the legislature is presumed to have known and had in contemplation when these acts were passed.

The judgment is reversed, and complaint dismissed in both

cases.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GARY, MR. JUSTICE FRASER and CIRCUIT JUDGES MEMMINGER, BOWMAN, SHIPP, MOORE, SEASE, SMITH, WILSON, DEVORE and GARY concur in the opinion of the Court announced by MR. JUSTICE HYDRICK.

MR. JUSTICE WATTS, dissenting. I cannot concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Hydrick. I think that the plaintiffs' exceptions should be sustained.

Under the law all returns are required to be filed with the auditor between the 1st day of January and the 20th day of February. It is not contested but that the banks performed this duty, and that the returns were acted upon by the county board and turned over to the auditor, and thereby became under section 345 a permanent record for the tax of that year. When the return was accepted by the auditor without objection and passed by the township board of assessors and the county board of equalization, the auditor, or any one else, was without authority or jurisdiction thereafter to increase the return, and to arbitrarily order the increase without a hearing in the manner it was done was an illegal imposition of excessive taxes without authority, and verging on tyranny. The auditor had no authority, neither had the Comptroller General any authority, to change the returns made and accepted in accordance with law in this case.

The second contention of the plaintiffs should also be sustained. The legislature exempted the county bonds from taxation in no uncertain terms, for it provides:

"Said bonds shall be exempt from all taxes, State, county, and municipal taxes."

Dissenting Opinion.

[ 106 S. C. Could any language be plainer or more comprehensive? The object unquestionably was that the bonds would bring a better price being exempted from taxes, and no doubt they did. The county selling the bonds got a higher price as intended, and the plain intent of the legislature was that they be exempt of all taxes in whosesoever hands they might pass to, and in order that they might be taxed, it was left to the astute mind of some lawyer to suggest the refined difference between the bonds being owned by a corporation or individual and to have the Court to write in the plain words of an act of the legislature this refined distinction. The bonds in question belong to the shareholders of the bank. All the assets of the bank belong to its stockholders and shareholders. The bonds in question by act of legislature are exempt from taxes; it clearly was the intention of the legislature to exempt them whether owned by the individual or a corporation.

If a bank in South Carolina cannot own bonds, issued under the authority of its legislature, exempt from taxation without paying taxes thereon, notwithstanding this plain exemption, then the result will be that the banks of this State cannot afford to compete with banks outside of the State in purchasing bonds, and the bonds will be owned by nonresident owners and escape taxation. No one ever heard of a nonresident paying any taxes on any bond held outside of the State.

If the tax department would display the same zeal in getting on the tax books the invisible and intangible property in the State that escapes taxation as it does in collecting the visible and tangible property, such as real estate, banks, factories, railroads, and other corporations, then it would not be put to the necessity of claiming the refined difference, as is made in this case, between an individual owning the bonds escaping taxation and the bank corporation required to pay. To require the bank to pay on these bonds, in view of the

act of the legislature exempting them, is a great hardship, and for an individual to act under such circumstances as developed herein, he would be met with a charge of sharp practice and attempt to overreach the purchaser of the bonds, acting in good faith, thinking he was purchasing a bond, which was, what it purported to be, exempt by an act of the legislature "from all taxes, State, county, and municipal taxes."

For these reasons I think the plaintiffs were right in their contentions.

MR. JUSTICE GAGE concurs in the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WATTS.

CIRCUIT JUDGE PEURIFOY Concurs in the result.

CIRCUIT JUDGES RICE and MAULDIN concur in the result as to the bonds issued under act of legislature.

9546

CAROLINA NATIONAL BANK OF COLUMBIA v. SPIGNER, RICHLAND COUNTY TREASURER.

(90 S. E. 748.)

1. TAXATION-EXEMPTIONS-NATIONAL BANK-BONDS OF CITY-STATUTE. -Civ. Code 1912, secs. 341-347, relating to the taxation of banks and their shareholders, make no provision for the taxation of property belonging to banks, except their real estate, and provide that the shares of stock shall be taxed in the manner designated. Act Feb. 14, 1908 (25 St. at Large, p. 1872), authorizing the city council of the city of Columbia to issue coupon bonds, by section 2 exempts them from all county taxes, and by section 3 provides that so much of the capital stock or funds of any bank located within the city as shall be invested in such bonds shall be exempt from county taxation. Held, that under section 2 a bank in the city, holding and owning the city bonds, was not entitled to any deduction on the taxes to be paid by its shareholders on account of such bonds, since the property belonging to the bank and the property belonging to the shareholders is separate and distinct; and that, under section 3, no deduction in

the taxes to be paid by the shareholders on account of the bonds owned by the bank was to be allowed.

2. TAXATION-EXEMPTION-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.-Section 3 of such act, declaring that so much of the capital stock or funds of any bank located within the city as shall be invested in the city's bonds should be exempt from county taxation, even if construed as extending to the tax to be paid by the shareholders, violated Const., art. X, sec. 1, providing for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation.

Before MOORE, J., Columbia, July, 1915. Affirmed.

Actions by the Carolina National Bank of Columbia against Prescott B. Spigner, treasurer of Richland county. From a judgment of the Circuit Court, affirming a decree of the Court of Common Pleas for Richland county for the defendants in each case, and dismissing the complaint, the plaintiff appeals.

The decree of the Circuit Court was as follows:

This is an action brought by the plaintiff, the Carolina National Bank of Columbia, against the Treasurer of Richland County for the refunding of certain taxes paid by the plaintiff under protest, which taxes the plaintiff claims to have been wrongfully levied and collected by the said treasurer from the plaintiff.

It appears from the complaint in the within action that the plaintiff bank is the holder and owner of certain city of Columbia bonds to the amount of $100,000, which bonds were issued by and under the authority of an act to authorize the city council of the city of Columbia to issue coupon bonds at a rate of interest not exceeding 4 per cent. per annum, for the purpose of paying or exchanging the 4 per cent. coupon bonds and script of said city, maturing July 1, 1910, which act was approved on the 14th day of February, 1908. Sections 2 and 3 of the act referred to provide as follows:

"Sec. 2. That said bonds shall be exempt from all State, county and municipal (taxation) and the coupons shall be receivable in payment of taxes due the said city.

"Sec. 3. That so much of the (said) capital stock or funds of any bank or banking association, located within the city of Columbia, as is or shall be invested in bonds of this issue, shall be exempt from all State, county, township, municipal or other taxation."

In making the returns required by section 344, Code of Laws 1912, vol. I, the officers making the returns for the shareholders, after showing and including all surplus or extra moneys, capital and every species of personal property of value owned or in possession of said plaintiff bank, claimed and attempted to deduct from said total amount the amount of nontaxable bonds described in the complaint. The auditor, however, proceeded under section 345 of the Code in making up the assessments required to be made and apportioned among the shareholders, and acted under the instructions of the Comptroller General of South Carolina, and refused to allow any such deduction to the shareholders, and included the said nontaxable bonds.

The plaintiff bank contends that it is entitled for their shareholders to an exemption to the amount of the said bonds by reason of sections 2 and 3 of the act referred to.

The defendant in his answer denies that there has been an excess assessment and valuation against the stock of the said bank or shareholder of the said plaintiff bank; alleges that the assessment was made as required by law, and in the manner prescribed in sections 341 to 347, inclusive. Further answering the complaint, the defendant alleges that the shareholders, as owners of the shares of stock of said plaintiff bank, are not entitled to any exemption by reason of said city of Columbia bonds mentioned and described in the complaint, the bonds having been bought and being now held and owned by the bank, and denies that there should be any exemption or deduction from taxation to the value of the shares of the shareholders by reason of said bonds bought, held, and owned by the said plaintiff bank; that the bonds mentioned and described in the complaint have not been