witness has religious convictions and a belief in punishment after death, as bearing upon the question whether he is likely to appreciate the solemn obligation of an oath; for the legal oath as administered according to forms generally in use involves an appeal to a Supreme Being. However, the object of the courts in requiring the administration of an oath to witnesses is to secure so far as practicable the speaking of the truth, and the oath may be varied so as to impose upon the witness in the manner most effectual as to him the obligation to speak the truth.

Religious toleration is also the rule in all states, and involves as it is sometimes expressed the right to worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience. But as a civil right, religious freedom is broader than this and involves freedom from compulsion with reference to any religious observances. The establishment of any religion by the state is inconsistent with religious liberty, for it must necessarily result in some discrimination against or compulsion upon persons who conscientiously adhere to some other form of religion or are not believers in any religion. The union of church and state in any form or for any purpose is inconsistent with our constitutional theory of government. It is widely recognized in the United States as beyond the proper functions of civil government to concern itself with the religious beliefs of its subjects, so far as such beliefs do not lead to actions inconsistent with the public health, public morals, or general welfare of the people. In other words, government concerns itself with acts rather than with beliefs or motives.

Complete religious liberty does not, however, necessitate an ignoring in public affairs of the fact that men in general entertain religious beliefs and that the Christian religion is the predominating form of religious belief among the people of the United States. Forms of religious observances in accordance with the accepted doctrines of Christianity are generally recognized or acquiesced in by public authorities. Thus, it is customary in the houses of Congress, and in many if not all of the legislative bodies in the states, to have the proceedings opened

with public prayer offered in accordance with the general beliefs entertained by Christian denominations, although it is not usual to give any preference or exclusive privilege to the forms practised by one denomination over those of others. It is customary also for the president of the United States and the governors of the various states by public proclamation to set apart a special day in each year for thanksgiving; and special occasions for thanksgiving are sometimes indicated in the same way. Chaplains are appointed and paid by the federal government to perform religious offices in the army and navy and by state governments in the various state institutions. By law ministers of the gospel and other religious teachers are sometimes exempt from jury service and prohibited from testifying as to communications made to them in their religious capacity. These various provisions are not in the nature of the establishment of religion, or any form of religion, but rather in recognition of the fact that by general custom religion is considered not inimical to but rather promotive of the public welfare.

208. Taxation for the Support of Religion.

Complete religious liberty is not, however, secured by exemption from religious tests as a qualification for voting and holding office, nor by guaranteeing toleration and freedom from restraint as to religious beliefs. Any exaction of support for religious organizations or observances by way of taxation would also be an interference with religious liberty. The same causes which forbid restraint or compulsion of the person with regard to religion would also forbid compulsory contribution of property for its support, and the various state constitutions generally contain some prohibition of this character. Such a prohibition not only prevents the establishment of a state church to be supported by taxation, but also precludes the support by public taxation of educational institutions devoted to the promulgation of any particular form of religion.

The controversies which have actually arisen in the courts as to religious liberty have related for the most part to the use of public money in aiding the schools under the control of some

particular religious sect or the introduction into schools supported by public taxation of some form of religious worship or instruction. (See Pfeiffer v. Board of Education and State v. District Board.) No satisfactory rule can be derived from the decisions of the courts with reference to these questions, for the reason that they have been made in applying the particular provisions of the different state constitutions, which are by no means uniform in their requirements; but this, perhaps, may safely be said, that the reading without comment of portions of the bible in the public schools is not an interference with religious liberty, provided attendance at such exercise is not made compulsory on the part of the scholars who desire to be excused, or whose parents desire to have them excused, on account of conscientious scruples. With regard to the use of public money in aiding sectarian schools a similar principle must be applied, and if attendance in the school is permitted only to those entertaining some particular form of religious belief, or if the school gives some form of religious instruction, or if it imposes any conditions which exclude pupils on account of religious belief or want of belief, it cannot properly be given appropriations or support from the funds raised by public taxation.

Similar questions have been made as to the constitutionality of exemptions from taxation of property devoted to religious purposes. It might reasonably be argued that to exempt property devoted to sectarian purposes from taxation is in effect to promote such purposes at the public expense, but it may be said, on the other hand, that such property is devoted to a benevolent purpose and a purpose which the state may legitimately encourage in the same way that property devoted to the use and support of private educational institutions, libraries, charitable societies, and other like objects is devoted to a use beneficial to the public, and may be exempted from taxation on the same general grounds. The amount of taxation of which the state is deprived by the exemption of property devoted to religious purposes is so small as compared with the total amount realized from general taxation, that the increase

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Sunday Laws.

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of burden thus thrown on other property owners may reasonably be disregarded. Moreover, the exemption of such property is not directly but only indirectly and remotely the imposition of any pecuniary burden, and such exemptions are generally sustained as proper when authorized by law.

209. Sunday Laws; Blasphemy, etc.

In the promotion of the general public welfare, the lawmaking power may properly take into account the fact that the great majority of the people recognize as desirable the setting apart of the first day of the week as a day on which ordinary business shall be suspended in order that they may have opportunity for undisturbed religious assemblies and exercises if they see fit; and it is regarded as proper and constitutional to prohibit the transaction of business or the performance of labor on such day, save as may be necessary to the public welfare or promotive of charity or religion. Such statutory provisions are supported, not as intended directly to compel or promote religious observances, but rather as securing the general tranquillity and welfare of the people. Perhaps a Sunday law could be sustained on the theory that it is conducive to the general health and prosperity of the people that they have an opportunity to devote one day in seven to rest from their regular callings. Without inquiring very particularly into the grounds on which Sunday laws have been sustained it is sufficient to say that they have been generally held to be constitutional, even as to persons whose conscientious belief requires them to set apart some other day of the week for religious purposes; but it is not unusual to exempt from the provisions of the law those who conscientiously observe some other day.

Laws for the punishment of profane swearing and blasphemy are also sustained, as calculated to prevent conduct shocking and obnoxious to the general sentiments of the people and productive of disturbance and disorder. Punishment for such offences is not imposed on account of the moral wrong done, but on account of the injury to others which results.

Disturbance of religious worship is generally punishable, but

this is rather for the preservation of the public peace and protection of the people in the exercise of religious liberty than as a recognition of religion in any form. In this instance, as in others, the government in making and enforcing the laws has regard to the general peace and welfare rather than to the protection of religion.

210. Religious Belief no Defence for Violating Law. When in the exercise of its legitimate authority and for purposes recognized as proper to be considered and promoted, the legislative power has prohibited any act or line of conduct, the conscientious belief that such prohibition is wrong and that the act or conduct prohibited is required as a religious duty will not be an excuse or defence for a violation of the law. Religious liberty does not include or involve the right or duty to violate the law. It is not necessary here to enter into any philosophical discussion as to possible conflicts between the law of the land and any assumed, natural, moral, or higher law. For the purposes of government, its authority exercised within its recognized sphere must be paramount to any other authority. Therefore, conscientious belief that war is wrong or immoral or contrary to divine law will not justify a refusal to pay taxes for the raising of funds to be used in military operations; and the persons thus refusing to contribute to the support of the government in the exercise of one of its recognized functions can properly be subjected to whatever penalty or punishment is provided in such cases. Likewise, compulsory military service may be required of such persons. But in the full recognition. of religious liberty it may be provided that persons who have a conscientious objection to war may be excused from military service on payment of some pecuniary equivalent. As a further illustration of the principle that religious belief is no excuse for violation of law it has been held that persons entertaining the belief recognized by one branch of the Mormon church that polygamy is morally right and commendable, may without interference with their religious belief be required to abstain from polygamous marriages on penalty of criminal punishment (Reynolds v. United States).