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ering new elements both of terrorism and of persuasion, which have had a decisive influence upon the judgment of mankind. They carried the doctrine of the sanctity of human life to such a point that they maintained dogmatically that a man who destroys his own life has committed a crime similar both in kind and magnitude to that of an ordinary murderer, and they at the same time gave a mew character to death by their doctrines concerning its penal nature and concerning the future destinies of the soul.” (Vol. 2, p. 45.) This author gives many illustrations and others from American soil may be added by readers of the history of the Jesuits in North America, graphically narrated by Parkman. As missionaries to the Indians, many priests of that order were put to death by lingering torture, and without the strongest arbitrary scruples this liability would unquestionably have led to many suicides. The theological attitude was naturally at an early period embodied in the law of England making suicide “a peculiar species of felony,” punishable by burial in the highway, with a stake driven through the body, and forfeiture of the felon's goods and chattels, “hoping,” as Blackstone says, “ that his care for either his own reputation or the welfare of his family would be some motive to restrain him from so desperate and wicked an act.” According to the modern conception the suicide himself is pitiable rather than reprehensible, and, of course, punishment cannot reach him, but only innocent persons who suffer vicariously. Indignity to his remains and attainder of his property, and in many communities the theoretical criminality of the act itself, have long been abrogated. The law should, however, punish most severely an aider and abettor of suicide, who, as he profits or escapes loss through indirectly causing another's death, is substantially guilty of murder. In England, as suicide was suffered to retain its status as a crime, and as, according to technical rules, accessories could not be tried before the principal, the former escaped. This anomaly was obviated by a statute passed early in the reign of Victoria, providing that one who persuades or abets another to commit suicide may be convicted as a principal in the second degree, or an accessory. In some of the American States, either the law upon abetting suicide is uncertain and difficult to administer, or there is no law at all. An Appellate Court of at least one State has said that “ the suicide is innocent; therefore the party who furnishes the means to the suicide must also be innocent of violating the law.” Such a ruling is a gross miscarriage of justice and the obvious remedy is one that has been adopted in New York and Missouri which, entirely ignoring the suicide's act, constitutes abetting suicide and abetting attempts at suicide independent crimes, carrying condign punishment. It is believed that the law may properly and efficaciously go one step further and, again ignoring consummated sui. cide, take cognizance of an attempt at suicide, not indeed as a criminal offence, punishable by fine or lengthy term of im: prisonment, but under the general police power of the State. Lecky contends, with substantial Cantonism: “Suicide is indeed one of those acts which may be condemned by moralists as a sin, but which, in modern times, at least, cannot be regarded as within the legitimate sphere of law; for a society which accords to its members perfect liberty of emigration cannot reasonably pronounce the simple renunciation of life to be an offense against itself.” If suicide were usually committed by persons in normal mental and physical condition, after mature deliberation, it would be difficult to answer Cato's and Lecky's reasoning. In very many cases, however, one destroys his life from impulse, or because of a mood of discouragement or remorse, or through intoxication or some similar temporary cause. Thousands of men and women, after having unsuccessfully attempted suicide, have passed long and useful lives. Except in instances of suicidal paranoia, a disease distinctly classified by alienists, the liberty of a would-be suicide cannot be interfered with on the ground of mental incapacity. Some writers and a few Judges have held that suicide is itself presumptive proof of insanity—an assumption abundantly refuted by every-day observation. Nevertheless, the preservation of the public health—and under this may be included the prolongation of life and the prevention of death—is the most important and the com: monest sphere of exercise of the State's police power. The present writer is of opinion that, as guardian of public health and life, the State may legitimately take temporary custody of persons who have attempted, and are therefore presumably still contemplating, self-destruction. If physical disease, or financial distress, or fear of disgrace has precipitated an attempt at suicide, medical treatment or charitable aid, or the sympathy and encouragement of friends may reconcile the unfortunate to facing life again. It may be of very substantial utility to have authority forcibly to restrain him from repeating his attempt until after these outside influences shall have been brought to bear, and the normal love of life shall have had opportunity to reassert itself. The State of New York has a law making an attempt at suicide a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment. Its theory is wrong, as the modern policy of penal legislation is not revenge but the prevention of future crime, and it is plain that punishing an attempter would not discourage others from similar attempts, or even deter a second attempt by the same person. These considerations, combined doubtless with a sense of the weight of Cato's and Lecky’s argument, have rendered the statute unenforcible. Many cases have been held by magistrates for grand juries, with the uniform result of refusal to find an indictment and dismissal of the proceedings. But it is probable that this New York law, notwithstanding its anomalous form, by authorizing the temporary detention of persons, has in many cases accomplished just the practical result at which any provision of the kind should directly aim. One who attempts suicide should be classed not as a criminal, but as merely amenable to temporary deprivation of liberty. He should be made subject to restraint in the discretion of a magistrate not exceeding a brief, definite period. Even extreme advocates of the view of Cato and Lecky ought to be reconciled to legislation of such limited scope. which probably would be instrumental in saving many lives, because the way can never be closed, even though it be temporarily blocked, against one who is calmly determined upon quitting the world. Comparatively little, however, can be accomplished by positive law. Lecky is correct in the view that the discouragement of suicide falls mainly within the province of religion and ethics. It is certainly one of the most remarkable phenomena in the evolution of morality that, during long ages when the killing of other persons in war, in duels, or even by assassination was regarded as venial, the Christian Church succeeded, without express Biblical authority, in classing the taking of one’s own life as an unpardonable sin. The anomaly and injustice of the distinction are obvious, and Lecky shews that even under Christianity there was a strong tendency to excuse, and thereby indirectly countenance, suicide by women in order to escape violation of their chastity. Lecky has said that “the doctrine of suicide was indeed the culminating point of Roman stoicism. The proud, selfreliant, unbending character of the philosopher could only be sustained when he felt that he had a sure refuge against the extreme forms of suffering or despair.” We may concede the legitimacy of the doctrine as applying to cases of hopeless physical ailment and suffering, although not to the domain of merely mental distress. Christianity out-stoicised the Stoics and, notwithstanding famatical extremes and abuses, the morale of modern civilization owes much to the arbitrary dogma. The church was building better than it knew, ingraining a sentiment that has been of prime importance in social evolution. Instead of the liberty to quit when worsted and despairing, there was substituted a dictate of conscience, and incidentally of pride, that one must still struggle on, ignoring personal consequences and immediate results, with faith in the great result that some day must be achieved. 3. Much has been eloquently written, both by the Roman Stoics and by moderns, in praise or extenuation of suicide. The merit of this literature is merely rhetorical, consisting as it does of variations upon the trite theme that a man may do as he wills with his own and that nothing is more essentially his own than his life. Illógical, begging the whole question, perhaps, but instinct with the very soul of modern evolution are the words of one who, by a lifetime of physical suffering and indomitable achievement, had earned the right to speak: “The ship rides trimmed, and from the eternal shore Thou hearest airy voices; but not yet Depart, my soul, not yet awhile depart. Freedom is far, rest far. Thou art with life Too closely woven, nerve with nerve intwined; Service still craving service, love for love, I, ove for dear love, still suppliant with tears. Alas, not yet thy human task is dones A bond at birth is forged ; a debt doth lie Immortal on mortality. It grows— By vast rebound it grows, unceasing growth; Gift upon gift, alms upon alms, upreared, From man, from God. from Nature, till the soul

At that so huge indulgence stands amazed.
Leave not my soul, the unfoughten field, nor leave

Thy debts dishonored, nor thy place desert Without due service rendered. For thy life, Up, Spirit, and defend that fort of clay, Thy body, now beleaguered ; whether soon Or late she fall; whether to-day thy friends Bewail thee dead, or, after years, a man Grown old in honor and the friend of peace. Contend, my soul, for moments and for hours.” As Robert Louis Stevenson thus voiced the enthusiasm of struggle and endurance to the bitter end—a spirit different alike from the passionless brooding of Nirvana and the proud resignation of Seneca and Cato—Arthur Hugh Clough sounded the concomitant modern note of faith: “If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars; It may be, in yon smoke concealed,

Your comrades chase e'n now and fliers,
And, but for you, possess the field.

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking, Seem here no painful inch to gain, Far back, through creeks and inlets making, Comes silent, flooding in, the main ' " The complexity and the strain of modern life conduce to the increase of suicide. For the conservation of the Christian tradition for the utilitarian good there is in it, many practical suggestions occur. Two of the more important may briefly be mentioned. There is no more tragic lot in the modern world than that of Jean Valjean, because of its inhuman ostracism, and because it affects only comparatively few whom the law is successful in making examples of, while others, of equal moral guilt but who are shrewder, or wealthier, escape. The policy of indeterminate sentence of criminals should furthel evolve the social rehabilitation of repentant convicts. Under arbitrary standards now prevailing the only alternatives offered to many a normal person who has made a mis-step under grave temptation is a life-long incognito, confirmed criminality, or suicide. It is probable that the real cause of many suicides is simple ennui. Some unfortunate strait, emotional or financial, may offer the occasion, but underlying is a feeling of slow growth that the game is no longer worth the candle. Suicides of this class are apt to be past middle life and to be childless. If many lives have proved worth living to their normal close after an extraordinary gift is as dead as if it had belonged to another person, certainly a life that has never

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