such doubts, is to be sought by the further use of the means by which the Conscience is enlightened and instructed. When the doubts turn rather upon special points than upon the general course of action, they are Scruples of Conscience.

What a person can do without offending against his Conscience, when the question has been deliber ately propounded and solved in his own mind, he does with a safe conscience, or with a good conscience.

CHAPTER XV.

CASES OF CONSCIENCE RESPECTING TRUTH.

374. It will appear from the preceding Chapter, that in all right action, the Conscience is employed, consciously or unconsciously. A man is bound in Conscience to do what he thinks right; but he is also bound to employ his faculties diligently, in ascertain. ing what is right. In cases in which, he has not ascertained what is right, his Conscience is doubtful; and for the purposes of right action, it is requisite that these doubts be removed. Cases which are considered by Moralists with the view of doing this, are Cases of Conscience.

We are not to suppose that any particular Class of questions in Morals are Cases of Conscience. Every case of Moral action is, for the person who acts, a Case of Conscience. But in the greater part of such cases, the Rule of Duty is so plain and obvious, that no doubt arises, as to the course of action; and thus, no internal inquiry brings the Conscience into notice. In cases in which there appear to be conflicting Duties, or reasons for opposite courses of action, we must endeavour to decide between them,'

by enlightening and instructing the conscience; and these are especially termed Cases of Conscience.

375. Since, in Cases of Conflicting Duties, whichever way we decide, one Duty is, or seems to be, evaded or violated, Cases of Conscience, as proposed by Moralists, have often the aspect of Questions as to when Duties may be evaded or violated. To discuss such questions, has been supposed, by the world in general, more likely to pervert than to improve men's minds; and hence Casuistry, the part of Morality which is concerned with such discussions, has often been looked upon with dislike.

376. But the question, in every Case of Conscience, really is, not, How may Duty be evaded? but, What is Duty ?-not, How may I avoid doing what I ought to do? but, What ought I to do? And this is a question which a virtuous man cannot help perpetually asking himself; and to which the answer may very often be far from obvious. In such Cases, he will be glad to know to what decision the Moralist, treating such questions in a general form, and free from the influence of personal temptation, has been led. We shall here consider a few questions of this kind.

There occur Cases of Conscience respecting all Classes of Duties: but in many of these Classes, the decision of the question may require a more exact determination of the Conceptions involved in it; for instance, in questions concerning Duties of Justice, of Humanity, which conceptions will be examined hereafter. But there are some Cases which we may consider by the aid of Rules and Maxims already laid down.

Such are particularly the Cases which respect the Duties of Truth (Subjective Truth, Veracity). The Rules Lie not, Perform your Promise, are of universal validity; and the conceptions of Lie, and of Promise, are so simple and distinct, that, in general, the

Rules may be directly and easily applied. We shall consider first some such Questions relative to Promises.

377. In what sense are Promises to be interpreted? We have already said (315), that the Mutual Understanding of the two parties, at the time of making the promise, is the sense in which it is the Promiser's Duty to fulfil it. This is the right interpretation of the promise, because the promise expressed and established this Mutual Understanding. If the Promiser, intending deceit to the Promisee, or to other persons, has used expressions, with a view to their being misunderstood, he has already violated the Duty of Truth. If he repent of this, his only way of resuming a moral condition is, to carry back the effect of his repentance to the time of making the promise, and to act as if he had intended what he was understood to intend.

Since the Promiser may be the only speaker in the transaction, and the Promisee may imply his acceptance of the Promise, and the sense in which he understands it, only by his silence, or by words of assent; we may state, as the Rule in such cases, that the Promiser is bound in the sense in which he believes the Promisee to understand him. For this is the only Common Understanding between them.

378. It may be, that the Common Understanding of what the Promiser is to do for the Promisee, includes some suppositions which are afterwards discovered to be false; and it may be asked if the Promise is still binding. This is the case of Erroneous Promises. And the answer to the question is, that the false supposition releases the Promiser, so far as it was included in the Common Understanding. Thus a person solicits alms from you, telling you the tale of his distresses. Your purse being empty at the time, you promise to relieve him if he will call again. In the mean time, you discover that his story contain

ed falsehood. How far are you bound by your Promise? It is plain that if the Promise was understood by both of you to be unconditional, and the delay to take place merely on account of the state of your purse, the Promise is binding. But if the Promise was understood to be conditional, on the truth of the tale; and if the falsehoods are material; the Promiser is released. Yet it must be very difficult for the Promiser to know how far his Promise is hypothetically understood. And therefore, to avoid the moral trouble which such doubts produce, it is wise in such cases to express the condition on which the Promise is given.

379. There is one circumstance__respecting Promises which must be noticed. The Duty which they create, is not an absolute, but a Relative Duty. It is a Duty relative to the Promisee only. He is the only person affected by the non-performance of the Promise. He has a Moral Claim for this performance; but he may relinquish this Claim, as he may relinquish any Right or Possession. And when he has done this, the duty of performing the promise ceases. Hence it is laid down, as a Rule of Morality respecting Promises, that they are not binding when released by the Promisee.

380. The principal Class of Cases of Conscience respecting Promises is, that of what are called Unlawful Promises; that is, Promises to do an immoral act; for we are not now speaking of law, but of morality.

When the immoral character of the act was known to the parties at the time, the Question of Immoral Promises is answered by recollecting what has been said (358) respecting violations of Duty. The transgressor ought to repent and amend; and as a part his amendment, he ought not to go on with an immoral act which is begun. To Promise, and to Perform, are parts of the same connected act. If the

of

Performance be immoral, the Promise was so. To promise, was a transgression of Duty begun; to perform, is to complete the transgression. It is my Duty to stop in the mid course of the act, as it was my Duty not to enter upon it at first. When the question of Duty is proposed, there can be no other answer.

This applies at once to all promises to perform, or to participate in, any act of violence, injustice, fraud, or impurity. In all such cases, the Promiser, by his Promise, has rejected his moral nature; and can only resume it, by repudiating his own act. Even to do this, does not leave him blameless; for, as we have said, repentance does not obliterate past guilt; but this is necessary: this is the only way in which he can avoid the continuation and further degradation of his moral condition. He offended in the Promise; he offends again in the Performance. Whatever Temptation led him to sin, in the first part of the act; he sins against conviction, if he perform his promise, when the question has been brought before his conscience.

381. But in breaking my Promise, immoral though it be, I violate my Relative Duty to the Promisee; and the case may be one in which he denies, and even blamelessly denies, the immorality of the act promised. For instance, I have promised the less worthy Candidate for an office, that I will vote for him. I cannot expect to induce him to release me from my Promise, by representing to him his own unworthiness. Nevertheless, my relative Duty to him must give way to my absolute Duty of voting for the most worthy Candidate. But though I now do what I ought, I am not therefore blameless as to the past. The violation of a Relative Duty, is an offence against the Promisee. He has good reason to complain of me; and I have reason to feel repentance and shame, for having given him a claim upon me which I can