the printing and publication of public documents or bulletins, prepare, print and distribute to such persons as may be interested, or may apply therefor, a quarterly or semi-annual bulletin in suitable paper covers, containing results of inspections, results of analyses made by the chemist for the dairy and food commission, with popular explanations of the same and such other information as may come to him in his official capacity, relating to the adulteration of food, drug and drink products and of dairy products so far as he may deem the same of benefit and advantage to the public; also a brief summary of the work done during the quarter by the commissioner and his assistants in the enforcement of the dairy and food laws of the state; but not more than fifteen thousand copies of each such quarterly bulletin shall be printed.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

The following compilation of supreme court decisions is faken from the report of Commissioner Jones of Illinois, 1906.

The following compilation of Supreme Court decisions is given that the rules for construing food laws may be understood and that the public may know what protection they have, and dealers may know to what extent and when they are liable under the laws, as construed by courts of last resort, and the first to be considered and the one most frequently presented is the question of intent.

IGNORANCE OF FACT OF ADULTERATION DOES NOT EXCUSE DEALER.

That a dealer may not know that an article sold or offered for sale is adulterated and yet be liable to punishment for selling or offering the same for sale, when selling or offering for sale, or having in possession with intent to sell, is prohibited by statute, I think well settled, as will be seen by an examination of the compilation of authorities hereinafter set forth and the rules as well as the reason therefor will be found in the case of State vs. Kelly, 54 O. S., 166, as follows:

At page 177 the Court states that the law under which the prosecution was brought, it being the first section of the Act of March 20, 1884 (Sec. 8805-1, rev. statutes), "That no person shall, within this State, manufacture for sale, offer for sale or sell any drug or article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this Act."

Further on, at page 178, the Court reasons:

The Act is not a provision for the punishment of those who sell adulterated foods or drugs, because of any supposed turpitude prompting such sales. Its purpose is indicated by its title. It is "An Act to provide against the adulteration of foods and drugs." It is a plan devised by the General Assembly to protect the public against the hurtful consequences of the sales of adulterated foods and drugs, those consequences being in no degree increased by the vendor's knowledge or diminished by his ignorance of the adulteration of the articles which he offers for sale. The provisions of the Act are appropriate to the purposes indicated by its title. It would have been inconsistent with that purpose to provide for the trial of such immaterial issues as the object of the vendor in making a sale or of the extent of his knowledge touching the quality of the article sold. Those who produce the adulterated articles whose sale is forbidden may live without the State. Purpose and knowledge, except when they are indicated by the character of the forbidden act, are, in most cases, insusceptible of proof. If this statute had imposed upon the State the burden of proving the purpose of the vendor in selling an article of food or his knowledge of its adulteration, it would thereby have defeated its declared purpose. Since it is the duty of courts to so construe doubtful statutes as to give effect to the purpose of the Legislature, they can.

not in case of a statute whose provisions are unambiguous and whose validity is clear, defeat its purpose by construction.

The Court further along, citing cases, reasons:

In Commonwealth vs. Farren, 9 Allen, 489, in construing a statute which provides that "whoever sells or keeps or offers for sale adulterated milk or milk to which water or any foreign substance has been added" shall be punished as provided. It was held that it is not necessary either to allege or prove that the accused knew that the milk he offered for sale was adulterated. With respect to a similar statute the same conclusion was reached in State vs. Smith, 10 R. I., 258. If knowledge of the adulteration were an element of the offense, it would be incumbent upon the State to establish it; but since it is not, the defendant could derive no advantage from any evidence tending to show the absence of such knowledge.

And the Court concluded this decision on page 180 with the following language:

In the enactment of this statute, it was the evident purpose of the General Assembly to protect the public against the harmful consequences of the sales of adulterated food and drugs, and, to the end that its purpose might not be defeated, to require the seller at his peril to know that the article which he offers for sale is not adulterated, or to demand of those from whom he purchases indemnity against the penalties that may be imposed upon him be- . cause of their concealment of the adulteration of the articles.

It is a well settled principle of law, established by an almost unvarying current of authorities both in this country and England, that guilty knowledge on the part of the seller need not be averred and proved, unless it is an essential element in the offense charged. In the opinion just delivered by the circuit court of Summitt county, in David Meyer vs. The State, 10 C. C. R., 226, Hale, J., says: "It may be fairly inferred that the legislature of the state intended by this positive enactment to prohibit absolutely the sale of adulterated wine, and that knowledge by the accused of its adulteration is not an essential element of the crime. It must be conceded that the object and purpose of this statute, if not wholly subverted, would be weakened to that extent that it would in nowise accomplish the results intended by its enactment, if the accused may go acquit by simply showing that he did not know the nature of the article sold. Food is sold to be consumed. The purchaser is under no obligation to analyze the article purchased for that purpose, to ascertain whether it contains substance injurious to health, nor would it be practicable for him to do so, and it should be no answer to his complaint that the seller had no knowledge of the impurity; nor should it be a defense to the seller when called to account by the state to answer that he was ignorant of the substance he was selling. We see no injustice in holding the seller of food products responsible for what he sells, and in casting upon him the burden of knowing whether the food does, or does not, fall within the prohibition of the statute, with that care and honesty which is incumbent on the seller of such products."

In People vs. Kibler, 106 N. Y., 321, the defendant was charged with selling adulterated milk. The defendant was not permitted by the trial court to show an absence of criminal intent, or to go to the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge which made his intent wholly immaterial, and his guilt consists in having sold the adulterated article, whether he knew it or not. Finch, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

"As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no element of the offense." This legislation is justified on the ground that use of the inhibited "articles used for food and drink by man," is injurious to the public health; and particularly because the adulterated articles of food and drink cannot be easily distinguished from the genuine, and are so readily substituted for it, as to work a fraud upon all the people who actually use and consume such articles

6-D & F

and things, as well as upon purchasers of the counterfeit food, in place of the genuine food and drink.

Any article of food or drink either manufactured or sold as being what it is named, would indicate to the public that it is a genuine article of its kind and species, which, if not pure and free from adulteration of every kind, would fairly come within the spirit and object of the Act, without reference to the extent of such adulteration, or the peculiar process of manufacture, and though the product be wholly similated.

The enactment of laws for the protection of the public from fraud and deception in articles "used for food and drink by man, whether simple, mixed or compound," is a legitimate, needful and necessary exercise of the police power of the State by the Legislature. Such legislation is clearly within the scope of legislative authority conferred by the Constitution of Illinois. "A fraud is, of course, a espass upon another's private rights, and can always be punished when committed. It is, therefore, but rational to suppose that the State may institute every reasonable preventive remedy when the frequency of frauds or the difficulty experienced in circumventing them is so great that no other means will prove efficacious. Where, therefore, poi.ce Teulations are established which give the private parties increased facilities for detecting and preventing fraud as a general proposition, these laws are free from all constitutional objections." Tiedman on Police Lim., 207.

FOODS.

WHAT ARE ADULTERATIONS?

Adulteration is the corruption by mixture with some foreign substance or with what is less valuable. People vs. West, 44 Hun. (N. Y.), 162; Com. VS. Hough, 1 Pa. Dist. Rep., 51.

Addition of water is adulteration. Com. vs. Scheffner, 146 Mass., 512. Persons making sales of adulterated food which is prohibited by statute to be sold do so at their peril. It is within the valid exercise of the police power of a state to enforce a penalty for the sale of adulterated articles of food or drink even hough the seller had no knowledge of the adulteration. People vs. Rowberger, 113 Mich., 86; People vs. Worden Grocery Co., 118 Mich., 604; State vs. Kelly, supra; Bissman vs. State, 9 Ohio C. C., 714; Com. vs. Farran, 9 Allen (Mass.), 489; Same vs. Nichols, 10 Allen (Mass.) 190; Same vs. Evans, 132 Mass., 11.

Statutes prohibiting sale of adulterated provisions are valid. State vs. Marshall, 64 N. H.

Persons furnishing provisions for market liable for violations. Hunter vs. State, 1 Head (Tenn.), 160; People vs. Parker, 38 N. Y., 35.

Adulterated food need not be shown to have produced sickness to convict. Goodrich vs. People, 19 N. Y., 577; Com. vs. Kolb, 13 Pa. Super. Ct., 347. The master is liable for sale by servant. Com. vs. Gray, 150 Mass., 327; Com. vs. Warren, 160 Mass., 533; Com. vs. Veith, 155 Mass., 442; Bissman vs. State, 9 Ohio C. C., 714.

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Possession by servant is possession by master. Com. vs. Proctor, 165 Mass.,

Penalty may be recovered in civil suit and is not crime. State vs. Grove, 77 Wis., 448; Cloud vs. Hewitt, 5 Fed. Cases, 1983.

A food inspector cannot compel, by injunction a manufacturer to sell an article of food for analysis, his remedy is by prosecuting under section for refusing to furnish. State vs. Capital City Dairy Co., 62 Ohio St., 123.

Possession of adulterated

vs. Purdon, 99 N. Y., 237.

tea for sale is nuisance. Health Department

To offer liquid chicory and coffee as "liquid coffee" is offense against food law. State vs. Dreher, 55 Ohio St., 115.

Selling raspberry syrup containing salcylic acid is violation and question whether injurious to health or not is not material. Com. vs. Kevin, 1 Penn. Supr. Ct., 414.

Any person may make complaint of violations of food laws. Isenhour vs. State, 157 Ind., 517; Com. vs. Mullen, 176 Mass., 132.

Under statute as to sale of article it is not necessary to allege that factory was a "full cream" factory where the sale was for selling skim milk to other than "skim milk” factory. People vs. Spees, 46 N. Y. Supp., 995.

Official character of chemist established prima facie by his testimony. Vandergrift vs. Niehla (N. J., 1901), 49 A., 16.

LARD.

Law requiring lard to be labeled stating ingredients, etc., is valid. State vs. Snow, 81 Iowa, 642; State vs. Aslesen, 50 Minn., 5.

Cottolene manufactured to resemble lard should be marked "Lard Substitute" under statute requiring lard substitutes to be so labeled. State vs. Hansen (Minn.), 54 L. R. A., 468.

VINEGAR.

Standard may be fixed and vinegar must comply. People vs. Worden Grocery Co., 118 Mich., 604.

Adulteration and artificial coloring of vinegar may be prohibited. Weller vs. State, 85 Ohio St., 259.

oloring vinegar during manufacture is artificial color. Weller TS. State, Supra.

Act forbidding manufacture and sale of vinegar containing artificial matter is valid. People vs. Girard, 145 N. Y., 105.

LIQUORS.

It is not unconstitutional to prohibit the sophistication or adulteration of wine. Ex parte Kohler, 74 Cal., 38.

Law prohibiting manufacture of beer or malt liquor from substances, etc., other than hops, etc., is accurate though it does not name water as proper material. State vs. Bixman, 162 Mo., 1.

If beer contains salicylic acid and is not so labeled and it is by, constant use injurious to health, it is an offense to sell the same under the food laws as to adulteration.

Whiskey is a drug under adulteration clause. It is offense to adulterate whisky even though sold as beverage. State vs. Hutchinson, 56 Ohio, 82: Same vs. Same, 55 Ohio, 573.

On prosecution for sale of adulterated whiskey it is immaterial that it was by saloon keeper and as a beverage. State vs. Hutchinson, 56 Ohio St., 82. It is not necessary to show that the acid in wine is injurious to health in order to sustain prosecution for selling adulterated food and drink. The putting of acid therein is an adulteration. State vs. Hays, 7 Ohio N. P., 624. To sustain conviction for selling adulterated wine it is not necessary to prove seller knew it was adulterated. Altschul vs. State, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep., 214.

Agent of principal who is now resident is liable if he only sends order to principal to ship goods to buyer. Meyer vs. State, 54 Ohio St., 242.

BAKING POWDER.

The formula of baking powder may be required-no man has the constitutional right to keep secret the composition of substances he sells to public as food. State vs. Aslesen, 50 Minn., 5; State vs. Sherod; State vs. Horrigan, 80 Minn., 446; State vs. O'Grady.

Alum baking powder must be marked as required by law. Stolz vs. Thomp son, 44 Minn., 271.