possible to set a pecuniary valuation." Patterson, Railway Acci. Law, sec. 401.

Nevertheless, the word as judicially adopted is not so narrow as to exclude damages for the loss of services of the husband, wife, or child, and, when the beneficiary is a child, for the loss of that care, counsel, training, and education which it might, under the evidence, have reasonably received from the parent, and which can only be supplied by the service of another for compensation.

66

In Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471, and 29 N. Y. 252, 86 Am. Dec. 297, the Court stated that the word 'pecuniary' was used in distinction to those injuries to the affections and sentiments which arise from the death of relatives, and which, though most painful and grievous to be borne, cannot be measured or recompensed by money. It excludes, also, those losses which result from the deprivation. of the society and companionship, which are equally incapable of being defined by any recognized measure of value."

To the same effect are the cases of Schaub v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 106 Mo. 74, 16 S. W. 924, which was followed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wilson, 1 C. C. A. 25, 4 U. S. App. 25, 48 Fed. 57; Lett v. St. Lawrence & O. R. Co., 11 Ont. App. Rep. 1; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. 329, 339; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Rush, 127 Ind. 545, 26 N. E. 1010; Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act, secs 154 to 162, inclusive; Patterson, Railway Acci. Law, secs. 401 to 406.

No hard and fast rule by which pecuniary damages may in all cases be measured is possible. In Lett v. St. Lawrence & O. R. Co., cited above, it was said in the opinion of Patterson, J.A., after a review of all the English cases construing the act of Lord Campbell:

Each fresh state of furnished a further The party claiming entitled, the scale of

"That there is through them all the same principles of construction applied to the statute. facts as it arose was dealt with, and illustration of the working of the Act. was held to be entitled or not to be compensation acted upon by the jury was approved or disapproved, in view of the immediate circumstances; but in no case has it been attempted to decide by anticipation what are the limits beyond which the benefit of the statute cannot be claimed."

The rule for the measurement of damages must differ according to the relation between the parties plaintiff and the decedent, "according as the action is brought for the benefit of husband, wife, minor child or parent of minor child, for the losss of services or support to which the beneficiary was legally entitled, or is brought for the benefit of a person whose damages consist only in the loss of a prospective benefit to which he was not legally entitled." Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act, secs. 158, 160-162.

The Court below instructed the jury that they could not allow damages for the grief and sorrow of the widow, or as a "balm to her feelings." They were directed to confine themselves to a proper compensation for the loss of any pecuniary benefit which would reasonably have been derived by her from the decedent's earnings. The Court did not stop there, but further instructed the jury that," in addition to that, independent of what he was receiving from the company, his employer, it is proper to consider the relation that was sustained by Mr. Wisemiller and Mrs. Wisemiller, namely, the relation of husband and wife, and draw upon your experiences as men, and measure, as far as you can, what it would reasonably have been worth to Mrs. Wisemiller in dollars and cents to have had, during their life together, had he lived, the care and advice of Mr. Wisemiller, her husband." [189 Fed. 496.] This threw the door open to the widest speculation. The jury was no longer confined to a consideration of the financial benefits which might reasonably be expected from her husband in a pecuniary way.

A minor child sustains a loss from the death of a parent, and particularly of a mother, altogether different from that of a wife or husband from the death of the spouse. The loss of society and companionship, and of the acts of kindness which originate in the relation and are not in the nature of services, are not capable of being measured by any material standard. But the duty of the mother to minor children is that of nurture, and of intellectual, moral, and physical training, such as, when obtained from others, must be for financial compensation. In such a case it has been held that the deprivation is such as to admit of definite valuation, if there be evidence of the fitness of the parent, and that the child has been actually deprived of such advantages. Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., and Lett v. St. Law

rence & O. R. Co., both cited above. If the case at bar had been of such a character, the loss of " care and advice " might have been a proper matter for compensation.

Neither "care" nor "advice," as used by the Court below, can be regarded as synonymous with "support" and "maintenance," for the Court said it was a deprivation to be measured over and above support and maintenance. It is not beyond the bounds of supposition that by the death of the intestate his widow may have been deprived of some actual customary service from him, capable of measurement by some pecuniary standard, and that in some degree that service might include as elements "care and advice." But there was neither allegation nor evidence of such loss of service, care, or advice; and yet, by the instruction given, the jury were left to conjecture and speculation. They were told to estimate the financial value of such care and advice from their own experiences as men." These experiences, which were to be the standard, would, of course, be as various as their tastes, habits, and opinions. It plainly left it open to the jury to consider the value of the widow's loss of the society and companionship of her husband.

66

In this part of the charge the Court erred. The assignments of error are otherwise overruled. But for this error the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

STORIES OF ENGLISH LAW AND LAWYERS.

The prolixity of counsel has provoked much good-andbad-humored interruption from the Bench.

In Mr. Justice Darling's Court a few years ago, counsel, in cross-examining a witness, was very diffuse, and wasted much time. He had begun by asking the witness how many children she had, and concluded by asking the same question. Before the witness could reply, Justice Darling interposed with the suave remark: "When you began she had three."

Of the same genial order was the retort of Justice Wightman to Mr. Ribton, when that counsel, in addressing the jury, had spoken at some length, repeating himself constantly and never giving the slightest sign of winding up.

He had been pounding away for several hours, when the good old Judge interposed, and said, "Mr. Ribton, you've said that before." "Have I, my Lord?" said Ribton, "I as very sorry; I quite forgot it." "Don't apologize, Mr. Ribton," was the answer. "I forgive you, for it was a very long time ago."

With these two creditable specimens of kindly, spontaneous humor, compare the remark of a United States Judge, which was much praised in the press at the time it was made, but which in our opinion is far inferior to Justice Darling's impromptu. The American visited the Court of Appeal, and was invited by the late Lord Esher to take a seat on the bench. A certain Queen's Counsel was addressing the Court. "Who is he?" asked the Yankee. "One of her Majesty's Counsel," replied Lord Esher. “Ah,” said the American, "I guess now I understand the words I have heard very often since I have been in your country, 'God Save the Queen.""

Bethell, afterwards Lord Westbury, confessedly adopted as a ruling principle the maxim: "Never give in to a Judge," and his overwhelming egotism enabled him to successfully carry off situations that would have brought a less fearless man to grief. All his sayings have a touch of bitterness and cynicism, and in reading those accounted most brilliant, one somehow feels that they savor of what might be termed colossal cheek rather than legitimate repartee. "Take a note of that," he once said in a stage aside to his junior.` "His Lordship says he will turn it over in what he is pleased to call his mind." The discursive habits of Lord Justice Knight Bruce he detested. "Your Lordship," he once pointedly cut short an observation of that Judge by declaring, "Your Lordship will hear my client's case first, and if your Lordship thinks it right, your Lordship can express surprise afterwards." And all the gratitude that fell to the successful suggestion of one of his juniors was the sotto voce remark, "I do believe this silly old man has taken your absurd point."-Central Law Journal.

The last chapter in the history of industrial development should be entitled "The Trust." As a force regulating the production of commodities, their transportation and their distribution, the Trust constitutes the last word. It represents the perfection of industrial organization.

It is not possible to trace here the history of industry in its slow and painful progress from prehistoric times. In at word it is the history of the victory of the principle of cooperation over that of isolated individual effort. Mankind was slow in learning its lesson. Countless centuries separate the needle, laboriously fashioned by the cave-man out of a piece of ivory or bone, from the machine-made steel needle turned out by the million in a modern factory, after undergoing a dozen or more processes at the hand of a dozen or more operatives. Of the various stages through which industry passed, before this principle of co-operation, which culminated in the modern industrial system, was recognized and applied, it is unnecessary to treat in detail. It must suffice to state that the Trust is the natural product of industrial evolution, and became possible only when the production of commodities was carried on under the factory system, transport highly developed, and communications quickened. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that without concentration of industrial concerns the development of transportation and communication would not have taken. place so rapidly or to anything like the same extent. These forces are interdependent.

1 Concentration and Control. A Solution of the Trust Problem in the United States. By Prof. C. R. Van Hise. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912.

VOL. XXXIII. C.L.T.-24