Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being

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W. Blackwood, 1856 - First philosophy - 543 pages

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Contents

It complies more closely with definition of philosophy than the other
9
But a system should be both true and reasoned
10
Systems of philosophy are unreasoned hitherto
11
The present state of philosophy described
12
First How is this state to be explained? Secondly How remedied?
13
First it is explained 1431 by philosophy not being reasoned
14
No good can be expected so long as philosophy is not reasoned
15
The masks of philosophy
16
Its unsatisfactory state further accounted for The globe of speculation
17
Explanation continued First principles always come out last
18
Illustrations of this from language and grammar
19
Illustration continued
20
Illustration from logic
21
Illustration from law
22
How ill the necessary truths have fared in Germany and in our
24
The true compromise between Sense and Intellect
28
A remedial system uniting truth and reason not impossible
33
it steers clear of spurious idealism 507
35
The synthesis of ego and nonego is original and not factitious
36
Why philosophy must be polemical She exists only to correct the inad
39
Its positive object still more distinctly stated Definition of metaphysics
45
338
49
All other systems make game of the laws of thought
50
General unintelligibility of systems is due to their neglect to exhibit this
51
3
52
The epistemology does of itself afford no entrance to ontology Why not?
57
The natural oversights of thought are rectified in these three sections
63
Their laws of thought always turn out at best to be mere laws of ima
65
PROPOSITION VI
73
PROPOSITION I
79
5
81
6
82
7
84
8
85
9
86
11
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13
89
14
90
15
91
16
92
17
93
19
94
888995
98
PROPOSITION III
105
No essential but only an accidental difference between the minimum
113
Matter per se reduced to the contradictory
134
20
140
21
141
22
142
Application to philosophy Here too first principles come out last 24 These principles though operative in philosophy are unnoticed and un known
143
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR IN COGNITION
156
DEMONSTRATION
157
Its criterion is the law of contradiction 99 Law explained
158
Why this proposition is introduced
160
Question concerning the particular and the universal instead of being made a question of Knowing
161
Was made a question of being by the early philosophers Thales
163
It still related to Beingnot to Knowing
164
Indecision of Greek speculation The three crises of philosophy
165
Plato appeared during the second crisis His aim
167
The coincidence of the known and the existent must be proved not guessed at
168
His merits The question respecting the particular and the universal demands an entire reconsideration
169
A preliminary ambiguity
170
Further statement of ambiguity
171
Is the Platonic analysis of cognition and existence a division into ele ments or into kinds?
173
Rightly interpreted it is a division into elements
174
It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds
176
Explanation of this charge
177
Sixth Counterproposition
179
This counterproposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers
180
Review of our position
181
Misinterpretation of the Platonic analysis traced into its consequences
182
Perplexity as to general existences
183
Realism is superseded by Conceptualism
184
Conceptualism is destroyed by Nominalism
185
to conciliate nominalism Its failure
186
Evasion by which conceptualism endeavours to recover her ground and 29 Nominalism
190
Nominalism is annihilated by Proposition VI
191
The sumining up
192
The abstract and the concrete
193
PROPOSITION VII
196
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
197
neglect of this propo
206
The second clause of proposition has had a standing in philosophy from
213
sertion that it was
216
explained
219
Materiality and immateriality Eighth Counterproposition
227
Both parties hold mind to be particular
233
The materialists error consists in his holding mind to be particular
235
The spiritualists error consists in his holding mind to be particular
236
The two errors summed up
238
PROPOSITION IX
241
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
242
Objection obviated
243
Another objection obviated
244
David Hume outgoes this proposition
245
What this proposition contends for
246
Ninth Counterproposition
248
History of word essence Its meaning reversed by moderns
249
Consequences of this reversalinjustice to the old philosophers
250
Confusion and error to which the reversal has led
251
This proposition reduces the ego per se to a contradiction
252
Why the word ego is used in these discussions
253
The root of the mischief History of distinction between sense and intellect
264
A rule for the historian of philosophy
266
Return to history of distinction between sense and intellect
267
Illustration of early Greek doctrine
269
PROPOSITION XIII
310
Further explanation of how one self can conceive another self
316
PROPOSITION XVII
335
The exact point in the counterproposition which natural thinking
341
Errors caused by this reversal
346
Two main ambiguities in the old systems
350
A traditional dogma about disdaining the senses
356
PROPOSITION XVIII
363
DEMONSTRATION
367
PROPOSITION XXI
373
A reminder
379
The importance of this result
401
PROPOSITION II
410
PROPOSITION IV
417
Fifth Counterproposition
423
PROPOSITION VII
430
THE OBJECT OF ALL IGNORANCE
432
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
433
The object of ignorance is neither nothing nor the contradictory
434
It is believed that this doctrine is new
435
What has caused this doctrine to be missed
436
Another circumstance which has caused it to be missed
437
In fixing the object of ignorance this proposition does not deny its mag nitude
438
How far the object of ignorance is definable and how far it is not de finable
439
The advantage of discriminating the necessary from the contingent laws of knowledge
440
This system is more humble in its pretensions than other systems
442
Eighth Counterproposition
443
Illustration of the difference between the speculative and the ordinary view in regard to the object of ignorance
444
The substantial and absolute in ignorance
446
Concluding remark
447
SECTION III
451
PROPOSITION I
453
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
454
The third alternative has to be eliminated
455
First Counterproposition
456
In what respect it is wrong
457
Origin of the mistake in regard to this law
458
The want of a clear doctrine of the contradictory has been the cause of much error in philosophy
459
Distinction between the singly and the doubly contradictory
460
PROPOSITION III
464
PROPOSITION VI
472
WHAT ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE IS NOT
477
Importance of the ego as a constituent of Absolute Existence
478
PROPOSITION IX
479
Question as to the origin of knowledgehas been erroneously treated
480
First consequence of the assumption Ninth Counterproposition
481
The earliest form of representationism Physical Influx
482
Correction of this doctrine by Des Cartes
483
Consequences of the Cartesian correction
484
The Cartesian salvohypothesis of Occasional Causes Its insuffi ciency
486
his Vision of all things in God
487
his Preestablished Harmony
488
Lockes explanation
489
his doctrine of intuitive perception
490
His fundamental defect
491
his misunderstanding of Berkeley
492
Reid failed to establish a doctrine of intuitive perception
493
His character as a philosopher
494
He mistook the vocation of philosophy
496
Kant Innate Ideas
497
The circumstance to be particularly attended to in considering this doc trine
499
This misconception has never been guarded against by any philosopher
500
In this controversy Kant is as much at fault as his predecessors
502
How this system of Institutes avoids these errors
504
it finds that all cognition consists of two elements
505
Fourthly it finds that matter is only a half cognition
506
Return Philosophy deals with necessary truthstherefore retarded by their prescription 35
509
secondary
510
PROPOSITION X
511
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
512
What is Truth?
513
All Existence is the synthesis of the universal and the particular
514
Thus the equation of the Known and the Existent has been proved
515
The coincidence of the Absolute in Existence with the Absolute in Cog nition has also been proved
516
Attention called to restriction in foregoing paragraph
517
This paragraph qualifies a previous assertion
518
In what sense we know and in what sense we are ignorant of Absolute Existence
519
Tenth Counterproposition
520
PROPOSITION XI
522
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
523
The system is forced to this conclusion
525
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
526
It is submitted that the system is both reasoned and true
527
Its negative character is to be attended to principally
528
The next step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character
529
The second contradiction which it corrects
530
The third contradiction which it corrects
531
The sixth contradiction which the epistemology corrects
532
The seventh contradiction which it corrects
533
The ninth contradiction which it corrects
534
The eleventh twelfth and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects
535
The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects
536
The derivative contradictions which it corrects
537
The opinions entertained by natural thinking and to some extent by psychology on the subject of Being
538
Exposure and refutation of these contradictions
539
The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects
540
By the correction of these contradictions the system has redeemed its pledge
541
As a discipline of necessary and demonstrated truth
542

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Page 97 - The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, — object plus subject ; thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition ' — a various wording of the general doctrine.
Page 543 - THE CRUISE OF THE MIDGE. By the Author of " Tom Cringle's Log." In One Volume, Foolscap 8vo, 3s. ed. THE LIFE OF MANSIE WAUCH, TAILOR IN DALKEITH. Foolscap 8vo, 2s. 6d. THE SUBALTERN. By the Author of " The Chelsea Pensioners." Foolscap 8vo, 2s. 6d. PENINSULAR SCENES AND -SKETCHES. By the Author of
Page 545 - ON THE ORIGIN AND CONNECTION OF THE GOSPELS OF MATTHEW, MARK, AND LUKE: With Synopsis of Parallel Passages, and Critical Notes. By JAMES SMITH, Esq. of Jordanhill, FRS, Author of the ' Voyage and Shipwreck of St Paul
Page 402 - Therefore, we can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known ; in other words, there can be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge.
Page 513 - All absolute exist"ences are contingent except one: in other words, there is " One, but only one, Absolute Existence which is strictly "necessary; and that existence is a supreme and infinite "and everlasting Mind in synthesis with all things.
Page 245 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.

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