An. s. h. p. 59

therefore is nothing; that an infinite Being, had not use and custom reconciled us to that expreffion, would be thought Nonsense and Contradiction; for every real being has a certain and determined Na、ture ; and therefore is not infinite in this sense, which is fo far from being a perfection, that it fignifies nothing real.

8

But fince Custom has made it necessary to use this word, it is necessary to explain what we mean by it: That an infinite Being fignifies a Being abfolutely perfect, or which has all poffible Perfections: which has no other end of its Perfections, but perfection itself; that is a finite imperfect Being, that wants any Perfections; that is an infinite Being, not which has no end of its Perfections, but which actually has all Perfections, and can be no more perfect than it is: For there is a measure of the most abfolute, and in this fense infinite Perfections, before which no Being is abfolutely perfect, and beyond which there are no new degrees of perfection; for if we do not grant this, there can be no Being abfolutely perfect.

As for inftance: Infinite Wisdom, Knowledge, Goodness, Justice, Power, have fixt and fet bounds to their Perfections, beyond which they cannot go :, Infinite Knowledge and Wifdom knows all things, that are knowable, and that are wife; infinite Goodness can do all things which are good; infinite Justice is perfect Justice, which obferves the exact proportions of Right and Wrong; infinite Power can do all things, which can be done: To know, what is not to be known, to do what is not to be done, to be good or just beyond the perfect Measures of Goodness and Juftice, is a contradiction; for it is neither Wisdom, nor Power, nor Goodness, nor Juftice: The Nature

of

of Wisdom, Power, Justice, and Goodness, is fixt and determined, and the utmost bounds of them is abfolute perfection: The Divine Nature is the Original Rule and Standard, and utmost bounds of them, and therefore abfolutely perfect. These Perfections indeed be called infinite in the Negative fense, with respect to us, that we know not, what the ut

may

most extent of them are: We know not how far infi-,&W.p 60.306.

nite Wisdom, and Power, and Goodness reaches, but then we certainly know, that they have their bounds, and that the Divine Nature is the utmost bounds of them; for nothing can be a Rule and Measure of abfolute Perfections, but the Divine Nature itfelf: Now this gives us a pofitive Notion and Idea of God, though we cannot comprehend his abfolute Perfections; we as certainly know, what God is, as we know, what Wifdom, Knowledge, Power, Goodness, Juftice fignifie; but how wife, how good, how powerful God is, we know not, because we do not know the utmost extent of these Perfections.

I muft now add, that there can be no abfolute Perfections, but thofe of a Mind, fuch as I have so often mentioned, Wisdom, Power, Goodness: As for Matter, it is fo imperfect a Being itself, that it cannot be the subject of abfolute Perfections: Nothing which belongs to Matter is a Perfection, confidered in itfelf; Extenfion is no Perfection, no more than the dimen fions of a Body are, to be long, or broad, or deep, to be little or great, which may be Perfections or Imperfections, as it happens, with relation to the just measures and proportions of different Bodies; for either greatnefs or littleness may make different things monstrous, and therefore neither of them are either Beauties or Perfections themselves; for what is in it Telf a Perfection is always fo..

Ex

Extenfion is of no use, but where there is a multitude or diversity of Parts, and fuch a compound Being can never be abfolutely perfect, because it is made of Parts, which are not abfolutely perfect, as no Part can be; and ten thousand imperfect Parts can never make up an abfolutely perfect Being And if what is infinitely perfect can have no Parts, it needs no Extenfion, and can have none; for what is extended has affignable Parts, whether they can be divided or

not.

Omniprefence is a great and unquestionable Perfe- ____ ction, but to be Omniprefent by infinite Extenfion, if fuch a thing could be) would be no Perfection at all; for this would be to be prefent only by Parts; as a Body might be, which is infinitely extended, and a Body is as capable of infinite Extenfion, as any Man can conceive a Spirit to be; and yet if a Spirit be Omniprefent only by infinite Extenfion, the whole Subftance of that Spirit is not prefènt every-where, but part of it is one place, and part in another, as many Miles diftant from each other as the places are, where fuch parts of the Omniprefent Spirit are. This all Men will confefs to be abfurd; and yet if the whole Mind and Spirit be present every-where, it is certain, it is not prefent every-where by way of Extenfion; for the whole Extenfion of an infinitely extended Spirit is not prefent every-where: And if Omniprefence itself cannot be owing to infinite Extenfion, no Man can tell me, why an infinite Mind should be extended at all: for Extenfion itself is no Perfection. Much lefs do any other Vertues and Qualities of Bodies deferve the Name of abfolute Perfections, and therefore we must seek for abfolute perfection only in a Mind; perfect Wisdom, Knowledge, Power, Good

nefs,

ness, Justice, make an abfolute perfect Mind; there are no other abfolute Perfections but these, and therefore there can be no other abfolutely perfect Being, but an infinite Mind.

But befides this we may obferve, that all these abfolute Perfections, by a mutual consciousness, may be entire and equal in three diftinct infinite Minds: There is no contradiction, that three infinite Minds should be abfolutely perfect in Wifdom, Goodnefs, Justice, and Power; for these are Perfections, which may be in more than One, as Three Men may all know the fame things, and be equally just and good: but Three fuch Minds cannot be abfolutely perfect without being mutually confcious to each other, as they are to themselves; for if they do not perfectly know each other, as they know themselves, their Wildom and Knowledge is not abfolutely perfect; for they do not know all things, if they do not perfectly know one another, and there can be no fuch perfect knowledge of each other, without a mutual confcioufnefs.

This fhews not only the poffibility of this Notion, that Three distinct infinite Minds fhould be mutually confcious to each other, but the neceffity of it, if there be Three fuch infinitely perfect Minds; for they cannot be infinitely perfect, without being confcious to one another.

Thus to proceed: This Notion plainly reconciles the perfect equality of all Three Perfons, with the Prerogative of the Father, and the Subordination of the Son and Holy Spirit. That all Three Perfons are perfectly equal in Knowledge, Wisdom, Goodnefs, Juftice, Power, is evident from their mutual confcioufnefs, whereby they all know, love, and do

Ans. hep 18.

the fame things, which is a perfect equality: But this does not destroy the natural Subordination of the Son to the Father, of a derivative to an original Light, as Chrift is called in the Nicene Creed, God of God, Light of Light: For though God has communicated his own Nature to him, and received him into his Bofom, to an intimate consciousness with himfelf, which makes him the perfect Image of his Father; yet he receives all this from his Father by eternal Ge neration, he is a Son ftill, though equal to his Father in all Divine Perfections, and therefore fubordinate to him as a Son: And the like may be faid of the Holy Spirit.

This fhews alfo, how these Three distinct Perfons are each of them God, and yet are all but One God. Each Perfon is God, for each Perfon has the whole and entire Perfections of the Godhead, having by this mutual consciousness, the other Perfons in himfelf, that each Perfon is in fome fenfe the whole Trinity The Son is in the Father, and the Father in the Son, and the Holy Spirit in Father and Son, and Father and Son in the Holy Spirit; and therefore if the whole Trinity be God, the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghoft God, they being all mutually in each other; and yet this is a plain demonstration, that they are not Three Gods, bnt One God; because neither of them are the One Supreme God, but as thus intimately united to all the reft; and then they can be all Three, but One Supreme God: This gives an intelligible account of one of the most difficult Problems in all School-Divinity, which the Master of the Sentences borrowed from St. Austin, as he has done most of his other Diftinctions; that the whole Trinity is not greater, than any One Perfon