This is explained in the Creed by the Union of Soul and Body; for as the reasonable Soul and Flefh is One Man, fo God and Man is One Chrift: which he fays vainly enough, is the only offer at Reason, that is to be found in the whole Creed. Well! we are glad any thing will pafs with him, though it be but for an offer at reason, and let us hear how he confutes it.

1. He fays, In the Perfonal Union of a Soul with a 1 Body, the Union is between Two finite things: but in the pretended) Perfonal Union of God to Man, and Man to God, the Union is between finite and infinite, which on the Principles of the Trinitarians, I wish he had told us, what thofe Principles are) is impoffible: For we must either fuppofe, that finite and infinite are commenfurate, that is, equal, which every one knows is false; or that the finite is united but to fome part of the infinite, and is disjoyned from the reft which all Trinitarians deny and abhor. I beg your pardon Sir! they were never fo filly, as to think of it; but they abhor to fee fuch Sacred Myfteries treated with fo much Ignorance and Impudence.

Since he is for confuting the Doctrine of the Trinity by raising Difficulties about the manner of this Union, how God and Man are united into One Perfon; I defire, he would first try his skill in inferior things, and tell me, how the parts of Matter hang together? which though every Body thinks, he knows, I doubt no Body does. Then I would defire to know, how Soul and Body are united, how a Spirit can be faftened to a Body, that it can no way releafe it felf, though never fo defirous of it, till the vital Union (which no Body knows, what

it

it is) is diffolved? Why the Soul can leave the Body, when the Body is difabled to perform the Offices of Life, but cannot leave it before? The Soul, I fay, which we Trinitarians believe to be a Spirit, which can pass through Matter, which cannot be touched, or handled, or held, by Matter, and yet feels the impreffions of Matter, is pleased, or afflicted with them, and fympathizes with the Body, as if it could. Le cut by a Knife, or burnt with a Feavor, or torn by wild Beafts, as the Body is.

And fince he apprehends, there can be no Union without Commenfuration, and therefore a finite and infinite Being cannot be united, because they are not Commenfurate; I defire to know, whether he thinks the Soul and Body are Commenfurate? whether the Soul have parts, as the Body has, which answer to every part of the Body, and touch in every Point? Thele will be very new Discoveries, if he can fay any thing to them; if he can't, it is his best way to deny the Union of Soul and Body, because he cannot understand it; to affert that man has no Soul, but only a Body, because it is impoffible, that Matter and Spirit fhould ever be united into one Perfon and Life; which is to the full as unreasonable, as to deny the Perfonal Union of God and Man, because he cannot understand how finite and infinite (which are not Commenfurate, nor can be, because neither a finite, nor infinite Spirit, have any parts to be meafured) can be united.

But in great good Nature, he has found out a Salvo for the Trinitarians; That God indeed is infinite and every Soul and Body (even that of Christ) finite, yet the whole God, and the whole Man are uni

ted ;

ted; becaufe, as the whole Eternity of God doth Coexift to a moment of time, fo the whole Immenfity of God is in every Mathematical point of place: And adds, The very truth is, they cannot otherwise defend the Incarnation, or Perfonal Union of an infinite God to a finite Man

This is Gibberish which I do not understand; but this I do understand, (which I fuppofe is the meaning of it, if it have any meaning) That an Eternal Being, who has no beginning, and no fucceffion of Being, may Coexift with time; and that an infinite Mind, who has no parts, or extenfion, is prefent every where, without extenfion: This I have luf-Vide supra ficiently discoursed already, and refer my Reader P.76,80. to it.

But he has a thundring Argument against this: -But withal it must be owned, that then the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation do infer, imply, and -Suppose all the Contradictions that Mr. Johnfon has objected to the Doctrine of Tranfubftantiation: I hope not all, for that is a very good Difcourfe, and I on ly wish for the Author's fake, fi fic omnia; but pray, what is the matter? His whole Book, and all his Demonftrations, are founded upon these two Suppofitions, that a longer time doth not all of it coexist in a fhorter; nor is a greater extenfion constipated, or contained in a leß. Suppofe this, for I have forgot what his Demonftrations are, and have not the Book now by me) what is this to the Trinity and Incarnation though a longer time cannot all of it coexist in a fhorter, (which I hope is not fo loofly expreffed by Mr. Johnfon, because it is not fenfe, for time is in a perpetual flux, and nothing of it exifts but ề v) but what is this to an Eternal Being's coexifting

Mm

with

with time without time or fucceffion? Though a greater Extenfion cannot be contained in a leß, what is this to an infinite Mind's being prefent every where without Extenfion for here is no Comparison between a longer and fhorter time, but between Time and Eternity, which is not Time nor Succeffion; nor between a greater and lefs Extenfion, but between a finite and infinite Mind, neither of which have any Extenfion. But fuppofe the worst, how does this concern the Doctrine of the Incarnation? If he could tell how to apply all the Demonftrations of Mr. Johnfon, (which he tells us in print, he forbears to do, because the Prefs is not open to them) thefe Abfurdities and Contradictions would not fall upon the Doctrine of the Incarnation, but upon the Notion of an Omnipresent God, who has no Parts, nor Extenfion, which was not invented to falve the Difficulties of the Incarnation, but is the true Notion of God, and his Omniprefence, who is not Omniprefent by Parts, but is every where a perfect and infinite Mind; and if he can ridicule God out of the World, we will quarrel no more about the Incarnation: I do not at all wonder, that he boasts fo much, what Follies and Contradictions he could difcover in the Athanakan Creed; for a man who cannot underftand common Senfe, can never fail of finding Follies and Contradictions.

1

2. He proves, That the Union between God and Man cannot make one Perfon, as the Union of Body and Soul does, because the Union of Soul and Body is not the Union of Two Perfons, but only of One Perfon the Soul to a thing otherways without Life, Reafon, Memory, or Free-will. But in the pretended) Union of God with a Man, there are Two distinct and

very different Lives, Memories, Reafons, and Freewills, which utterly destroys a Perfonal Union, for that fuppofes but One Life, One Reafon, One Memory, One Free-will.

Now this is falfe as to matter of Fact: for though we will allow the Soul to be the Perfon, yet by its Union to the Body, it has two forts of different Lives, Wills, Affections, Appetites, Reasons; the Animal and Senfual, and the Rational Life, Will, Appetites, a Carnal, and a Spiritual Reason, that is, two different Principles of Flesh and Spirit, as much as if every Man had two Souls.

So that there may be two Lives, two Wills, &c. in the fame Person, and it makes no difference in this Cafe, whether these two Wills be feated in two different Subjects, or the fame Soul by its vital Union to 'Matter, have two diftinct Wills and Reafons; and therefore we must find out fome other Notion of a Perfonal Union than this, that one Perfon can have but one Will, one Reafon, &c. for it is plain, one Perfon may have two Wills and Reasons, and if he may have two, he may have three, according to the number and diverfity of Natures, which are united into One Perfon.

1 Anth h. p 322

Now when I inquire what it is that unites different Natures into One Perfon, I do not mean, what it is that naturally unites them; neither what the natural Union is between Soul and Body in the Perfon of Man, nor of God and Man in the Perfon of Chrift, for this we know nothing of, and therefore no pretended Contradictions and Impoffibilities in this, fhall hinder my belief of it; as difcourfed in the firft Section: But how two different Natures M m 2

may