ectly or indirectly received by a person from any office or employment, or from any profession or calling, or by any trade, manufacture or business, as the case may be; and shall include the interest, dividends or profits directly or indirectly received from money or interest upon any security or without security, or from stocks, or from any other investment, and also profit or gain from any other source whatever." (New). While on this branch of the case it might be as well to cite here section 7 of the same Act which is of some importance in this connection, it says:

EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN OFFICERS OF SUPERIOR COURTS ABOLISHED AS TO FUTURE APPOINTMENTS.

7. "Exemption to which certain officers connected with the Superior Courts were, at the time of their appointment, and on the 5th day of March, 1880, entitled by Statute, in respect of the salaries, is abolished as respects all persons appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor to such offices after the said 5th day of March, 1880, and shall continue in respect of such officers only as were appointed before that date. R.' S. O. 1897, ch. 224, sec. 12."

The officers referred to in the said sec. 7 of the Ontario Assessment Act, 1904, will be found named in the Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1877, vol. I., at page 411, being ch. 40, sec. 15; an Act referring to the administration of justice and the Court of Chancery in Ontario. The officers referred to are the Master in Ordinary, the Registrar, the Referee, Clerk of Master's Office and the Clerk of the Registrar. Subsection 2 of the said section 15 sets forth that the salaries of these officers, and of all officers of the said Court, shall be paid free from all taxes and deductions. This Act of 1877 makes a distinction between "officers" and "Judges," the two classes being entirely distinct and separate as a refererce to the said Act will shew.

The Judges did not come within this latter clause, nor were they any of the officers referred to in the Statutory Exemption therein mentioned. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Assessment Act so far as it assumes to tax Dominion officials is intra vires which the plaintiff does not admit but denies. It will be noticed that by sec. 7 the exemption referred to therein is abolished "as respects all persons appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor to such offices after March, 1880." Here again we have an excellent guide

to the intention of the Ontario Legislature when passing the Assessment Act, 1904. The reference is to persons appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario. That means appointments made by the Provincial Government of Ontario. The reference to the year 1880 comes 2 years after 1878, when the case of Leprohon v. City of Ottawa was decided. There is no reference to the Federal or Dominion appointments, nor any interference with their salaries or exemption, because Leprohon v. City of Ottawa had settled that matter 2 years before. The Provincial Legislature of Ontario had no jurisdiction in this respect, and so when passing the Ontario Assessment Act of 1904 they continued sec. 7 as it had appeared in the previous Assessment Acts of Ontario. It might also be mentioned that the provisions of the present section appear in the Ontario Statutes of 1880, 43 Vict. ch. 27, sec. 5, for the first time. This clearly shews what the Legislature had in mind when passing the present Assessment Act, and that it recognized the limits of its jurisdiction. Now at the time sec. 7 was inserted in the Assessment Act, R. S. O. 1897, ch. 224 and sec. 2, sub-sec. 8 in the new Act of 1904, the case of Leprohon v. City of Ottawa, 2 Ont. App. Rep. 522 (1878), had been decided and was law. It was decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal in March, 1878. That case, together with 12 or 15 other cases subsequently decided by the Superior Courts in the different provinces of Canada on this very same question (to be cited on another branch of the case for the plaintiff) decided that under the British North America Act, 1867, the salaries of officials of the Dominion Government could not be taxed by the province, nor were they seizable or attachable by Court process, nor could they be compelled to pay a judgment debt by instalments, and further, that the province had no authority to confer such power on the municipalities, and these decisions are well known all over Canada, and by every legislature and judicial tribunal.

The law is clear that it is presumed that the Legislature has informed itself as to the state of the law on any subject as to which it undertakes to legislate, and makes new laws or amends old laws accordingly. This rule is very well stated by Lord Blackburn in the case of Young v. Major, &c., of Leamington (1883), 8 App. Cases 517, 526, where he says: "The Courts ought in general in construing an Act of Parliament, to assume that the Legislature knows the existing

state of the Law." And in the case of Mulcahy v. R. L. R., 3 H. L. 306, at p. 319, the Judges said that the Treason Act, 1796," did in terms sanction and embody the received interpretation of the Statute of Treasons, with which it must be presumed that the Legislature was acquainted, and which it left undisturbed."

And in MacMillan v. Dent (1907), 1 Ch. 114, Lord Justice Moulton said: "In interpreting an Act of Parliament you are entitled, and in many cases bound, to look to the state of the law at the date of the passing of the Act in order to properly interpret the Statute in question."

In the case of The Dean, &c., of Ely v. Bliss (1842), 5 Beav. 574, at p. 582; 11 L. J. Ch. 351 at p. 354, Lord Langdale M.R., says: "Every Act of Parliament must be considered with reference to the state of the law subsisting when it came into operation, and when it is to be applied; it cannot otherwise be rationally construed. Every Act is made, either for the purpose of making a change in the law, or for the purpose of better declaring the law, and its operation is not to be impeded by the mere fact that it is inconsistent with some previous enactment."

In the case of Yorkshire Insurance Co. v. Clayton, 8 Q. B. D. 421, at p. 426; 51 L. J. Q. B. 82, at p. 85, Brett, L.J., says: "It is a well known rule or canon of construction that in construing an Act of Parliament one ought to take into account the state of the law and of judicial decisions at the time the Act is passed."

Now the case of Leprohon v. City of Ottawa, was decided in 1878, and from that date up to the completion of the Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1897, when all the laws of Ontario were revised and consolidated, no mention is made of taxing the remuneration of Dominion Government officials, and between 1897 and 1904, when ch. 23 of the Statutes of Ontario, 1904, was passed, the law was in a similar state. So that up to 1904 the Ontario Legislature impliedly upheld the decision of Leprohon v. City of Ottawa; or for a period of 26 years, and the said Statute has not been amended or altered since 1904, so far as this part of the Act is concerned.

Therefore, with full knowledge of the then present state of the law (and the Legislature is presumed to legislate at all times with full knowledge of the then state of the law), at the time they passed the Assessment Act of Ontario in R. S. O., 1897, and again in 1904, when the new Assessment Act

was passed, the Ontario Legislature did not see fit to abolish this exemption, or to declare the decision in Leprohon v. City of Ottawa, no longer binding, which they could have done, in either sec. 2, sub-sec. 8 or in sec. 7 referred to, or by any other part of said Act, nor by any amendment since 1904, but on the contrary expressly stated that certain exemptions therein named were to be abolished which does not mention or include the exemption of remuneration of the Judges of Ontario. If the Legislature had intended to abolish this exemption or to render null and void the decision in Leprohon v. City of Ottawa, they would have said so specifically or would have provided expressly for taxing the remuneration of Judges. The Legislature must have intended the Assessment Act to receive the same construction as though the decision in Leprohon v. City of Ottawa had been expressly incorporated into it. That decision was a decision on the British North America Act, 1867, which is an Imperial Statute passed by the Imperial Parliament at Westminster, and has never been expressly overruled. The principle of that decision it is submitted, has been embodied in the Ontario Assessment Act of 1904, herein referred to, which can only be amended and remedied by the Legislature of Ontario, and that Legislature has no jurisdiction to tax the salaries of Canadian Government appointees.

Now as to the word "person' when used in an Act of Parliament :

:

The Interpretation Act of Ontario, sec. 8, sub-sec. 13, says, that "the word 'person' shall include any body, corporate or politic, or party to whom the context can apply according to law."

And in the case of Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association, 49 L. J. Q. B. 736, 5 Appeal Cases 857-Lord Blackburn said as regards the word "person": "The meaning which it has in any particular Act, must depend on the context and the subject-matter. Circumstances, and indeed very slight circumstances, in the context might shew which way the word is to be construed in an Act of Parliament."

Then in what sense does the context of sec. 2, sub-sec. 8 shew the word "person" to be used? Clearly it means a person engaged in business of a commercial, manufacturing or financial nature, or in the practice of a profession or calling, or in the carrying on of a trade, or as a clerk or other

such employment in the nature of the relation of master and

servant.

The expressions used in sec. 2, sub-sec. 8 of and throughout the Assessment Act are restricted, and it is clearly intended to exclude these things which are not enumerated. Certain things are precisely stated to be "income," and to be liable to taxation. It is intended therefore, to exclude everything else and all things different in genus and description from those which are enumerated. "Expressio unius est exclusis alterius." The express mention of the one thing implies the exclusion of another. This is one of the first principles applicable to statutory construction, and it is particularly applicable to the case under consideration.

The Judiciary is a separate and distinct body of men all over Canada, appointed by the Dominion Government to administer the laws of the country; they are not employees in the sense in which the word " employment" is used in the Assessment Act of Ontario, nor are they office-holders. In an American case it has been laid down that the words "office and "officer" are terms of vague and variable import, the meaning of which necessarily varies with the connection in which they are used; and to determine it correctly, in a particular instance, resort must be had to the intention of the statute, and the subject-matter in reference to which the terms are used. See State v. Küchli, 53 Minn. 147, 155; 54 N. W. 1069. It is further submitted it cannot refer to the Judiciary, because the provincial Legislature has no jurisdiction in the matter. They hold what are known as "judicial appointments" as Judges. The word "employment" is used. in the Act in the same sense as the word "office" in the Act, that is ejusdem generis, and means being employed in a position of a commercial, trading, manufacturing, financial or other such business nature as described throughout the Act, and in the sense of the relation of master and servant, such as a managerial position or a clerkship, or as a secretary, treasurer, director, and other similar positions. The Judges of the Courts are what has been termed "judicial functionaries" occupying a privileged and special position, and enjoying immunities of various kinds in the community as witness the great care taken to secure the independence of the Judges, and if it is proposed to tax them they must be specifically mentioned in any statute as a class. They are not Provincial appointees," but Dominion "appointees," and their salary