19th of June it was moved by Mr. King of Massachusetts "whether the Comittee should rise & Mr. Randolphs propositions be re-reported without alteration, which," as Mr. Madison says, "was in fact a question whether Mr. R's should be adhered to as preferable to those of Mr. Patterson";1 on which question the States divided as follows: Massachusetts, aye; Connecticut, aye; New York, no; New Jersey, no; Pennsylvania, aye; Delaware, no; Maryland, divided; Virginia, aye; North Carolina, aye; South Carolina, aye; Georgia, aye.

The Randolph plan, as amended and altered in the committee, was therefore reported to the convention and served as the basis of future discussion. The New Jersey plan, however, had served its turn. It had united the advocates of the States and made it clear that either Mr. Randolph's plan would prevail or that a compromise would have to be reached on middle ground. The attitude of the smaller States was accurately but somewhat brutally put by Mr. Pinckney, who is made by Mr. Madison to say that the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Nati'. system.”

2

The
Proposal

The Patterson plan as a whole out of the way, the discussion turned on the Randolph resolutions as modified in such a way as to give the States an equal representation in the second branch. The foundation had already been laid for this compromise by John Dickinson of Delaware, the possibility of such a solution adverted to by Roger Sherman of Connecticut, and with- Connecticut out attributing either the origin or the success of the project to the representatives of any State or any one person, the delegation of the State of Connecticut, which Oliver Ellsworth declared to be not a small but a middle State, seems to have occupied what may be called the strategic position. The conciliatory attitude of its members seemed inclined to produce conciliation, and from here on until the acceptance of the principle of equality Mr. Ellsworth seems to have played the leading rôle. Certain it is that the members of the Connecticut delegation not only assumed leadership and stated their views in such a way as to court concession from the larger States by showing themselves prepared to yield proportional representation in the first branch, but Mr. Ellsworth's motion of the 29th of June "that the rule of suffrage in the 2a. branch be the same with that established by the articles of confederation," divided the States equally in the session of

the State Governments - It was equally necessary for the General Government. The firmness of Judges is not of itself sufficient. . . . It will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when passed.

Mr. Rutlidge. If nothing else, this alone would damn and ought to damn the Constitution. Will any State ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this manner. It is worse than making mere corporations of them whose bye laws would not be subject to this shackle. Documentary History, Vol. iii, p. 602.

1 Ibid., p. 162.

July 2d, leading to the appointment of a committee of one from each State to find a way out. This Committee of the States reported on July 5th the compromise ultimately adopted, that the principle of proportional representation should prevail in the first branch; that, in the second, each State should have an equal vote, with the further provision that revenue bills should originate in the first branch and should not be altered or amended in the second, which latter provision was changed in the course of debate by permitting the Senate to alter but not to originate money bills. Or, as stated more at length in the report of Mr. Gerry, on behalf of the Committee:

That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the Convention on condition that both shall be generally adopted. I. that in the 1st branch of the Legislature each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed 1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants of the description reported in the 7th Resolution of the Com. of the whole House: that each State not containing that number shall be allowed 1 member: that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the Salaries of the officers of the Govern'. of the U. States shall originate in the 1st branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the 2a branch: and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the 1st branch II. That in the 2a branch each State shall have an equal vote.1

In the session of the 25th of June, Mr. Ellsworth urged "the necessity of maintaining the existence & agency of the States. Without their co-operation it would be impossible to support a Republican Govt. over so great an extent of Country."2 Dr. Johnson of Connecticut likewise urged "the necessity of preserving the State Govts- which would be at the mercy of the Gen'. Govt. on Mr. Wilson's plan"; and on the question to agree "that the members of the 24 branch be chosen by the individual Legislatures," nine States voted in its favor, with Pennsylvania and Virginia in the negative.

Thus, Mr. Dickinson's original motion, which laid the basis for the compromise, was reaffirmed for the reason stated by Mr. Madison in a note that "the largest States particularly Pennsylvania & Virginia always considered the choice of the 2a Branch by the State Legislatures as opposed to a proportional representation to which they were attached as a fundamental principle of just Government. The smaller States who had opposite views, were reinforced by the members from the large States most anxious to secure the importance of the State Governments." 3

In reply to an elaborate and somewhat theoretical disquisition on government by Mr. Madison in the session of the 28th, Mr. Sherman of Connecticut curtly and correctly said:

The question is not what rights naturally belong to men; but how they

of Views

may be most equally & effectually guarded in Society. And if some give up Diversity more than others in order to obtain this end, there can be no room for complaint. To do otherwise, to require an equal concession from all, if it would. create danger to the rights of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man who enters into Society along with the poor man, gives up more than the poor man, yet with an equal vote he is equally safe. Were he to have more votes than the poor man in proportion to his superior stake the rights of the poor man would immediately cease to be secure. This consideration prevailed when the articles of Confederation were formed.1

Matters had come to such a pass that Dr. Franklin, immediately after Mr. Sherman's remarks, proposed that hereafter the session should open with prayer. On the 29th, Dr. Johnson carried the matter a step nearer agreement by a series of timely and well balanced remarks:

The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the States as districts of people composing one political Society; those on the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is the States do exist as political Societies, and a Govt. is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the States as such are to exist they must be armed with some power of selfdefence. . . . On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to be represented, in the other the States.2

Later, in the same session, Dr. Johnson's colleague, Mr. Ellsworth, moved the proposition previously quoted, for equality of suffrage in the second branch, in accordance with the Articles of Confederation, and in support of his motion he is reported by Mr. Madison to have said:

He was not sorry on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had determined against this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground of compromise with regard to the 24. branch. We were partly national; partly federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was conformable to the national principle & would secure the large States. agst, the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle and was necessary to secure the Small States agst the large. He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take place. He did not see that it could on any other. And if no compromise should take place, our meeting would not only be in vain but worse than in vain. To the Eastward he was sure Massts. was the only State that would listen to a proposition for excluding the States as equal political Societies, from an equal voice in both branches. The others would risk every consequence rather than part with so dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting the body of America in two, and as he supposed would be the case, somewhere about this part of it. The large States he conceived would notwithstanding 1 Documentary History, Vol. iii, p. 233.

2 Ibid., p. 237.

the equality of votes, have an influence that would maintain their superiority. . . . The power of self defence was essential to the small States. Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the creation. He could never admit that there was no danger of combinations among the large States. They will like individuals find out and avail themselves of the advantage to be gained by it.... Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary & Legislative power be created; but Let not too much be attempted; by which all may be lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good we could, rather than do nothing at all. The other half may be added, when the necessity shall be more fully experienced.1

On the 30th, Mr. Ellsworth's motion being under discussion, its mover thus replied to Mr. Wilson's "capital objection" that the minority would rule the majority:

The power is given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? . . . No instance of a Confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the foundations of the building. When we need only repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States, to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for the 1st. branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary. . . .

After illustrating the possibility of this he appealed, again to quote Mr. Madison, "to the obligations of the federal pact which was still in force, and which had been entered into with so much solemnity, persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the plighted faith under which each State, small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general Councils. His remarks were not the result of particular or local views. The State he represented (Connecticut) held a middle rank.” 3

In the course of this debate, which was largely between Messrs. Ellsworth and Madison, Dr. Franklin interposed, saying:

The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States say that their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner here both sides must part with some of their demands, in order that they may join in some accommodating proposition.*

This was indeed an olive branch from a large State, and the necessity for a compromise, which Dr. Franklin suggested, was made evident by the re

marks of Mr. Bedford of Delaware, who, to quote Mr. Madison's report, " contended that there was no middle way between a perfect consolidation and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of the question, and in the latter they must continue if not perfectly, yet equally sovereign. If political Societies possess ambition, avarice, and all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought we not to view them in this light here? Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him look at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small? They think no doubt that they have right on their side, but interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. S. Carolina is actuated both by present interest & future prospects. She hopes too to see the other States cut down to her own dimensions. N. Carolina has the same motives of present & future interest. Virg. follows. Maryd. is not on that side of the Question. Pena. has a direct and future interest. Massts. has a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the small States will act from pure disinterestedness." After appealing to experience, Mr. Bedford thus continued:

1

Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole History of mankind proves it. The three large States have a common interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether combination as we suppose, or a competition as others suppose, shall take place among them, in either case, the smaller States must be ruined. We must like Solon make such a Govern'. as the people will approve. Will the smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them.

After calling attention to the fact that all were agreed that the powers of Congress should be enlarged in order that it could meet its obligations, and after adding that the little States were willing to comply with their engagements, but only if the principle of equality be observed, he proceeded in language which caused no little commotion among the delegations on behalf of the large as well as of the small States:

We have been told with a dictatorial air that this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a Good Governmt. It will be the last indeed if the propositions reported from the Committee go forth to the people. He was under no apprehensions. The Large States dare not dissolve the confederation. If they do the small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence; which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal powers not annihilating the federal 1 Documentary History, Vol. iii, pp. 259–260.