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(Ultzen v. Nicols, ubi sup.; and cf., as to the negligence, Phipps v. New Claride Hotel, 22 Times L. Rep. 49; Bullen v. Swan, 23 Times L. Rep. 258; Giblin v. McMullen, L. Rep. 2 P. C. 317).

4. Lastly, at a subscription dance or concert held in a country institute or assembly room, a subscriber leaves his overcoat in the cloak room, and it is afterwards found missing. The evidence may negative a bailment with the entertainment committee, and as to any breach of an implied contract by the committee to take proper care of any chattels so deposited, it may be negatived by the low price of the tickets: (Baker v. Cain, Times, 23rd Nov., 1812, p. 3).

It is evident, therefore, that if the place visited be not an inn, the customer must shew some express or implied contractual obligation, or a bailment. And the reader may have concluded, and we think correctly, that the traveller in the first case would have had to suffer the loss if the place he had gone to had not been an inn, because he did not deliver his overcoat to the innkeeper or one of the servants, and, as every lawyer knows, and the derivation of the word. "bailment" suggests, delivery of the chattel in trust is essential to a bailment of it. In the second case a small cloak-room charge might have been demanded and paid; and, therefore, it will be useful to recall that a bailment may be either for reward or gratuitous, and that this distinction affects, and very reasonably so, the degree of diligence which is expected of the bailee. And whenever the place is not an inn, it may be worth considering whether the responsibilities of a boarding-house keeper, or at least some of them, which were a few years ago discussed and enunciated in a case in the Court of Appeal (Scarborough v. Cosgrave, 93 L. T. Rep. 530; (1905), 2 K. B. 805), do not also attach to the proprietor of the establishment in question; and further to bear in mind that if liability for injury or loss exist, it would not be limited to £30.

It appears, then, that in a case of customary liability, a plaintiff has to, if it be possible, prove he visited an inn (see Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Ald. 286), and that the relationship of innkeeper and guest, in the legal sense of these terms, In this connection we would point out that when Mr. Justice Wills stated (Orchard v. Bush and Co., ubi sup.) that, from the point of authority, he did not think that there was much to be said for the proposition that the term

arose.

"guest" is to be limited to a wayfarer, and that the liability of an innkeeper arises whenever he receives a person causa hospitandi or hospitii, it was obiter, as the plaintiff in the case was held to be, and clearly was, a traveller; and, with great respect for that learned Judge, we must add that this dictum appears to be inconsistent with other cases (e.g. Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. & S. 306; Reg. v. Rymer, 35 L. T. Rep. 774; 2 Q. B. Div. 136; Lamond v. Richards, 76 L. T. Rep. 141; (1897), 1 Q. B. 541). We should be glad if the meaning of the term came again shortly for consideration and judgment; as we are inclined to think it is still arguable that a person who dines at an inn in his town, and then returns home, or goes on to the play or a ball, is not a "guest," and must, accordingly, frame his case irrespective of the fact that the place he visited was an inn.

The conclusion we must reach is that there are several nice points in this very everyday subject which, it may fairly be said, are as yet uncovered by decision, and remain of a very difficult and somewhat controversial nature. Each adviser will doubtless have, now and again, to make inferences which do not admit of rigid proof by precedent, or of support by obiter dictum. And there is perhaps, an advantage in this state of things. For elasticity enables those who have to administer a law to adapt it the more readily to the modern requirements of the age.

"CONFINED AS A PATIENT IN A HOSPITAL."-The popular notion nowadays of the meaning that is ascribable to the word "hospital" is markedly different from that which lawyers always entertain concerning it. Thus, to anyone not having access to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, a refuge where the sick and injured are medically and surgically treated is simply the meaning that "hospital," standing alone, conveys to the mind. But reference to that admirable compilation shews that the interpretation which Judges have from time to time thought proper to place upon that word is far more extended. For their Lordships bear in recollection the original very wide meaning thereof. Any place of lodgment might be a "hospital" in the ancient meaning of the word, as Mr. Justice Bruce pointed out in Moses v. Marsland (83 L. T. Rep. 740; (1901) 1 K. B. 668). The true modern meaning, however, is a building

appropriated not only for the reception of sick and injured persons, but also for the aged, or infirm, poor. That appears plainly enough from what was said by Lord Watson when delivering the considered judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (79 L. T. Rep. 473, at p. 476; (1899) A. C. 99, at p. 107). So, likewise, from the remark of Chief Justice Holt in Philips v. Bury (2 T. R. 353), that a "hospital is for those that are poor and mean and low and sickly." But even so, the line had to be drawn somewhere, as it was in the recent case of Ormskirk Union v. Lancaster Union (107 L. T. Rep. 620). The question there raised was whether a female pauper lunatic who, before being confined in a county lunatic asylum, had resided in a house established for the relief of deserving poor, aged, helpless, and afflicted persons, had been "confined as a patient in a hospital," within the meaning of the proviso to sec. 1 of the Poor Removal Act 1846 (9 and 10 Vict. ch. 66). If so, she would, by virtue of that enactment, be prevented from becoming exempt from removal to the parish of her settlement. As appears from our report, imbeciles and persons suffering from epilepsy and contagious diseases were not admitted to the house in question, nor persons requiring skilled nursing or constant medical attendance. The house was established principally as a home for the education and training for service of orphan and deserted Roman Catholic children, and as a refuge for the aged poor. The pauper lunatic referred to was a voluntary and ordinary inmate doing domestic duties and receiving no special medical attention. Under these circumstances, the Divisional Court, consisting of Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Justices Channell and Avory, were of opinion that, having regard to the nature of the institution, it would be wrong to describe it as a hospital," within the meaning of the proviso to sec. 1 of the Act of 1846. In Ormskirk Union v. Chorlton Union (87 L. T. Rep. 446; (1903) 1 K. B. 19; affirmed on appeal, 89 L. T. Rep. 256; (1903) 2 K. B. 498), the Court of Appeal held that a "home" which was used for the reception of patients suffering from illness was a "hospital" within the meaning of the same proviso. And that case was relied upon as an authority in favour of a similar decision in the present case. But there was not much difficulty found in

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distinguishing it. Although, as was observed by Mr. Jus tice Channell, it was a matter of some doubt, there does not appear to be anything wrong in the conclusion arrived at by the Divisional Court. Unquestionably, a wide meaning ought to be given to the phrase "patient in a hospital" in the proviso especially having regard to the explanation it has received in former cases. All the same, to say that those words mean an inmate of a charitable institution, like the particular one in the present case, would seemingly be going farther than is warranted by previous deci

sions.

LEGACY PAYABLE OUT OF REVERSIONARY FUND.-The important question whether a legacy which is directed to be paid out of a reversionary fund carries interest as from the expiration of a year after the death of the testator, or not until the reversionary fund falls into possession, has at length for it is the first time, seemingly been dealt with by the House of Lords. It was raised in the recent case of Walford v. Walford (107 L. T. Rep. 657). And the decision of the Court of Appeal thereon (see 105 L. T. Rep. 739), in favour of the former view, met with the entire approval of the learned Lords. Mr. Justice Joyce, in the Court of first instance, had, on the contrary, held that the question was governed by the decision of Sir John Romilly, M.R., in Earle v. Bellingham (No. 2), (24 Beav. 448). In that case, the learned Judge expressed the opinion that the period from which interest was payable on legacies payable out of a fund to which a testatrix was entitled on the death of a certain person was the time when the right to receive the legacies accrued. That is to say, the period to be regarded was the death of the person in question and not the death of the testatrix. And Mr. Justice Joyce had certainly ample excuse for adopting that view. For Earle v. Bellingham (No. 2), (ubi sup.) is treated in the textbooks as laying down good law: (see Jarman on Wills, 6th edit., p. 1108; and Theobald on Wills, 7th edit., p. 189). Moreover, the principle of that decision has been accepted as sound in several reported cases: (see inter alia, Re Lud

lam; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 63 L. T. Rep. 330; and Re Gyles; Gibbon v. Chaytor, 1907, Ir. Rep. 1 Ch. 65). On the other hand, it was considered by Lord Rardwicke that because a legacy was made payable out of a reversionary fund it made no difference to the time of payment of interest. At any rate, his Lordship in Lloyd v. Williams (2 Atk. 108, at p. 110), stated that he knew of no distinction, in respect of the carrying of interest, "between a reversionary estate and any other." The whole question turns upon whether it can be said that, when a legacy is directed to be paid out of a reversionary fund, that necessarily involves that a particular time is fixed by the will for payment of the legacy. If so, that time must be treated as the date from which the interest begins to run, as appears from what was said by Lord Cairns in Re Lord's Estate; Lord v. Lord (17 L. T. Rep. 105; L. Rep. 2 Ch. App. 782, at p. 789). But in the present case of Walford v. Walford (ubi sup.), there was no express direction in the will of the testator as to the time for payment of the legacy. There was nothing to the effect that payment was to be postponed until the date when the reversionary fund fell into possession. Nor was it the fact that the legacy was payable out of a reversionary fund which was constituted such by the testator himself. The former circumstance, if not the latter, weighed with the House of Lords, no less than with the Court of Appeal, in deciding that the legacy carried interest from the end of one year after the testator's death, in accordance with the ordinary rule: (see Tatham v. Drummond, 2 Hem. & M. 262; Wood v. Penoyre, 13 Ves. 325, at p. 333; Order LV., r. 64). Lord Haldane, L.C., who delivered what was practically the judg ment of the House of Lords, was considerably more disposed than the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal had expressed themselves to be to narrow his decision down to the provisions of the particular will before his Lordship. There seems, however, little reason to suppose that, if any case arises in the future in which a legacy is bequeathed out of a reversionary fund as in the present case, the time of payment of interest will admit of serious question. But whether, if the fund were made a reversionary one by the express terms of the will itself, any different result would follow may possibly remain to be seen.

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