Bank of England.

Had not public indignation been at length roused, it is impossible to foresee the extent to which the Bank would have carried its inhuman traffic. Twenty years of blood sufficiently showed that nothing was to be expected from their humanity. The Daily Press, and all the mock advocates of humanity, religion, and law, were silent during this time. It is to the labours of the Weekly Press,* acting on the humanity and good sense of an English Jury, that we must ascribe some pause in this cannibal feast. But though the vultures were scared, they were loth to abandon their prey. The execution of Cashman, Weller, and Driscoll, in December, was an unparalleled outrage on reason and public feeling. The acquittals of Juries, the fallibility of their inspectors and clerks, the impossibility of ascertaining forged from genuine notes-all which had been established beyond doubt, surely ought to have saved these unfortunate men. But the Bank was callous both to reason and humanity; and, like Shylock the Jew, obstinately insisted on the last pound of flesh awarded by the law.

Before we conclude this subject, we will insert two or three important returns made to the House of Commons, which will fully illustrate the absurdity of their attempts to prevent the imitation of their notes, and also the impossibility of distinguishing forged from genuine paper.

* The great champion in the crusade against the Bank, was the Black Dwarf, whose unceasing attacks, and valuable expositions, first excited public attention to the Bank Hangings. In that paper it was fully demonstrated—

1. That the forgery of Bank notes is a matter of the easiest accomplishment.

2. That they may be imitated so correctly, as to prevent any person distinguishing betwixt true and false notes.

3. That the Bank servants were not only incompetent to distinguish genuine from forged paper, but had often ignorantly refused good notes.

4. That most of the evil was attributable to the slovenly manner the notes were executed, affording to their servants and the public no criterion to distinguish good from

bad.

5. That the Judge, from a confidence in the Bank, had frequently admitted incompetent evidence, from a belief that the Bank was possessed of demonstrative proof. Lastly, it was shown that the Bank had no such proof; and that their clerks and inspectors were all fallible, and unable to distinguish forged from genuine paper.

These positions were all supported by numberless instances, which left no doubt of their authenticity.

Bank of England.

LIST I.

AN ACCOUNT of the Total Number of Forged Bank Notes discovered by the Bank to have been Forged, by presentation for payment, or OTHERWISE, from 1st January 1812, to 10th April 1818; distinguishing each Year, and also distinguishing the number of Notes of different values.

From this statement it appears, that the amount of forgeries, notwithstanding the Bank executions increased every year; and that the total loss sustained by the public, on account of paper rejected as forged, amounted, in SIX YEARS, to the enormous sum of £131,361.

Here follows a statement of the sums expended by the Bank in prosec■tions since the suspension of cash payments,

LIST II.

AN ACCOUNT of the whole Expense incurred by the Bank of England, in Prosecutions for Forging their Notes, or for knowingly uttering or possessing such Notes, from 1st of March 1797, to the 1st of April 1818; containing the number of Persons prosecuted each Year, and the Expenses of the same.

Bank of England.

Nearly a QUARTER OF A MILLION expended in prosecution. But the next list is still more curious. It is an account of the notes which were actually received at the Bank, and paid as genuine, but which afterwards proved to be forged.

LIST III.

AN ACCOUNT of the Total Nominal Value of Forged Bank Notes presented to the Bank of England, from the 1st of January 1816, to the 10th April 1818, distinguishing each year, and distinguishing the amount of those of which payment was refused, from that of the Notes which were paid and which afterwards proved to be Forgeries.

This list proves decisively the barbarous and inhuman principles on which the Bank have proceeded. Here is not one, but seventy-five pounds which the Bank paid as genuine, but which afterwards proved forged. This surely ought to have made them pause. They had their own experience of their inability to identify their notes. Yet they went on hanging and transporting without mercy, on the bare suspicion (for after these repeated blunders, they could deem it nothing else) that their paper was imitated.

We shall now conclude our history of the Bank. We have given some account of its origin,-the stoppage in 1797,-the most important laws relative to the establishment, and, lastly, the Bank hangings. Our next ob ject is to give an account of the BANK profits, and the enormous wealth it has acquired since the suspension of cash-payments.

The profits of the Bank arise from various sources. First, from the inte rest of their notes in circulation, which, in some years, as in 1817, amounted to more than twenty-nine millions. Secondly, from balances of public money. These balances arise from the produce of different taxes paid into the Bank, and which have not been drawn out for the service of government. On an average of ten years, from 1806 to 1816, the balance amounted

Bank of England.

to £11,000,000, on which the Bank gained an interest of five per cent. per

annum.

The third source of profit is the interest on their capital and savings. The Bank's permament capital amounts to £11,686,000, lent to government at an interest of 3 per cent. The fourth source of profit is from the management of the borough debt. From a late act for the management of the debt, the Bank is paid £340 per million per annum, when its amount shall be 400 millions, and not exceed 600 millions: and £300 per million on such part of the debt as exceeds 600 millions.

The fifth source of profit is from the management of lotteries; for issuing the tickets and paying the prizes, they have generally received £1000 for each lottery. Besides these sources of profit, the Bank derives a profit from its trade in bullion, the destruction of its notes, and the private deposits of individuals. It also has a profit, at the rate of £805: 15: 10 per million, for receiving subscriptions on loans contracted for by government.* All these form the gross profits of the Bank; from which, in order to form an estimate of their annual gain, it is only necessary to deduct the amount of their expenses, the stamp duty on their notes, and the interest of their cash and bullion, which constitutes their unproductive capital.

First, as to the expenses of the Bank. The Committee of Public Expenditure stated, in their Report in 1807, "that the number of clerks em"ployed in the Bank, exclusively or principally in the public business

was,

In 1786....
1796..
1807...

243

..313

..450

"whose salaries, it is presumed, may be calculated at an average "between £120 and £170, for each clerk: taking them at £135, which "exceeds the average of those employed in the South-Sea House, the

❝ sum is

"at £150, the sum is

"at £170, the sum is

£60,750

67,500

76,500

"either of which two last sums would be sufficient to provide a superannu "ation fund.”

*During the continuance of the income-tax, the Bank had an allowance of £1250 per million, or one eighth per cent. for receiving the produce of that inquisitorial impost.

Bank of England.

The total expense for managing the public business, the salaries of the governor, directors, &c. as stated by the same Report, are as follow:Salaries to governor, deputy-governor, and directors £8,000 Incidental expenses, about..

Additional buildings and repairs.....

..15,000

.10,000

Law expenses, and loss by frauds and forgeries, about 10,000
Largest estimate for clerks

....76,500

Total....£119,500

Owing to the increase in the debt and other causes, Mr. Ricardo supposes, that the number of clerks employed in the public business had increased from four hundred and fifty to between five and six hundred. The expenses estimated by the Committee, in 1807, at £119,500, he calculates to have increased, in 1816, to £150,000. He states, on very good authority, the total number of clerks employed by the Bank, in the whole of their establishment, at one thousand. Half of this number is employed in the public business, and the other half in the private business of the Bank. The expenses of the Company may be supposed to bear some proportion to the whole number of clerks employed. And according to this rule, Mr. Ricardo says, 'that, as £150,000 has been calculated to be the expense attending the employment of five hundred clerks in the public business, we may estimate a like expense to be încurred by the employment of the other five hundred, and, therefore, the whole expenses of the Bank, at the present time, about £300,000, including all charges whatsoever."-Secure and Economical Currency, p. 71, 2.

This estimate includes every charge: the expense of managing the public business, the salaries of the governor, directors, and clerks; incidental expenses, additional buildings, and repairs; together with law expenses, loss by frauds, forgeries, and every other expense incurred in conducting the business of the establishment.

The next subject forming a part of the outgoings of the Bank is the Stamp Duty. The Bank, till lately, have always been particularly favoured in the composition which they paid for stamp duties. In 1791 they paid a 'composition of £12,000 per annum, in lieu of all stamps either on bills or notes. In 1799, on an increase of the stamp duty, this composition was advanced to £20,000; and an addition of £4000 for notes issued under £5, raised the whole to £24,000, In 1804, an addition of not less than 50% per cent. was made to the stamp duty; but, although the Bank circulation of notes under £5 had increased from one and a half to four and a half mil