military strength equal to that of any nation; and that, with the strong feeling of loyalty that evidently actuated every part, the Empire might defy the attacks of all comers. All this was apt to create an over-confidence in the public mind.

Of all the millions who witnessed the great pageants in June last, how very few considered the weak points!—the diminution in trade, the vanishing profits, the increasing foreign competition, and the destruction of the agricultural interest. How few considered the danger to England, and through her to the Empire, of the precarious and hand-to-mouth food supply! Every day that things go on as they are, we are in danger a danger that is constantly becoming more threatening. Our Empire is leaving it in the power of two not overfriendly nations to combine, and, by putting an embargo upon all food products, to be able, possibly, to starve England into submission; and this they might do without capturing a gunboat, without winning a battle, without firing a shot. The sea routes might be kept open in every direction, but as the nations other than Russia and the United States, which alone could supply food, only send her now 4,271,000 quarters, which presumably is the greater portion of their surplus, they certainly could not supply, in addition, more than a very small fraction of the 19,160,000 quarters which the United Kingdom would require to feed her people.

The Mother Country is to-day, as a nation, in the position, as it were, of an impregnable fortress, which has been armed with the finest artillery, supplied with munitions of war and military matériel without limit, garrisoned beyond its need, and stored with water for years, but in which no provision has been made for a secure supply of food, without which all the other precautions are absolutely useless. The great lesson to us all is that every effort should be made by all parts of the Empire to have this evil remedied, and the food supply made safe, in order that we may be self-dependent and self-sustaining in every particular. The food to feed the British people should be grown upon British soil, under the flag of the Empire, where it could be secured in case of war, and where it would be among people ready to fight for it and guard it for the common cause.

I discussed this question with many people in England, and with some of the best authorities, and the replies to my suggestions of danger were varied. Some would not discuss the possibility of war with the United States. Canadians, who are better able to judge of the state of feeling on this continent, know that if England were in a life-and-death struggle, and particularly if it were with Russia, the United States would be almost certain to throw in their whole strength against England. The belief which they have, that in combination with Russia they would with ease be able by a joint embargo to bring England to her knees, adds greatly to the danger of war. England's food supply were safe within her Empire, the United States

If

Government would be more inclined for peace, and their diplomatic tone would at once become more courteous. Some thought that in case of war these nations would not put an embargo on food products because it would interfere with their trade, and that, having command of the sea, Great Britain could get the food. They seemed to forget that, if we had command of the sea, these nations would have only one possible weapon, an embargo on food, and would be driven to use the only offensive action possible. Then some relied on trade theories, such as that the demand would create the supply, which they thought would override all military conditions. I asked why the demand did not create the supply for the French in Paris in 1870. Then they admitted that war did sometimes upset trade theories.

I found a general confidence that theories of some kind, or luck, or a kind Providence, or something, would bring them through all right; but I found no one able to satisfy me as to how England could be fed under the war conditions I have mentioned. No one seemed to appreciate that in the great wars with Napoleon the United Kingdom was able to feed itself, and that even as late as the Crimean War in 1854-5 the home production was, after deducting seed, 16,427,742 quarters and the imports only 2,983,000 quarters. The present condition of Great Britain is without a parallel either in its own history or the history of any great nation. England is living from hand to mouth more than people have any idea of. I found from the best authority I could get in Liverpool, that in August, when I was there, the supply of wheat in the hands of importers was for between three and four weeks only-inquiry in a number of bakers' shops disclosing the fact that the average supply in them was for about four or five days, in the large bakeries less than a week, in the mills three or four weeks. Two months' stoppage of foreign corn would reduce the rations for the people to about one-fourth of what is required, and half of it would have to be secured by the command of many divergent and lengthened

sea routes.

The belief in the certainty of keeping command of the sea is also another instance of the feeling of over-confidence to which I have already alluded. I do not believe Great Britain can obtain the absolute and complete command of the sea everywhere. She may be able, and I hope and believe she will be able, to command certain routes and keep them open. She may be able to be in command, at any particular point where it is necessary for her to be in command, but it is unreasonable to expect that any fleet of 500 or even 700 ships could command all the sea routes, all the time, in all parts of the world. For this reason the food supply is the great and pressing danger, and should be put right at all hazards and at whatever cost may be necessary, either in money or theories.

There are several ways in which matters might be improved. National granaries is one suggestion, for which much can be said, and

if adopted would make the Empire safer; but it would be a very costly method, and would be a greater burden in money than a duty on foreign corn, which might be imposed in place of the duty on tea, tobacco, and some other articles in common use by the people. Granaries, while adding to the safety, would add nothing to the wealth, progress, or stability of the Empire; but preferential tariffs would strengthen the Colonies immensely in population and wealth, would in the end strengthen and increase the trade of England, and would bind all parts of the Empire in the bonds of a common interest. If the preference was greater in favour of the home farmer, it would revive agriculture, and give employment to hundreds of thousands of men who are competing with the factory hands and tending to reduce wages. A sufficient duty, and it need not be large, would ensure within the British Isles the growth of 15,000,000 quarters of wheat, instead of five or six millions as at present. A small preference of two or three shillings a quarter against the foreigner would increase the Canadian production by leaps and bounds. We have in Canada fertile wheat-bearing land, capable of producing the finest wheat in the world, in quantities far more than sufficient to feed Great Britain ; and a slight preference would send emigration to fill up our fields and strengthen a portion of the Empire, instead of fostering and encouraging and building up foreign countries, which may at any time be hostile.

The sea route from Canada to England from the Straits of Belle Isle to the North of Ireland is almost a British route. It has no foreign naval stations to the North, and it is guarded by our stations at Halifax and St. John's on the West, and Portsmouth, Plymouth, Milford Haven and Bear Haven on the East. It is, without any doubt, the safest and most easily defended sea route from England in any direction.

The objection to this suggestion is that it would aid Canada. If it is not more important for England, and more advantageous to her ten times over than to Canada, it is not worth discussing; Canada is getting on all right. If her progress is not very fast, it is sure and on solid ground. We are not afraid of being starved into submission, and believe we can hold our freedom as a people, if it comes to straight fighting, as our fathers did in 1812, 1813, and 1814, against odds many times greater than we are likely to have to encounter now. But the British Empire is our Empire, as it is the Empire of every part; and we are as much interested in the safety of the heart of it as is any portion, and we have the right to urge that England shall take steps to make her condition safe.

If such a war should happen as we have been discussing, the heaviest brunt of the fighting would fall upon the Canadian people. Russia would probably attack India; and the United States, Canada. It is not a pleasant prospect for us to look forward to, with England's

food supply in the condition it is. Six millions of us Northern men, fighting on our own soil for our homes and freedom and all we hold dear, would, we believe, be able to hold our own in spite of the odds; but in what a position would we be placed, if we heard of the men, women, and children of England starving and pleading for peace, and being told by the United States that we must lay down our arms before they would send the food to save the lives of our brethren in England!

We have a right to ask the English people to provide against this disaster, either by granaries, bounties, preferential tariffs, or in any other way. This should be done, not to carry out or to upset any trade theories, but as an insurance against a great national danger, as a necessary expenditure, as a war measure of defence.

GEORGE T. DENISON.

The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake
to return unaccepted MSS.

INDEX TO VOL. XLII

The titles of articles are printed in italics