Moral Sentiments; and the Reflex Sentiments. We shall consider them in order.

1. The Appetites.

26. The Appetites or Bodily Desires are common to man and brutes. The strongest and most obvious of them are the Appetites for Food (Hunger and Thirst), by which the individual is sustained; and that by which the species is continued. These appetites are tendencies towards certain bodily things, and cravings for these things when they are withheld.

But besides these, there are many other bodily Desires which may be classed with the Appetites, and which are powerful springs of action. Such are the desire of rest after labour, the desire of sleep after long waking, the desire of warmth and shelter, the desire of air and exercise.

These Desires are Natural Wants; they are Needs of man's nature. Man cannot exist at all, except they are satisfied in some degree; and cannot exist in a healthy and stable condition, except they are satisfied in an adequate degree.

27. Moreover, by the constitution of man, certain Pleasures are conjoined with the satisfying of these wants; and the Springs of Action, of which we now speak, include the Desire of these Pleasures. Thus, man has not only an appetite for food, but a desire of delicious food, and a Sense of Taste, by which he relishes such food. He has, in like manner, a pleasure in sweet odours, and a desire of this pleasure; and similarly for the other senses.

Man uses various Arts, to satisfy his natural wants, and to gratify his desires for the pleasures of sense, of which we have spoken. As such gratifications, through means of art, become habitual, they also become Wants, and are termed Artificial Wants.

VOL. I.-D

These Artificial Wants, no less than Natural Wants, are powerful Springs of Action among men.

2. The Affections.

28. The Affections are tendencies or cravings directed towards conscious individuals; not, like the Desires, tendencies and cravings for bodily objects. The Bodily Desires tend to things, Affections to Persons.

But the Affections are not mere tendencies or cravings, they are internal Emotions or Feelings: being directed to persons, not to things, they mould the thoughts in a way quite different from what the Appetites do.

29. The two principal affections are Love and Anger. The term Love, is sometimes used to describe the Bodily Desires, as when we talk of a Love of wine, or a Love of the pleasures of the table. But the more direct and proper sense of the word, is that in which it denotes an affection towards a person. A man's love of his wife and children is more properly Love, than his love of wine or of music.

30. The most important of the Affections which thus come under the name of Love are ;-the Love of the mother and of the father towards the children, Maternal and Paternal Love ;—the Love of children towards their parents, Filial Love;-the_Love of brothers and sisters towards each other, Fraternal Love; the special and distinguishing affection of man towards woman, and woman towards man, which tends to the conjugal union; this is often expressed by the word Love without any epithet; its natural sequel is Conjugal Love. Also, among the kinds of Love we must enumerate Friendship, and our Love of our Companions; likewise the Affection, so far as it partakes of the nature of Love, with which we regard

our fellow-citizens, our fellow-countrymen, our fellow

men.

31.

The Affection of Anger also appears in various forms. Anger comes into play against any one who assaults or threatens us, in man as in other animals; and this Affection, giving vehemence and rapidity to our actions, aids us in self-defence. Anger in this form is the natural repulsion and return to any harm which falls upon us or approaches us, and is called Resentment, as being the sentiment which is a natural re-action to the hostile sentiment of another person.

32.

The Affections conspire with the Desires. We are angry with those who take from us, or prevent our obtaining, what we desire. We love those who aid us in gratifying our desires. These affections are modified according to the circumstances under which they thus arise, and receive special names. Men feel Gratitude towards those who have conferred benefits upon them. As they feel sudden Resentment against a sudden attack, they feel Permanent Anger against those who have inflicted or endeavour to inflict pain or harm upon them, or whose desires come in conflict with theirs. When this feeling is no longer a burst of emotion, but a settled and steady feeling, it is Hatred, Malice, or Ill-will. When malice prompts men to return pain and harm to those from whom they have received pain or harm, it is Revenge.

All these Affections belong to the irascible part of man's nature.

33.

The Affections, as has been said, are directed towards persons. In speaking of them, we suppose him who feels them to live as a man among He is in Society; and his desires and affections are excited, determined, and modified by the circumstances of his social condition. These circumstances may be various, both for the individual, and

men.

for the general body of the society. There are various Forms and Stages of Society. We may conceive, as the original form, a society in which there are no Affections except the Family Affection, and no Appetites except the Natural Wants. But as the Society becomes more numerous, and Artificial Wants increase, many other kinds of relation and dependence grow up among the individuals who compose the society, and the Affections are modified by these new conditions.

34. In speaking of other Desires and Affections. which we still have to notice, we continue to suppose man existing in society: and we shall have to consider mainly, at first, those Desires and Affections which have reference to the intercourse of a man with other men.

3. The Mental Desires.

35. The Appetites are of the nature of Instincts, in that they tend to their objects, without their objects being present to the mind as abstract notions. But yet when we bring into view abstract notions, the bodily desires may be described as tendencies to such abstractions. Thus Hunger and Thirst may be described as the Desire of Food: which is, as we have seen (3), an abstract notion. All the Bodily Desires may be included in the Desire of Pleasure, which is a still more abstract notion.

As the developement of the human mind goes on by the exercise of thought (22), the objects of desire are all presented to the mind as abstract notions, more or less general. In this way, the Bodily De. sires may be presented in a general and abstract form. But besides these general and abstract forms of Bodily Desires, there are other Desires which cannot be conceived in any other way than with reference to abstractions; as the Desire of Fame,

the Desire of Knowledge. These we shal: call Mental Desires.

36. We now speak of those Springs of Action which result from the operations of the mind. Among such operations, besides those which have been referred to, we must place Memory, by which past facts and objects are recalled to the mind, and subjected to its view, in the same manner as if they were present; and Imagination, by which the distant, the absent, and the future is represented to the mind, under combinations and aspects imposed by the mind itself. These faculties fill up the abstract outline of the objects of desire, with particulars and images, by means of which they obtain a far stronger hold upon the purpose and will, than the mere abstraction of itself could have. By their means, the desire of a general and abstract object impels us, not merely with the force residing in the ultimate generality, but with a power belonging to the whole of the successive steps of generalization, from objects of sense upwards.

37. Every object of desire as contemplated by the mind may be described by a general term as a Good. Quicquid petitur petitur sub specie boni. This is the most general aspect of the objects of desire. Opposed to the objects of desire, are objects which we shun, as Pain, Constraint, and the Want or Privation of objects of desire. These are Evils. The mind, furnished with the stores of Memory, and exercising the powers of Imagination, can contemplate remotely future, as well as immediate gratifications, arising from the attainment of objects of desire. Such objects, contemplated as future, are wished for; if the attainment of our wishes, is deemed probable, they are hoped. The infliction of future evils, if probable, is feared. Evil so contemplated is Danger. Hope and Fear are springs of action no less powerful than present Desire.