v.
Melvin (91 S. E. 97), 106 S. C.
245; Sanford v. Sanford (91 S.
E. 294), 106 S. C. 304; Wills,
De Leon v. DeLeon (91 S. E.
376), 106 S. C. 401.

LOGS AND LOGGING.

1. In an action of claim and de-
livery for a sawmill, where the
controversy was as to amount
due, under the contract defend-
ant was entitled to compensation
for boards manufactured and de-
livered at designated points, and
for the cutting and hacking of
lumber for plaintiffs, it was im-
proper to restrict his claim for
compensation to boards manu-
factured. Griggs v. Graves (91
S. E. 319), 106 S. C. 431.

MAGISTRATES.

1. A defendant sued in a magis-
trate's Court for damages to
plaintiff's land, who did not fol-
low the procedure prescribed by
Code Civ. Proc. 1912, sec. 87-91,
is precluded from questioning
plaintiff's title, and the magis-
trate has jurisdiction notwith-
standing Const., art. V, sec. 21,
and Code Civ. Proc. 1912, sec.
87, providing that the magis-
trate's jurisdiction shall not ex-
tend to cases where the title to
real estate is in question. Barnes
v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co.
(90 S. E. 1017), 106 S. C. 227.
2. Under Code Civ. Proc. 1912,
sec. 92, the magistrate is not de-
prived of jurisdiction of an ac-
tion for damages to plaintiff's
land by fire where defendant
did not appear at the trial and
dispute plaintiff's title. Id.
3. Jurisdiction of magistrate in
criminal cases. See Criminal
Law. State v. Mellette (91 S. E.
4), 106 S. C. 224.

4. Where there was evidence to
support finding of Circuit Court
reversing on appeal judgment of
magistrate, determination will