As for inftance: Some new Philofophers will tell you, that the Notion of a Spirit, or an immaterial Substance is a Contradiction, for by Subftance they understand nothing but Matter, and then an immaterial Substance is immaterial Matter, that is, Matter and no Matter, which is a Contradiction: but yet this does not prove an immaterial Substance to be a Contradiction, unless they could first prove, that there is no Substance, but Matter; and that they cannot conceive any other Substance but Matter, does not prove, that there is no other.

Thus the Atheist discovers a great many Contradictions or Abfurdities in the very Notion and Idea of a God, or of an Eternal, Omniprefent, Omnipotent, Omniscient Being. For to be without a caufe, and without a beginning, without time, and without fucceffion; to be prefent every-where, and to fill all Places, and yet to have no parts, no extenfion; to be able to create a World, and to annihilate it again, to make all things of nothing, and to reduce all things to nothing again; to know all things, past, prefent, and to come, especially the most contingent Futurities, the freeft Thoughts and Counfels of Men, before they think them, or fome Ages before they themfelves are in being, without impofing a Fatal Neceffity on Humane Actions; I fay, the Notion of fuch a Being is very much above our conception, and to an Atheist, who is for believing nothing, but what he can fully comprehend, feems very abfurd and contradictious.

This fhews, that Men may eafily mistake in charging the Nature and Notions of Things with Contradictions, and therefore we must enquire, how we may discover, when fuch an appearing Contradiction

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is not real, but is wholly owing to our imperfect conception of things.

I. Now in the first place we have great reason to fufpect this, when it relates to fuch things as all Mankind agree, we do not, and cannot fully understand or comprehend; for it is a vain and arrogant preAn.sh. t. pr. 141.fumption to fay what is, or what is not a Contradi,ction, when we confefs, we do not understand or comprehend the thing we fpeak of: A Contradiction in the Nature of Things, is what is contrary to the Nature of that Being of which we speak: Now fo far as we understand the Nature of any Being, we can certainly tell what is contrary and contradictious to its Nature: As that Accidents should fubfift without their fubject, that a Body should be without extenfion, or an organized Body without any distinction of parts; that the fame individual Body should be in Heaven and on Earth, and in a thousand distant pla ces at the fame time; that Flesh and Blood fhould lie invifible under the Species of Bread and Wine; that a Body, fuppofe of five or fix foot long, fhould be concealed under the least crum of Bread; these and fuch like are the manifeft Abfurdities and Contradictions of Tranfubftantiation; and we know that they are fo, because we know the Nature of a Body, and know that fuch things are a contradiction to the effential Properties of a Body: But now all Men must confefs, that they have not a clear and comprehenfive Notion of the Nature and Effential Properties of a Spirit, efpecially of an infinite Spirit, as God is; and it is impoffible to know, what is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit, if we know not, what the Nature of a Spi-. rit is; and that Man, who fhall pretend to comprehend all that is poffible in an infinite Nature, is as con

temptibly

temptibly ridiculous, as if he should challenge to himfelf infinite Knowledge, for without that, no Man can comprehend what is infinite.

II. It is a fufficient proof, that fuch feeming Contradictions are not in the nature of things, but in our imperfect manner of conceiving them, when we have other evident proofs, that the thing is, though we cannot comprehend it for nothing can be, which involves a Contradiction in its nature, and therefore if it is, the contradiction is not real, but imaginary. As for inftance: As unconceivable as the Notion of Eternity is, yet all Mankind, even Atheists themfelves, must confefs, that fomething was from Eternity; for if ever there was nothing, it is impoffible there ever should have been any thing; for that which once was not, can never be without a cause, and therefore whatever Difficulties there may be in the Notion of an Eternal Being, we must acknowledge. fomething Eternal, and that is proof enough, that there is nothing abfurd or contradictious in the Notion, though we cannot comprehend it and I am fure the Notion of a first Eternal Caufe, is much more eafie and natural, than to make either Matter, or the World and all the Creatures in it Eternal. What-ever we can certainly prove to be, either by Senfe, Reason, or Revelation, if there be any difficulty in conceiving it, we must attribute that to the imperfection of our own Knowledge, not to any Abfurdity or Contradiction in the thing itself.

;

This fhews how unreasonable that Method is, which is taken by Atheists, Infidels, and Hereticks, to dispute against the being of any thing from the difficulty of conceiving it, and fome pretended Abfurdities and Contradictions in it, when there are very

plain proofs that the thing is, and fuch as it is impoffible for them fairly to answer; this is the fundamental miscarriage, which is not owing to a prudent caution, as is pretended, but to wilfulness and obstinacy, and pride of Understanding, or to a fixed prejudice and averfion to the belief of fuch matters, and therefore I fhall not only obferve, but particularly prove the unreasonableness of it.

The proof of this comes to this one point, that we may have fufficient evidence of the being of a thing, whofe nature we cannot conceive and comprehend; he who will not own this, contradicts the fenfe and experience of Mankind ; and he who confeffes this, and yet rejects the belief of that, which he has good evidence for, meerly because he cannot conceive it, is a very abfurd and fenfelefs Infidel.

And the reason of this is very plain, because all the ways whereby the being of any thing can be proved, are obvious and intelligible to all Mankind, but the nature of most things are very dark and obfcure, and such as the wifeft Men know little or nothing of: And therefore we may certainly know, that a great many things are, whofe nature and effential properties we cannot conceive: As to fhew this particularly.

1. The proofs that any thing is, are either from Senfe, from Reason, or from Revelation. What is evident to Senfe, is evident to all Men, who have their Senfes ; what is plainly proved by Reafon (and it is not a fufficient proof, if it be not plain) is plain to all Men, who can use their Reafon; and what is plainly revealed every Man may know, who can read and understand the Scriptures; the being and nature of things are known very different ways, and

the

the being of things not only may, but most commonly is known without knowing their natures: Any Man may know the firft, but few Men in any meafure can know the fecond Whoever has his Senfes about him, knows that there are fuch things, as he fees, hears, or feels, but the Philofophy of Nature is not learnt by Senfe: Reason will convince us by fome vifible and fenfible effects, that there are some invifible causes, without informing us diftinctly, what the nature and powers of fuch causes are; and God may and does reveal many things to us, which we either are not capable of fully comprehending, or the nature of which he does not think fit particularly to explain to us; and in all these cases we may certainly know, that things are, without understanding the Nature and Philofophy of them.

2. It is fo far from being a wonder to meet with A. Så hr. p 8, 9.295. any thing, whofe nature we do not perfectly underftand, that I know nothing in the World, which we

do perfectly understand: It is agreed by all Men,

whoever confidered this matter, that the effences of Tip 205. things cannot be known, but only their properties and An saw. p. 9.11. qualities The World is divided into Matter, and Spirit, and we know no more, what the fubftance of Matter, than what the fubftance of a Spirit is, though we think we know one, much better than the other: We know thus much of Matter, that it is an extended fubftance, which fills a space, and has diftinct parts, which may be feparated from each other, that it is fufceptible of very different qualities, that it is hot or cold, hard or foft, &c. but what the fubftance of Matter is, we know not; And thus we know the effential properties of a Spirit; that it is a thinking fubftance, with the Faculties of Understanding and