Bank of England. were "alarmed for the safety of the house;” and asked him, when “ HE would think it necessary to interfere." Pitt interfered on the following Sunday: a singular day for the consummation of the most villainous transaction in history. Immediately after, the Bank had recourse to the vilest and most barefaced hypocrisy to disguise their disgraceful bankruptcy from the public. On the 2d of March, six days after the stoppage, a Court of Proprietors was called. Mr. Bosanquet, who waited on Pitt to express his fears for the "safety of the house," and to know when ministers would interfere, was present. After expatiating on the THEN prosperous state of Bank affairs, this gentleman told the Proprietors that he carnestly hoped they would soon be permitted to pay their notes, as usual, in cash. Thanks were then voted to the Directors for complying with the Order in Council, which empow ered them to violate their engagements to the public with impunity, and refuse payment for their notes. All this was excellent. Mr. Bosanquet earnestly hoped that they would be permitted to do that which he had earnestly petitioned Pitt they might be protected from doing; and the Proprietors gravely thanked the Directors for complying with their own earnest request! This was more than Punic craft and Romish duplicity. The Bank showed itself worthy of being incorporated into a system of fraud and pillage. Its whole history is without a parallel, except in the Church of Rome. Blood, frand, and duplicity,-these are its characteristics. The Reformers are unceasingly accused of immoral and disorganizing principles. What more so than the Pitt System! Look at the history of the first-born of that system. Look at the history of the Bank of England. Here, indeed, are anti-social and immoral principles with a vengeance. Here are a company of traders, or pawn-brokers, or swindlers, or any other more appropriate name; they commence business, incur debts, and, unable to fulfil their engagements, a government of social order and religion interposes to protect them from the demands of their creditors. What right had Government to interfere at all? The Company had clearly become bankrupt; they were unable to pay their debts, they were mere traders; why not share the fate of other bankrupts ; the establishment dissolved, and their effects sold for the benefit of their creditors? This, indeed, was as it ought to have been. It would have been fortunate for England, for Europe, and the world. It would have saved Europe from a desolating war of twenty years. It would have preserved a Bank of England. million of lives, and saved rivers of blood. It would have saved France from the bigoted and benumbing sway of the Bourbons; Spain from Ferdinand and the Inquisition; England from her paupers, and all that upstart wealth, that beggarly and insolent greatness, that splendid wretchedness, and perishable grandeur, neither accompanied with happiness, nor knowledge, nor honour, nor liberty, nor humanity, nor any other great and estimable quality in human nature. Let us now resume our history of the Bank Stoppage. The Order in Council, requiring the Bank to issue no more cash, was issued on Sunday the 26th of February. The Restriction, or Protection, or, more truly, the Swindling Act, received the royal assent on the 3d of May, and was to continue in force till the 24th of June, that is, only for fifty-two days. On the 22d of June, two days before the expiration of the original act, it was renewed till one month after the next Session of Parliament. This was the first renewal; the second renewal was in 1798, to continue till one month after the signing of a definitive treaty of peace. Peace came in 1801; but before the expiration of the month, the third renewal was passed, to continue till the 1st of March, 1803; before that time, notwithstanding peace continued, a fourth renewal passed to continue till six weeks after the next Session of Parliament. In the interim war broke out; the fifth renewal followed as a matter of course, and to continue till the signing of a definitive treaty of peace. In 1814, plaguy peace came again to put the faith of these deluders to the test; but before the expiration of the six months, the sixth renewal passed, to continue only ONE YEAR. In 1816, the country being at peace, every one expected the swindling law would expire; when, lo! it was renewed the seventh time, for Two YEARS! In 1818, it was again renewed, for the eighth time, for one year; and in 1819, it was renewed for the ninth time; and the Bank protected from payment of its notes in statutable coin for FOUR YEARS. Such is a brief history of the Restriction Act. It was foreseen at the time by Fox, Sheridan, Hobhouse, and others, that such a law, once enacted, would never be suffered to expire. Events have verified the prediction. Men are loath to part with power of any kind, and least of all the power of making money. Nothing could possibly be more dangerous and impolitic than to empower a company of traders, whose only object was gain, to issue paper not convertible at the will of the holder. Such a power was sure to be abused. The Bank had an interest in its abuse. Their interest was to f Bank of England. inundate the country with paper, to expel the precious metals from circulation, and substitute, in place of the legal coin, their own ragged wealth. They have pursued their interest, and the evil is now incurable. Sixty millions of paper can never be converted into a metallic currency. While the system continues, England must always be cursed with-the greatest of all curses to a commercial country—an inconvertible paper money. There appear two points of view under which the resumption of cash-payments may be principally contemplated.-First, it appears necessary, that the Bank should be provided with a sufficient quantity of specie to take up the whole of its notes before the restriction on cash-payments can be safely removed. Secondly, is it possible that such a supply of the precious metals can, by any means, be obtained? Now, in our opinion, the first is an indispensable condition; and that the second is physically impossible. Let us endeavour to make these two points a little more clear. Since the stoppage, bank-paper can be considered nothing more than a forced government paper, and of course its value depends upon the stability of the Government. Supposing the restriction removed, every note holder would be at liberty to demand payment, and the Bank liable to be called upon, at any moment, for the whole amount of paper in circulation. Would the Bank be so called upon? This must depend upon public opinionupon the opinion entertained of the security of Government. What is the opinion entertained now of Government, or likely to be entertained, while the present system continues? Is there a single individual who feels any confidence in its permancy? Is any one so blind as not to see it is placed on the brink of destruction, ready either to be swallowed up in its own inextricable difficulties, or dashed to atoms by a suffering and indignant population? Can cash-payments be resumed under such circumstances? Is it not base delusion to pretend such a thing? The restriction removed, the only thing to maintain bank paper in circulation would be faith in Governmentin the Oligarchy-the perpetuity of the borough system. Is such faith anywhere to be found? Does any one believe that the present system of mockrepresentation, profligate expenditure, sinecures, and a hundred more abuses, clear as the day, can now stand against the knowledge of the com'munity? We believe no one entertains such an opinion. Our position then is, that it is gross stupidity, base delusion, to talk about the resumption of cashpayments until Government is reformed. The grievances of the people re Bank of England. dressed, their rights restored, justice administered, confidence inspired; in short, when a government is established, supported by the good wishes of the people, and not by the bayonet, the dungeon, and field-piece, it is possible the restriction might be removed. There would be nothing then to create a sudden run upon the Bank, except the unfavourable state of the exchanges, which the Bank, in a great measure, has the power to controul. From July 1816 to July 1817, the market price of gold did not exceed £3: 19 per oz.; and the exchanges with the Continent, for a considerable portion of that period, were in favour of this country. While this continued there was nothing to cause a run upon the Bank-there was nothing to induce the holders of notes to offer them for payment, but a want of confidence. A similar state may again occur; and, we believe, exists at this present time; but would any one say the restriction might be removed? Would not the whole of the Bank issues be returned in the present insecure and unsettled state of the Government? Must not this insecurity last while the Government is unreformed? We conclude then, that provided the restriction were removed, from a want of confidence in the present system, the Bank would be called upon to take up the whole of its notes; therefore it would be necessary to be prepared with a sufficiency of specie for that purpose. But we will now show, that to acquire such a quantity of specie, by any means, is utterly impossible. A country not possessed of gold and silver mines, acquires possession of the precious metals very slowly. It can only acquire them by its exports exceeding its imports; in other words by the balance of trade being in its favour. When the balance of trade is in its favour, the exchange will also be in its favour, and the market price of gold will fall. The balance of trade, however, can never continue long in the favour of any country; its exports can never long continue to exceed its imports; nor, on the contrary, the imports of a country exceed its exports. A country which exports more than it imports, will be constantly receiving a new accession of the precious metals. But gold and silver, like labour and every other commodity, as they become more plentiful, also become cheaper; consequently increasing the supply of the precious metals lowers their value; or, which is the same thing, rises the prices of all other commodities. Hence it is, that the balance of trade can never continue in favour of any country; because it must enhance the price of its produce and manufactures; and consequently it will be undersold at the foreign market; and thus from being an exporting, it Bank of England. most probably will become an importing country. In like manner it might be shown, how a country could never long continue to import more than it exported; for being drained of the precious metals in the payment of the balance of trade, all its produce would fall in price; so that it would be able to sell cheaper than in any other country. To apply these principles to England. During the whole of Pitt's war the balance of trade was in her favour: the superior skill and industry of the people caused wealth to flow into the country in abundance; while, on the other hand, it was as regularly conveyed out again to promote igaorance and slavery in the liberticide and Machiavelian projects of her rulers. But though her real wealth was squandered, the shadow or representative remained. Paper money became the substitute for gold and silver, and the commerce of the country suffered all the evil of excessive riches, in a state of absolute poverty. Hence it is, that though England is perhaps the poorest country in the world in respect of the precious metals, her foreign commerce is as much crippled by her imaginary wealth as though she were the richest. The paper has not only forced out of the country its intrinsic wealth, but by keeping up the price of its produce and manufactures, must continue an insuperable obstacle to its re-admission. There is no likelihood, therefore, of England having the balance of trade in her favour, and of course it is not from this source the Bank can obtain a supply of specie. Indeed, to bring back the specie, would require England to have as great a commercial superiority over all the nations of the earth, for the forty years to come, as she has enjoyed during the forty years which are elapsed. Is this likely to happen with her debt of £40,000,000, her 40,000 lawyers and parsons, her 2,000,000 of paupers, and her 100,000 tax-gatherers? But if we examine the subject in another point of view, we shall see how desperately foolish is every hope of the resumption of cash-payments. In the event of the Restriction being removed, it is not merely the paper of the Bank of England, but also a considerable portion of the country bank paper, which would be returned for payment. In the present state of alarm and incertitude, the Bank of England might daily expect to have nearly the whole of its paper returned, and the Country Banks at least one half; so that to prepare cash for such a run, at least £40,000,000 of specie would be needful. Where or how is such an enormous mass of specie to be obtained? Such a sum is more than five times |