shewn. And when it appears on the face of the ordinance that its purpose is to safeguard the public welfare, or where the regulation can fairly be said to tend toward a better and safer condition, it will ordinarily be presumed to be valid, and the discretion of the council will not be interfered with upon light grounds." As applied to the control of street railways, the police power is the continuing and paramount authority of the legislature within its constitutional prerogatives, and of municipal corporations, under their delegated powers, to establish regulations, which promote the public welfare, do not unreasonably interfere with the franchise, management, or business of the company, or violate the obligations of any valid contract." 11 Among the many subjects of regulation recognized with respect to the operation of street cars are the number of servants, screens for the same, rate of fare,10 tickets, transfers, 12 separation of races, speed,13 stopping before crossing streets,14 stopping for passengers, frequency of car service, vigilant watch,15 brakes, fenders, 16 warnings, use of sand on tracks, use of salt, and sprinkling the tracks.18 17 People v. Detroit United R. Co., 134 Mich. 682, 104 Am. St. Rep. 626, 97 N. W. 36, 63 L. R. A. 746. Booth. Street Railways, § 220. 8 See note to South Covington & C. Street R. Co. v. Berry. 15 L. R. A. 604, as to the validity of ordinances requiring conductor on street car. See note to Silva v. Newport, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1060, as to the validity of statutes and ordinances for the protection or comfort of street car operatives. 10 See note to Sternbery v. State, 19 L. R. A. 570, as to regulation of street railways as of fares. 11 See Rice V. Detroit, Y. & A. R. R. Co., 122 Mich. 677, 81 N. W. 927, 48 L. R. A. 84. 12 See Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Chicago, 199, Ill. 484, 65 N. E. 451, 59 L. R. A. 631, and Er parte Lorenzen, 128 Cal. 431, 79 Am. St. Rep. 47, 61 Pac. 68, 50 L. R. A. 55. 13 See note to Ford v. Paducah City R. Co., 8 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1093, as to operating street car at speed in excess of that prescribed by ordinance as negligence, and see State, Cape May. D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor v. Cape May, 59 N. J. L. 393, 36 Atl. 679, 36 L. R. A. 656. 14 See State, Trenton Horse R. Co., Prosecutor v. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 132, 20 Atl. 1076, 11 L. R. A. 410. See Fath v. Tower Grove & L. R. Co., 105 Mo. 537, 16 S. W. 913, 13 L. R. A. 74. 10 See State, Cape May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor v. Cape May, supra. 17 See State, Consolidated Traction Co., Prosecutor v. Elizabeth, 58 N. J. L. 619, 34 Atl., 146, 32 L. R. A. 170. 18 See note to St. Paul v. St. Paul City R. Co., 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 235, as to power to compel street railway to sprinkle tracks. Similarly, the power of a municipality to make reasonable regulations for the prevention of overcrowding in street cars has often been recognized and is generally admitted, since overcrowding tends to the discomfort and inconvenience of, and danger to, the public. Thus it has been held proper for a city to make it unlawful for a street railway company to permit a greater number of passengers to ride in any car than one and one third the number of seats provided in the same.19 And an ordinance requiring the street railway company to furnish a sufficient number of cars on each separate line to carry passengers comfortably and without overcrowding, and providing a penalty for its violation, is also within the police power of a city. Such an ordinance has for its object the laudable purpose of protecting the traveling public against discomfort, annoyance, and danger; and, being designed to promote the public safety and health, it will be sustained.20 An ordinance of the city of Minneapolis provided, first, that the street railway company should post in its cars the number of people to be reasonably carried in each car; second, that the company should continuously provide and operate upon every part of each car line within the city a sufficient number of cars to receive and carry all persons desiring transportation thereon, without admitting into any such car more passengers than the carrying capacity thereof (75 in that case); and third, that whenever any passengers should be admitted in excess of the carrying capacity, the company should forfeit a certain sum for each and every passenger so admitted. The ordinance was held valid as within the power of the city in the exercise of the functions committed to its care by the state. The Court emphasizes the fact that no penalty was provided for failure to comply with the second requirement, and that in regard to the third stipulation, the company was not required to receive more than the carrying capacity, but might run a car from one end. of the line to the other, if filled to its capacity, without stopping anywhere except to allow passengers to alight, and might thus avoid the penalty. It was stated as a general 19 South Covington & C. R. Co. v. Covington, 146 Ky. 592, 143 S. W. 28, L. R. A. (N.S.) -. 20 Chicago v. Chicago City R. Co., 222 Ill. 560, 78 N. E. 890. VOL. XXXIII. C.L.T.-68 principle that cities may properly make such regulations of street car companies as are deemed necessary for public convenience, safety, or health, and that the question of expense to which the company is put in order to comply with such regulations is not important.21 66 66 And in a recent New Jersey case, where an ordinance required the street railway corporation during designated rush" hours to run from certain congested terminals a sufficient number of cars to provide with a seat every passenger from whom a fare is demanded," it was conceded by the railway corporation that the police power of the city fairly included such regulation of their business out of regard for the comfort, safety, and health of the passengers, and it was contended simply that the ordinance was unreasonable because of the impossibility of compliance therewith. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Judge Pitney remarks that although the situation was difficult, yet it was such as to render it proper that the traction company should be required to do all that reasonably lay within its power to furnish a sufficient number of cars to accommodate the passengers comfortably, and it was held that the ordinance was not so unreasonable as to be void, especially in view of the fact that no effort had yet been made by the traction company to comply with it.22 And under a statute granting local authorities the power of making and enforcing rules and regulations with respect to tramway carriages, a borough council may require every proprietor of a tram carriage, to cause a statement of the number of passengers authorized to be carried at any one time in and upon such carriage to be painted conspicuously on the inside and outside of such carriage, and may further provide that no proprietor or conductor of any tram carriage shall suffer to be carried at any one time in or upon such carriage a greater number of passengers than will admit of the provision of seating accommodations to the extent at least of 16 inches from side to side and 15 inches from front to back of every seat for each person carried, and of accommodations to enable every such person to sit with ease.23 1072 21 Minneapolis Street R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 189 Fed. 445. 23 Smith v. Butler, L. R. 16 Q. B. Div. 349, 34 Week. Rep. 416. However, where an ordinance of the city of St. Louis required the street railway company to report quarterly to the city register as to the number of trips made and passengers carried during the quarter, and also required the -register, if any report shewed that the company had carried an average of over eighteen persons per trip to each car since the last previous report, to inform a police justice of that fact, and the ordinance further provided that this situation should subject the company to a fine, it was urged that the second provision was unreasonable and illegal, and that the first was so connected with it that both must fall together. And the Court, in holding the first provision valid and separable from the second, implies that the latter may be invalid, though there is no explicit statement to that effect.24 And in the Minneapolis case, supra, reference was made to a "case from the city of Detroit" which seems not to have been reported. It is said, however, that in that case an ordinance required the street railway company during certain hours of the day to provide a sufficient number of cars to accommodate passengers, so that no car should carry a greater number of passengers than its seating capacity and one half as many more; and further required any car when signaled, to stop for more passengers, although already filled to or in excess of the number specified, unless another car should be following within a distance of 200 feet, under penalty of a fine. As a result, the only way the company could comply, without being liable to the penalty, was by running cars every twenty seconds, and this was deemed to impose so tremendous a liability and obligation upon the company in the purchase of new equipment that the ordinance was held to be unreasonable and void. Case and Comment. 24 St. Louis v. St. Louis R. Co., 89 Mo. 44, 58 Am. Rep. 82, 1 S. W. 305. A MODEL BILL OF COSTS. The other day the lawyer had occasion to lunch at his client's hotel, and at the close of the meal the following bill of costs was presented to him : 2 12.50 .50 10 2 .50 Two Consultations with the Cook Six kinds of Meat and Vegetables Saying, "I hope you'll enjoy your luncheon" Ten Visits to the Cellar Sundry Acts of Courtesy, etc. Matches Wine and Cigars Reading Bill of Fare aloud Serving Dessert Dessert Clearing the Table Satisfaction of Hunger Wear and Tear and Breakages Letting down Window Shutters Receipting same .... The lawyer, as his client had done, paid the bill without demur. |