while not expressly or in terms so limited, the case cannot be properly regarded as an authority beyond that point.

Having subjected the individual cases to a critical analysis and comparison, the annotator must proceed by a careful, synthetical process to combine the results of his study in as clear and homogeneous a treatment as possible. exercising great care on the one hand to avoid mere repetitions of the same point under slight changes of form, and. on the other hand, to preserve the real and essential value of the cases, either by grouping with proper limitations and due regard to vital points of difference, or, if necessary, by separate statements with regard to individual cases. The nature of the subject and the extent and character of its complexities, must determine the final form which the note will assume.

While the expression of his own views and conclusions, drawn from a study of the cases and his own reflection upon them, is clearly within the province of the annotator, he should never allow the strength of his own convictions to deter him from developing and presenting the full strength of the cases on either side of the question. The ultimate aim of annotation, as of all legal work, should doubtless be the vindication, establishment, and exemplification of sound and just principles and rules of law. But, so long at least as the Courts are regarded as the final arbiters of the law, the annotator may best contribute to this end by so presenting the cases that have dealt with his subject as to give every lawyer, whatever aspect of the question he may have, or whatever his particular state of facts may be, every possible chance of establishing his contention, which the cases, by a careful and searching analysis and comparison, may be made to yield him.

In the measure in which this is done by the annotator, the Court, when it comes to decide the case, is afforded the opportunity of testing its conclusions, not merely by the generalizations of other Courts or text-writers, or of the annotator himself, framed, perhaps, without any conscious intention of dealing with the essential phase of the question or point of view presented in the instant case, but by specific and detailed decisions, in rendering which the Courts have necessarily dealt with the considerations peculiar to the particular aspect of the question under consideration. In the same measure the Court is aided in formulating its own

statement of the law with precision and accuracy, and with due regard for proper limitations and restrictions imposed by the particular question before it, thus making its proper contribution to a consistent, but carefully discriminating, body of law.

THE FRENCH JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

I.-CIVIL.

The North and South Poles are no nearer each other than are many of the principles of justice and procedure of England and the United States to those of France, and, in fact, to those prevailing as a rule in Latin countries. It is not only the divergence in many elementary principles, but the manner of their enforcement-the different way of regarding and dealing with fundamental ideas of right and wrong and of the best methods of ascertaining the truth-that makes it so difficult for the Anglo-Saxon to understand French jurisprudence and the administration of justice in France. Although at first view the AngloSaxon is apt to derive the notion that justice between man and man is not evenly administered under a system so completely divergent from his own, yet with experience and a closer knowledge he soon realises that the scales of justice in France are as evenly balanced as in his own land. But for the stranger to come to this conclusion takes time; it requires an understanding of the constitution, jurisdiction, and operation of the various Courts, the rules of procedure, and the administration of justice.

While French civil practice differs materially from that of American and English Courts, yet the machinery of the French system in the end is capable of accomplishing all that a litigant can attain by those more cumbersome methods, and with far less trouble, annoyance, and money. Speed and simplicity are the predominant features of French procedure.

The French civil judicial system, in many respects, has its advantage over that of England and the United States, as, for example, in the rapidity in which commercial disputes can be settled and the comparative small expense entailed; in the production of evidence; in the absence of

those technical questions on the admission of testimony that fill our law reports, and in pleadings that, although regulated by and confined to well-established rules, are not subject to those interminable controversies with which the English and American lawyer is so familiar. In many other ways, however, such as pressing a judgment debtor, and enforcing a judgment when obtained, French procedure lacks those vigorous methods of pursuit peculiar to Anglo-Saxon procedure, and consequently too often enables an adroit, unprincipled debtor, although capable of liquidating his debt, to easily escape and go scot-free; and in the non-admissibility in many instances of witnesses, thoroughly familiar with the facts, on the ground of selfinterest that antiquated theory that once prevailed in England and the United States, but which has long since been discarded as unsuitable to the proper administration of justice.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for a person, educated under the principles of Anglo-Saxon law, to become imbued with those of the civil law where exclusively used and the procedure thereunder. The two systems are diametrically opposed, and their very basis and foundation are antagonistic. Under Anglo-Saxon law everyone is assumed to be honest-everyone is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty and a man's unwritten word is as good as his bond. Under the civil law, however, everyone is regarded with suspicion, and self-interest is accepted as a sufficient reason to discredit everything he does or says in other words, he is presumed to prevaricate, and Judges possess the right, even in the absence of any positive rule or legislation on the subject, of excluding the testimony of any witness on the ground that, in their opinion, the testimony is not sincere owing to the witnesses' interest in the litigation. This may appear like a very broad and unjust statement, but it is not so; it is justified by daily experience.

That people are assumed to be dishonest instead of honest is illustrated in many little ways. For instance, a party to a suit and his household domestics and employees are presumed to be so incapable of telling the truth that they are precluded from testifying with the single exception of a divorce suit. In other words, a party and those living in his house and serving him are discredited-they are not believed to be sincere in what they say. And should you

meet with an automobile accident, neither your testimony nor that of your chauffeur would be received as conclusive ⚫ on the ground of self-interest; you would have to look about for some by-stander or pick up some witness in the street if you hope to prove your case in a Court of justice. It is for this reason that one constantly sees after an accident those concerned standing idly about waiting for the appearance of a sergent de ville because his report or procés verbal is official and legal evidence; he jots down the facts as he finds them, and the names of witnesses, and in this way the circumstances are preserved for future use. Where certificates are given servants on leaving, these although signed by the employer, are regarded as worthless unless the signature is duly attested by the commissaire de police of the quarter where the employer resides, the mere unverified signature having no probative value.

There are no officers for the administration of oaths, such as Commissioners for oaths or Notaries Public, nor are oaths required, ordinary pleadings and petitions not being sworn to; and the usual affidavit, so familiar in Anglo-Saxon practice, is unknown, except where introduced in a case by international lawyers. In an ordinary civil case none of the evidence is verified, nor are there any restrictions or limitations as to what may be introduced as evidence, everything being admissible even to newspaper cuttings and unverified telegrams. Everything goes in, but then comes the cleverness and adroitness of the French avocat, who is a master in the art of sifting and analysing papers. letters, and documents, so that in the end only such as have a real and legitimate bearing on the issue are taken into. consideration by the Court. Nothing surprises a stranger more than to be told it is only on the rarest occasion that witnesses are heard in a civil case, and then only when an enquête is ordered-that is to say, an examination orally of witnesses before a Judge alone, as happens frequently in divorce cases; or before a master or referee (arbitre), or an appraiser or valuer (expert), who is appointed to investigate and report as to the injury done or the value or quality of work, or the condition of property, such, for example, as an automobile. But in no instance does the avocat personally interrogate a witness. At an enquête the avocat or avoué remains present like a disinterested spectator, while the Judge interrogates the witnesses, and

takes down their testimony in narrative form. He may, however, request the Judge to put some additional questions to the witness, but he cannot insist on this. In civil cases • the evidence is not recorded in the form of questions and answers. There is nothing like those wearisome objections to the admission of evidence, on the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, that constantly encumber a trial in the United States, and as jury trials do not exist in civil cases, except in cases of eminent domain, all those dilatory and artificial requests to charge, and objections to the Judge's charge, that so often end in the failure of a litigation aside from the merits involved, are unknown in France. In this respect the French system is vastly superior to the practice before American tribunals, where a large percentage of cases are lost or won, not on their merits, but because of some error in practice or procedure committed by the counsel engaged or by the Court itself. In such case the client suffers, but he is left without remedy or redress. The absurdity to which these technicalities are carried in America has reduced the practice of the law to a black art, in which the interests of clients are daily sacrificed, through mistakes of commission or omission, in an attempt to live up to the numberless artificial rules that have gradually attached themselves to the practice of the law and become an incubus. Happily, nothing of this kind exists in France, where a better sense of justice. prevails; that is to say, where the law is regarded as a means for the quick and just settlement of disputes according to their merits, and where, if a man has a good case, he does not run ninety chances in one hundred of being beaten through some trifling indiscretion or officiousness of his avocat in the examination of witnesses, or by reason of the Judge putting the case to the jury in an inartificial and inartistic way. In France cases get down to their real basis, and the truth is sure to come out, instead of being smothered under collateral questions that have nothing whatever to do with the matters at issue.

One of the reasons that enables French procedure to dispense with oaths and bonds is that the fabric of the French system is constructed under the constant surveillance of administrative and judicial officers, all of whom are educated and admitted into their several orders after most careful examination as to their moral and financial