Expense of the Administration of Justice. maintain it. He went with the attorney to the special pleader, an eminent man, and convinced him that his counts were worth nothing. Others were added, but these were no better than the former: and on pointing out the circumstance to the pleader, he struck them out and inserted two counts which were very good ones. Different counts were sometimes necessary, because the action consisted sometimes of different cases. For instance, suppose he employed an architect to build a house, and the architect covenanted to do it in a workmanlike manner, but did not, then he had his action for breach; but it might happen that there was a warranty, and if the evidence went to a warranty that would not do without a count to sustain it, as had been decided by the Court of Exchequer, because it would be taking the defendant by surprise. "Now, the more their lordships looked at the Statute-Book, the more clearly they would see that it was like the Augean stable, and required somewhat of a similar remedy. He recollected a curious debate in the other house on the subject of the India-Bill. There was a lawyer on one side who stoutly maintained that nothing could be better than a charter, because it had the great seal to it, and therefore it proved itself. On the other side there was a sturdy Yorkshire lawyer of the name of Jack Law, who had been attorney-general, and he asked, "Pray what is a charter, but a piece of parchment with a great piece of wax dangling at the end of it?" A shrewd Scotchman followed up this by asking, "And pray what is an attor ney-general when he is honged, but a mon dongling at the end of a string?" But the object was to do as much as. possible without the "mon dongling at the end of the string." Lord Stanhope's speeches generally abound in just observations, and curious anecdotes; but he had such a pernicious habit of wandering from his subject, and dragging forward irrelevant matter, that it is rather hazardous attempting a quotation. Some part of the preceding extract we fear will not be intelligible to the whole of our readers; but we consider that in itself an argument against the present system; for we shall always contend that there never ought to be any thing either in law or its language otherwise than intelligible to every person of ordinary attainments. It is not a science which only belongs to a few individuals to be acquainted with, it is a profession which every one is presumed to understand; its language then ought to be as universal as its application; and its maxims intelligible to all who are amenable to them for their conduct. Besides, the mode in which laws are administered, implies that they should be simple and easy to be understood. Juries are the ultimate judges of the law it is for their Expense of the Administration of Justice. guidance they were made; and these men being taken from all classes, without regard to their education or intellectual endowments, it is clearly contrary to the theory of English jurisprudence, that they should be accompanied with any thing perplexed, subtle, or difficult. But the whole is a paradox and absurdity. When his lordship remarks, that the object is to do as much as possible, without the "man dangling at the end of the string," he is perfectly intelligible. This is what we wish to see; we wish to have as little of the wax and parchment of the profession as possible. It is, however, not merely in leases of land, but in wills, devises of land, assignments, bills of sale, bonds, articles of partnership, and in similar instruments, in which we imagine there is abundant room for improvement and simplification. We cannot see why these matters may not be drawn up by any rational individual, and when attested by one or two credible witnesses, be deemed as valid as when executed by an attorney or conveyancer. To be sure this would be making things vastly simple; it would be introducing a little reason and common sense into these matters; ingredients which we conceive are not less obnoxious to gentlemen of the bar than the priesthood. Lord Stanhope says, no class of persons have so much power to be useful. This must be allowed, but then it can scarcely be denied there is hardly any class so pernicious. There are no doubt exceptions, but we think the general character of the profession is bad, servile, selfish, and rapacious. These qualities are rendered still more noxious, because accompanied with considerable knowledge, exhaustless malice, and amazing cunning. They are all sighing after chief justiceships, chancellorships, and attorney-generalship; they long unceasingly for the emoluments of excise informations, and for the legal simony of bartering offices in courts of justice. Take the most eminent gentlemen of the bar, those who it might be supposed were emancipated from the trammels of their trade, and we shall find them completely blinded either by the prejudices or the interests of the profession; in short, mere lawyers. For instance, there is Mr. Brougham, an enlightened man, and seemingly of good intentions, but bless us! he would never do any substantial good were he to live a thousand years. He is wholly ignorant, or selfishly averse to every measure the least likely to rescue the country from its present calamities, and avert the still greater evils with which it is threatened. Again, there is Jeffray, the critic, conductor of the Edinburgh Review, and perhaps as clever and well-informed as any man in Europe, but then he is a LAWYER. He is palpably blind on the great question of Reform. He can see no good in a Reform of the House of Commons, which Expense of the Administration of Justice. eventually might lead to a reform of Scotch law and the Court of Session. This, no doubt, though possibly he may be insensible of it himself, is the source of all his apprehensions on the subject of Radical Reform. Besides an immense reduction of lawyers and attorneys, reform would cut up by the roots the whole system of the Revenue Laws. These laws have arisen solely from excessive taxation, and must disappear with the causes which created them. The GAME LAWs too are a source of endless cruelty and injustice, and we can never expect any rational law on this subject but from a Reformed Parliament. The best law in this case would be one which abrogates all other laws relating to Game, and suffer it, like the light or air of heaven, to be the general property of all who find it in their possession. These odious enactments are not only a disgraceful memento of a barbarous age and foreign subjugation, but are founded on the same feudal principles as our present Representation. Personal property gives no right to kill game. A man may have a hundred thousand pounds in the funds, or vested in broad cloth, and not have the privilege to shoot a hare or a partridge. In like manner, a person may be the owner of a copyhold estate worth £100,000 per annum, and not have the smallest influence in the making of those laws, by which both his property and his person are secured. These principles are alike absurd; belong to another age and state of society; and the restoration of the elective franchise to the people, would infallibly restore the natural and universal right to kill game. We will only make one more remark, and then conclude. To us there appears some little absurdity in enacting any new laws while the old remain in their present state. No one knows what laws are already in force; it is impossible therefore to be certain whether any new enactment be an abrogation or repetition of some other already in existence. Besides, to add even good laws to the present mass of antiquated rubbish, would be something like the folly of patching a piece of new cloth on an old coat; it would be blending that which is pure and excellent in itself, with that which is rotten and corrupt. We leave this suggestion to the consideration of Mr. Bennett and Sir James Mackintosh, who appear more inclined to add to the old system of jurisprudence, and enact new laws, than to render intelligible those we have. Bank of England. INFLUENCE OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND. THE proverb says,— If a knave or a fool with Carus we see, A knave or a fool Carus we sentence thee. It is certainly a just observation, that they may generally know a person by the company he keeps; and we think they may as certainly know whether any individual is a Reformist or Corruptionist, by ascertaining his profession and connexions. It hardly appears possible that any disinterested individual should be the advocate of the present system of pillage and injustice; and, therefore, we generally find those who come forward in its defence, are connected with it either in state, law, divinity, or some other way. As soon as we saw the name of JOHN WHITMORE affixed to a Declaration of London merchants, bankers, traders, and others, in defence of property and social order, we felt quite sure that JOHN WHITMORE Would turn out to have some great stake in the sort of social order that Declaration was intended to support. Accordingly, we found, after a little inquiry, that this gentleman was the governor of the Bank of England, at the time of the famous Bullion Report in 1810, and that the same person is now a Bank director. This circumstance alone will sufficiently explain Mr. Whitmore's meaning, when he declares his abhorrence of "seditious and blasphemous publica Bank of England. tions," and his "full reliance on the efficacy of the laws, the purity of their administration, and the wisdom of the Legislature." This language is now well understood; and no one is so little informed as not to comprehend its meaning when proceeding from the mouths of sinecurists, placemen, judges, bishops, and Bank directors. There is no establishment which has such a powerful interest in the continuance of the present system as the Bank of England. The policy of the last twenty-five years has been the source of all its wealth and influence. It is to the war against liberty and knowledge, the Bank owes all its greatness and inordinate gains. It is to the war the Bank is indebted for the Restriction Act, which enabled it to raise the circulation of its notes from 12 millions to 30 millions. It was the war which raised the unredeemed public debt from 220 to 850 millions. Of this debt the Bank has had the management, and for which it has received from the public about £300,000 per annum, whereas the receipt on account of the debt in 1792 was only £99,800. It is to the war too, the Bank is indebted for the increase in the amount of public deposits. In 1792 the deposits were probably less than four millions. In and since 1806, they have generally exceeded eleven millions. From this source alone, Mr. Ricardo calculates, that, in the ten years from 1806 to 1816, the Bank gained £5,500,000. It is to the war the Bank has been indebted for an annual dividend on its capital to the amount of 10, 12, and in some years as high as 17 per cent. Lastly, the Bank is indebted to the war for clear savings, from the year 1797 to the year 1816, to the enormous amount of £13,426,249. These savings are exclusive of the annual dividends and bonuses to the proprietors. It is a sum which yet remains in the hands of the Bank, and which has not been shared among the proprietors. It is a sum wrung from the wretchedness, the toil, and industry of the people. It is a sum which forms the unhallowed spoil of the last twenty years of blood and violence. It is a sum, which, we think, ought to be returned to those from whom it has been unjustly plundered; and applied to mitigate those unparalleled distresses, for which Mr. WHITMORE says, he cherishes "sentiments of unfeigned commiseration." These facts the reader must at present be content to take on credit; we assure him, however, that before this article is concluded, they will not only be made perfectly intelligible, but established on unquestionable authority. |