ledge of the rules of procedure in litigation. Much time is often lost by a lack of knowledge as to the proper procedure to take at a particular juncture in a pending action, and much time is also lost either through inability to obtain the necessary information of how to proceed or on account of reluctance on the part of the student to make inquiry for fear his lack of knowledge may tell against him with his firm. This handy volume will be found a ready reference in cases of doubt, and should on that account be much in demand. A Handbook of English Law Reports from the last quarter of the 18th century to the year 1865. By J. C. Fox, a Master of the Supreme Court, Chancery Division. Part 1. House of Lords, Privy Council, and Chancery Reports. Butterworth & Co., London. Without reservation it can be said this book supplies a long existing want. It is not difficult to look up a case when you have the citation and are able to refer to the abbreviated names of the reports, and no volume will be in greater demand than the present one so soon as its publication is known to the members of the Canadian Bar who find it necessary to constantly consult the English Reports. Leading Cases in Workmen's Compensation. By G. N. W. Thomas, M.B., Ch. B., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. worth & Co., London. Butter With workmen's compensation as a theme for discussion in practically every country in the world, especially Great Britain, Canada and the United States, the present volume appears at a very opportune time. Under the various headings such as "What is an accident?" "Statements of a deceased person," "Did the accident arise out of and in the course of the employment?" "Misconduct of workman," "Negligence of fellow-workmen," &c., the principles of labour involved are ably set forth and the leading cases governing each point are given. The book will be found one of the most useful of recent publications to the practitioner and one which he will find of great assistance in looking up a point involved in this very often difficult subject. Spouse Witnesses in Criminal Cases. By Herman Cohen, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Haynes, Law Publishers, Bell Yard, Temple Bar, London. 1s. 6d. net. This little pamphlet discusses and sets forth the law or this subject in concrete form, stress being laid on the copetence and compellability of spouse witnesses both in prosecution and for the defence in criminal cases. The discussion of these points will aid much in the interpretation of difficult passages in the criminal statutes. Justice and the Modern Law. By Everett V. Abbot, of the Bar of the City of New York. Houghton Mufflin Co., Boston and New York; Carswell Publishing Co., Toronto. This able work is a dissertation upon the approximation of modern law to the ideal of justice. In the introduction, the author, in the opening sentence, states "If the law were suddenly to be administered as it actually is, the people would receive justice-but they would be shocked. They would enter upon the enjoyment of unaccustomed rights, and would find themselves relieved from long-accustomed burdens, but, until habited to their new privileges, they would believe that the foundations of the Government were being unsettled." In answer to an inquiry why the ideal of justice is not actually attained the author states as the reason that we are heirs of ancient views and customs which must first be corrected and the proper method of correction has not yet been learned, that there is fear of a change in the established order and the people fall into sophistry when the point is approached at which the application of accepted principles develops unexpected or undesired results. As between a justice which would overturn many existing institutions, and a sophistry which preserves them, sophistry is chosen." 66 In discussing the ethical principles of law, one chapter is devoted to "The Law as it is Practised," a second to “The Law as it is Administered," and another to "The Principle of Sufficient Reason," that is to say, any case which comes before the Courts for their judicial decision must be decided upon rationally sufficient reason. In conclusion, the author believes that the time has come for an ideal system of justice and that the injury inflicted in bringing this about would be infinitely less than the good results achieved. 66 Authorized by its charter; by the permission of the Commissioner of Works of the North West Territories; and by the license of the Minister of the Interior, the company (prior to August 1900), constructed its canals across certain road allowances" in a locality then within the North West Territories. Afterwards, it was desired by the Alberta Government that these road allowances should become public highways. And the question was whether the company was bound to build and maintain the necessary bridges. The obligation was said to rest upon two grounds: (1) implied common law liability; and (2) express agreement between the company and the Commissioner of Public Works. The Alberta Court (proceeding upon the first of these grounds), held that the road allowances were in 1eality roads; that the authority of the company was subject to the implied condition that bridges should be built (citing three English cases); and decided, therefore, against the company. In the Supreme Court Davies, Duff, and Anglin, JJ., in view of the existence of special statutory provisions regulating the liability of the company, held that the alleged liability could not be implied. The Chief Justice and Idington, J., were of contrary opinion. In the Privy Council, senior counsel for the King contended that the allowances were really highways and that the English cases applied; afterwards he spoke of them as "potential highways" (and counsel for the company accepted the phrase); but upon the whole he found that he VOL. XXXIII. C.L.T.-37 could make nothing of his assertion of an implied liability. At one stage of the argument Lord Dunedin said:— "I quite understand your not wishing to give up the point, but I see a certain difficulty in your extreme argument; supposing they are highways, it is perfectly clear from these statutes that they give power to the Commissioner to cross them. Supposing they were highways, then it does not say anything about there being a necessary bridge; it seems to me that the Act of Parliament would override the public right, whatever it was. It really helps you in the second argument, namely, of terms, and what are the terms inherent; but apart from the terms it is a little difficult to see if they were highways when the Act of Parliament says the Commissioner shall have the right to give you the power to cross these whether that would put it in his power if he liked to put you across even without putting up a bridge." Counsel persisted in the argument, contending that under the statute the Commissioner could not dispense with the implied liability to construct bridges, but Lord Dunedin again interrupted, and the following colloquy ensued: "Lord Dunedin: That is a much more difficult position for you; and, observe, unless you absolutely conquer that very difficult position then it does not matter because the moment that you have to surrender, if you have to surrender. that extreme position, then it entirely comes to: What terms has he given? "Mr. Lafleur: Clearly, my lord, and I am content really to rest my case on that. "Lord Dunedin: Rightly or wrongly one understands your position; that you do not like to say you will give up the other. 66 Mr. Lafluer: It has impressed some of the Judges below so strongly that I concluded there must be a good deal to be said in its favour, and I am impressed with the idea. that even if these were not highways they were intended to be highways or land set apart for highways; and at the same. time there ought to be no greater right of obstructing these permanently than there would be of obstructing highways; the only thing being the time at which the bridges should be built." Senior counsel for the King having thus expressed his willingness to rest his case on the question of the terms imposed by the Commissioner-upon the question of contract, junior counsel for the King did not pursue the argument in support of an implied liability. Senior counsel for the company referred to the point in opening. He said: "I may take that point first, because it is most convenient. I submit that the Courts in Alberta were quite wrong in deciding, as all of them did, on the authority of the English cases as to the liability of a company or an individual who, under statutory power, had removed a highway at a particular point, had interrupted a highway at a particular point, to put the bridge. "Lord Dunedin: I do not think those cases have anything to do with it, because they were all maintenance cases. "Sir Robert Finlay: And yet it is upon the supposed applicability of those cases that all the judgments in the Courts of Alberta in my friend's favour proceed. I will not deal with them after what your Lordship has said.” Counsel then proceeded to shew that allowances for roads. were not roads, and, therefore that, for that reason also, the cases could not apply. Counsel for the King had left little for him to do, and after some references to the statutes, believing the Committee to be with him, he said: "Sir Robert Finlay: As I understand, your Lordships do not desire that I should go through the other statutes dealing with road allowances as distinguished from roads. I am prepared to do so, if your Lordships desire it. "The Lord Chancellor: I think we have enough in our minds with regard to that." That was the last that was said upon this first point of the King's case-the existence of an implied obligation. If not actually given up by counsel for the King, their Lordships had sufficiently indicated their disagreement with it. The rest of the argument was devoted to the second contention-the existence of an express agreement, Lord Dunedin saying to Sir Robert Finlay : "That is, as I understand, the contention against you." And counsel saying: "The case is now based on contract. It is said there was a contract. There is not a word in the statement of claim about anything of the kind. The statement of claim is based entirely upon the common law liability which forms the basis of the judgment in the Court of Alberta." |