he was not to be found. At last a happy idea seized the foremost one-he sprang to his companion and exclaimed, An' sure, Jamie, it's my opinion it's nothing but a noise.'"

On one occasion, while a great battle was being fought and he was waiting anxiously for news, he entered the room where a Christian lady was engaged in nursing a member of the family, looking worn and haggard and saying he was so anxious that he could eat nothing. The possibility of defeat depressed him greatly; but the lady told him that he must have faith, and that he could at least pray. "Yes," said he, and taking up a Bible he started to his room. Shortly afterwards a telegram was received announcing a victory. He immediately re-entered the room, his face beaming with joy and said: "Good news! Good news! The victory is ours, and God is good."

"Nothing like prayer," suggested the pious lady, who believed the news to be the direct result of the prayer.

"Yes there is," he replied-" praise-prayer and praise."

The lady afterwards said: "I do believe he was a true Christian, though he had very little confidence in himself."

CHAPTER XVII.

WHEN the Southern States decided upon secession, they staked the institution of slavery upon the result of the war. If they were to be victorious it was their purpose to found a slave republic. If they were defeated the penalty could be nothing less than its abolition, how much more-they hardly realized. Many eager Sprits of the North felt that the issue should be squarely met and decided at once and they called upon the President to issue an emancipation edict without delay. As time passed on and the course of the war seemed to be unfavorable to the national cause, the demand became stronger that the President should make the issue a distinctive one between slavery and freedom. Not only was he constantly beset with advice and entreaty and sometimes with a vehemence which almost changed the prayers to threats, but a number of strong, influential Republican papers began to reproach him for his hesitancy which some went so far as to denominate moral cowardice.

No Republican paper took a more decided stand or found more fault with Mr. Lincoln on this score than the New York Tribune. Mr. Greeley was, beyond question, a true patriot, and had the best interests of the country, as he conceived them, at heart. Both his disposition and environment were peculiar. He

had always been in favor of Abolition and he seems now to have become convinced that the affairs of the country were faring ill and that its only salvation consisted in creating a moral issue, which would rally to its support all right-minded patriots. He manifested both impatience and petulance at the course of the President and strove in every way to compel him to adopt his own views. But Mr. Lincoln's perceptions were much clearer than those of Mr. Greeley, and his judgment calmer. He listened patiently and attentively but he could not be persuaded to change his policy against his own judgment and more clearly than any-one else could, did he apprehend the part which he was to play in the great drama. His duty was not to be guided by the dictates of sentiment, however elevated, nor to preserve one institution and overthrow another. He realized that he was the representative of the soverign people and that his powers and privileges were strictly defined by a most solemn obligation, which he had voluntarily taken upon himself and he summoned all the strength of his resolution to his aid to keep inviolate his oath of office. He had solemnly sworn to preserve the Constitution and this meant the perpetuation of the Government and the uninvaded rights of the people.

In a letter to Mr. Greeley in reply to one ungenerously chiding him, he stated clearly his views upon this subject, as follows:

As to the policy I seem to be pursuing' as you say, 'I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.' I would save the Union. I would save it in the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored the sooner the

If there be

Union will be-the Union as it was. those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could, at the same time, destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to save the Union and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing a slave I would do it. And if I could do it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it. And if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less, whenever I believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause."

Mr. Lincoln's position on this question can only be fully understood in the light of the circumstances by which he was surrounded. It had been his policy, persistently maintained, to retain in the Union, so far as possible, the border States, at a time when the Union and secession elements nearly balanced each other. In the most of these States, slavery was a recognized institution and any intimation from the President that he proposed to interfere with it, would have precipitated them into immediate secession. In the Northern States there was far from an united sentiment in favor of immediate emancipation. A large party were opposed to it, partly upon principle and partly because they believed the proper time had not arrived. Hence any precipitate movement in this

direction would have alarmed and perhaps alienated many active supporters at a time when the Government was most in need of support from every one of its loyal citizens. But perhaps the most potent influence acting in the mind of Mr. Lincoln was that of the high principle upon which the war was being fought. If slavery were made the issue, in either event of the struggle, the great constitutional question would remain unsettled and at some future time another sectional dispute might once more array different portions of the nation against each other in armed conflict. By making the preservation of the Union the one great issue and subordinating all other questions, however vital to it, the conflict once fought would be forever finished and no difference of interest or opinion could ever renew it again. It was fortunate for the country that the man in the Presidential chair had a mind sufficiently broad to grasp fully the situation, and a purpose sufficiently fixed to stick closely to the one great principle unmoved by all the influences that could be brought to bear upon him.

The experiment of military emancipation had been tried early in the war. When, in the midst of the struggle to retain Missouri in the Union, General Fremont had been placed in command of that military department, almost his first important step was to issue an order declaring all slaves held in that district to be free. The proclamation would probably have lost Missouri to the Union had not the President promptly annulled it and forbidden the issuance of a similar order in the future without his own express consent. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the controversy with General Fremont,