On what ground of right does France base her claim to recover Alsace and Lorraine ?

Is it on behalf of the right of nationality that she urges this claim? Is it because the peoples of the Rhenish provinces desire the change?

Alsace is German; Lorraine is of uncertain nationality.

On this subject it will not be amiss to make a brief excursus into history.

France obtained possession of Alsace in 1697, partly through intrigues and partly through success in war; but Louis the Fourteenth very soon after formed the opinion that this province was not necessary to his kingdom, and was ready to restore it to Germany after Malplaquet. He kept it, however, and expelled from French territory the Pretender to the English throne. By this ignoble act the Grand Monarque procured the friendship and favour of Queen Anne, who in the treaty that was soon afterwards concluded proposed terms of peace that were less disastrous to her neighbour across the Channel than those that would otherwise have been offered.

The conquest of Lorraine is of more recent date. It was conceded to France in 1766; and to Duke Francis the Third, who had claims upon the territory, Tuscany was granted by way of compensation. This was at a period when Italy, divided up into twelve States, and weak withal, served as a place of refuge for dispossessed princes. It was the Treaty of Vienna of 1738 (the precursor of the treaty which was still more injurious for us-that of 1815) which thus disposed of the throne of the Medici.

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This chopping and changing of dominions was wrought at the will of princes and rulers, and without regard being had to any idea of nationality or to the wishes of the inhabitants. In 1738, just as in 1871, it was solely the right of the conqueror' that was the principle of the treaty and at the present day also nothing is known to have been done which points to a need of the modification of existing treaties.

Alsace and Lorraine have now for twenty-seven years formed an integral part of the German Empire; and during this long period the inhabitants of those provinces have shown no sign of being dissatisfied with their position. At Paris the people are continually giving expression to their feelings by clamours and demonstrations, or by placing garlands on the statue of Strasbourg; but at Strasbourg and at Metz the Emperor William is cheered by the citizens whenever he visits those cities.

We Italians have other records to boast of, and we have given to the world examples of how we bear ourselves in the face of foreign occupations of our country. In 1815 the Powers assembled at Vienna put our peninsula under the sway of Austria, handing over to that Power the direct rule of a portion of Italy, while

other parts were to be governed by princes who were merely lieutenants of Austria. Very speedily did the people utter their protest, by an insurrection against the hated tyranny of Austria, and peace was only restored when the Austrian departed from our country.

The comparison between the Italy of not long ago and the Alsace and Lorraine of to-day will show in the clearest manner the reason for the old unrest of the former and for the tranquil condition of the latter. We see, on the one hand, the inhabitants of the Rhenish provinces, who by the fortunes of war in 1871 were placed again in the fatherland that was theirs of old, show no signs of a disposition to change; on the other, a Government at Paris which wants to get back these provinces, and which, not being itself strong enough to attain this end, has found an ally to help it.

In consenting to this alliance the Czar has undoubtedly not acted without receiving the promise of a quid pro quo.

The treaty which we are discussing is the second Franco-Russian treaty of the century that is now drawing to a close. The times, however, are changed, the conditions of Europe are very different to-day from those which existed ninety years ago; very different too, are the men who rule over it.

The Continent in those days, from the Pyrenees to the Vistula, from Naples to Warsaw, was under the sway of Napoleon. France had only two enemies, England and Austria; and the great Emperor was in a position to propose to the Czar Alexander the division of Europe into two.

Now, however, the parts are inverted on the Continent: France is isolated, and for that reason she has had to seek after the alliance of Russia by sacrificing the principles which ought to inspire the Government of the Republic. Would that this might be the limit of the mischief! But it is natural to presume that the stipulations in favour of Russia in the treaty contain a possible future danger for the liberties of the peoples of Europe.

At Tilsit Napoleon flatly vetoed the possession of Constantinople, and in the treaty of the 12th of October 1808, signed at Erfurt, conceded only the dominion of Moldavia and Wallachia. To-day such a concession would not be possible.

Moldavia and Wallachia no longer belong to Turkey; blended into one independent kingdom under the guarantee of the Great Powers, and wisely governed by King Charles, they offer no pretext for destroying their autonomy.

From these data the conclusion must follow that the Dual Alliance, which has its origin in unsatisfied ambitions, will bring on war. The same cannot be said of the Triple Alliance.

The Triple Alliance has been a pledge of peace in Europe. In the fifteen years that it has existed it has not been the cause of any action tending to irritate other nations. The reason of this is quite

manifest not one of the three allied monarchies has any ulterior object to pursue their interests are limited to the conservation of what they possess, and consequently to the refraining from putting their possessions in any jeopardy. And this they could do in no other way save by keeping the peace.

The Dual Alliance affords us no feeling of security, and it is no haphazard judgment of it that we express when we maintain that Europe has a right to be suspicious.

France wants the provinces which she lost in 1871; Russia, in return for her co-operation, demands dominion over Constantinople. We must not forget that in 1888 it was not Russia's fault that the peace was not broken in consequence of the election of Prince Ferdinand to the throne of Bulgaria. And we may feel proud to be able to say that in that year the initiative in the amicable compromise came from Italy.

Only oneho pe can arise in our mind, which is that the present alliance between the Czar and the French Republic may have the same end as that of 1808 between the two Emperors. The alliance arranged at Erfurt was never put into execution. Through various exigencies of government, disputes speedily sprang up, and in less than three years Napoleon and Alexander became enemies again. It is not inopportune to call to mind that the apple of discord between the two was the reconstitution of Poland.

But in politics men do not live on hope:

Caveant consules.

F. CRISPI.

THE MONETARY CHAOS

REPORTS a few weeks ago as to the nature and objects of the American bimetallic mission to this country, and the probability of the Government here agreeing to their proposals as the Bank of England had already been arranged with, revived once more the endless bimetallic discussion and brought into relief some of the uglier features of the bimetallic agitation itself. There was a revolt in the City in consequence, as there is certain to be always when bimetallism is pressed home; and the Indian Government had to object very strenuously to re-opening its currency question, in the midst of the formidable difficulties with which it is surrounded, at the bidding and for the convenience of foreign Governments. The crisis is believed to be at an end with the recent meeting of the Cabinet, and the official correspondence since published is superficially to that effect. The proposals of the American Commissioners are already set aside temporarily, and it may be hoped they are set aside for good. But there is a good deal in the official correspondence that is not at all reassuring. The proposals were much worse than the City had any notion of, and they were dealt with in a dilatory fashion instead of being summarily dismissed. That British ministers should listen gravely to proposals that they should not only reopen the Indian mints to the coinage of silver, but should arrange for the Bank of England to keep a fifth of its reserve in silver, should withdraw half-sovereigns from circulation and issue small notes instead, and should purchase 10,000,000l. of silver annually in order to rehabilitate silver, is not pleasant to read of in a country which has a monetary history like that of England. The occasion seems a good one, therefore, to read the lesson of the bimetallic agitation itself, to discuss the features of the monetary chaos which has resulted, and to insist on the principles which ought to guide this country through the difficulties which have been created, and which foreign nations also must follow if agitation and unrest are to come to an end.

The monetary chaos of the present time, to sum up the situation in a sentence, results entirely from the determination of one or two Governments-the United States and India-to depart from elemen

tary principles in establishing their standard money. These principles are, that the standard which is to be the sole measure of value and unlimited legal tender in a country should consist of one metal only, because there cannot and ought not to be two or more; that the coinage of this metal should be automatic-that is, at the pleasure of those who bring it to the mint, Government meddling no further with the business than by stamping the metal so as to indicate its weight and fineness; and that Governments should refrain from any measures directly intended to alter or affect the value of the standard, or to make money abundant or the reverse, or to attain a stable par of exchange with other moneys, or between gold and silver themselves, because this is to embark on a course where there is no goal, and which will create an endless monetary discussion, and so produce discredit and unrest. Let us see what has happened.

To begin with the United States, nothing could have been simpler there than the position in 1873-78, on the eve of the resumption of specie payments. The country had just emerged from a great panic which was partly the result of the inconvertible paper itself, and the Government were in a position to resume specie payments on the basis of a single gold standard which had been in existence practically for many years before the Civil War led to the issue of inconvertible paper, and had also been in existence theoretically from 1873, when preparations began to be made for the resumption. The United States had only to let well alone to be in the same position after 1878 as England has been since 1816. With an automatic gold standard they would have had a perfect money for the ordinary transactions of life, and many agitations and panics would have been spared them. No further great demand for gold would have been needed beyond what was accumulated before 1878, for the paper was sufficiently protected by that time, and a good deal more paper could have been. protected by the same stock. Some improvement in the banking system would have been expedient, but even without that improvement the United States could have got on. But the soft money' party in the States wrecked everything. Failing to obtain the establishment of bimetallism which they first went for, the silverites of the United States managed in 1878 to pass the famous Bland Act decreeing the purchase and coinage as full legal tender of so much. silver annually. Ever since there has been an incessant battle either for free coinage of silver or for larger and larger coinage, till the assurance of a certain gold standard has been lost, and the United States Government has invested 100,000,000l. in wholly unsaleable and totally useless silver-silver which might just as well be used in making silver coffins, to use the phrase of a humorous correspondent, and in so restoring it to the earth from which the miners have taken it. Bad as the loss of money is, the effect of what has been done in the United States in impairing the gold standard is worse. In all the history of money there has been no such period of discredit as