PART argument Neither will your logical axiom, "quicquid efficit tale est magis tale," help you any thing at all; for, first, your “quic[The Observator's quid efficit" must be "quando efficit." If a cause have to the con- sufficient vigour and efficacy at such a time as the effect is trary fails.] produced, it is not necessary that it should retain it for ever after, or that the people should retain that power which they have divested themselves of by election of another. To take your case at the best, they have put the staff out of their own hands, and cannot without rebellion and sin against God undo what they have done. Secondly, for your "magis tale," there is a caution in this canon, that the same quality must be both in the cause and in the effect; which yet is not always; not in this very case: it must be in causes total, essential, and univocal; such as this is not. The sun is the cause of heat, yet it is not hot itself; "sol et homo generant hominem viventem," yet the sun lives not. If two litigants consent to license a third person to name another for arbitrator between them, he may elect a judge, not be a judge. Yet I shall not deny you any truth; when and where the antecedent consent of free societies, not pre-engaged, doth instrumentally confer and convey (or rather apply) power and authority into the hands of one or more, they may limit it to what term they please, by what covenants they please, to what conditions they please, at such time as they make their election; yet covenants and conditions differ much, which you seem to confound (breach of covenant will not forfeit a lease, much less an empire). I have seen many covenants between kings and their people, sometimes of debt, 533 and many times of grace; but I do not remember that ever I read any conditions, but with some old elective kings of Arragon (if they were kings), long since antiquated, and one only king of Polonia. [Dissolution of sovereignty You add, and truly, that there "ought to be no dissolution of sovereignty but by the same power by which it had its not in the constitution," wherein God had His share at least; but this will not serve your turn. If you dare speak out plainly, tell power of the sub ject.] [See Robertson's Charles V, Introd. sect. iii. vol. iii. pp. 145, 146. 8vo. edit.] [Express "pacta conventa" (so called) were customarily exacted from the king upon his election under the old Polish monarchy (Univ. Hist., vol. xii. pp. 427, 428). Possibly Bramhall alludes to the election of Henri de Valois in 1573, from whom some extraordinary conditions were demanded (ibid., p. 492).] II. us, when a king is constituted by right of conquest and long DISCOURSE succession, yea, or by the election of a free people, without any condition of forfeiture or power of revocation reserved (as the Capuans gave themselves to the Romans'), and so according to your position it is "established by God," can the people or the major part without gross treason attempt to dethrone this king, or send him a writ of ease? They that are so zealous in religion to have every thing ordered according to the express Word of God, let them shew but one text, where ever God did give this power to subjects, to reduce their sovereigns to order by arms. If this were so, kings were in a miserable condition. Consider the present estate of Christendom; what king hath not subjects of sundry communions and professions in point of religion? Upon these men's grounds he must be a tyrant to one party or more. Moses seemed a tyrant to Korah and his rebellious company. [Numb. Queen Elizabeth and King James did seem tyrants to Squire, 14.1 Parry, Sommerville, and the Powder-traitors. Lycurgus, of whom Apollo once doubted whether he should be numbered among the gods or men, was well near stoned, and had his eyes put out, in a popular tumultd. Thus Barabbas may be [Lukexxii. 18-25.] absolved and the King of kings condemned. What devilish plots would this doctrine presently raise, if it were received! What murders and assassinates would it usher into the world! especially considering, that the worst men are most commonly active in this kind, to whom nothing doth more discommend a king than his justice. xvi. 12 SECTION THE SIXTH. Observ." As for the final cause of regal authority, I do not find any thing in the king's papers denying, that the same people is the final which is the efficient cause of it; and indeed it were strange, if the people, in subjecting itself to command, should aim at any thing but their own good in the PART first and last place. "Tis true, according to Machiavel's poli II. tics, princes ought to aim at greatness, not in, but over, their subjects; and for the achieving of the same, they ought to propose to themselves no greater good than the spoiling and breaking the spirits of their subjects, nor no greater mischief than common freedom, neither ought they to promote and cherish any servants but such as are most fit for rapine and oppression, nor depress and prosecute any as enemies but such as are gracious with the populacy for noble and gallant acts." And a little after, "His dignity was erected to preserve the commonalty, the commonalty was not created for his service, and that which is the end, is far more valuable in nature and policy, than that which is the means f." [Of the final cause Rom. xiii. 4. I Cor. ix. 7. Answ. Still this discourse runs upon elective kingdoms: of govern- as for those which have had other originals, here is a deep ment.] silence. "Scis tu simulare cupressum, quid hocs ?"—" you can paint a cypress tree, but what is this to the purpose?" Let it be admitted, that in such monarchies the aim of the people is their own protection, concord, and tranquillity ;rulers "are the ministers of God for" our 66 good;"-so, on the other side, sovereign princes have their ends also,-"Who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk thereof?" So there are mutual ends; and these ends on both sides are lawful and good, so long as they are consonant to the rules of justice. And though prince and people do principally intend their own respective good, yet it were folly to imagine to attain to such high ends, of such consequence and concernment, without the mixture of some dangers, difficulties, troubles, and inconveniences. As St. Ambrose saith, that since the fall of Adam, thorns often grow without roses, but no true roses without thornsh. We must take the rose with the thorn, the one with the other, in good part, for better for worse. "Fructus transit cum onere"-"the benefit passeth with the burden." If we can purchase tranquillity, which we intend, with obedience and subjection, which we e [Observations, &c., p. 2.] f [Ibid., p. 3.] [Horat., A. P., 20, 21.] h [Ambros., Hexaem., lib. iii. c. 11; Op. tom. i. p. 51. C—E.] II. must undergo, we have no cause to complain of the bargain. DISCOURSE It is a most wretched government, where one real suffering is not compensated with ten benefits and blessings. good must Again, this public good of the people, is (to use your own [Private 534 phrase) either singulorum or universorum, public or private, yield to of particular subjects or of the whole commonwealth. How- public.] soever the actual intentions of individual members of a society may aim at the private, yet, when these two are inconsistent (as sometimes it falls out), a good governor must prefer the public; and particular members must not grumble to suffer for the general good of the body politic. not neces than the But you say, the end is far more honourable than the [The end means, and the preservation of the commonalty is the end of sarily more regal dignity. True, but this preservation must be under- honourable stood sub modo, according to law; which is not alterable at means. ] the discretion of humourous men, but with the concurrence both of king and subjects. Likewise this is to be understood, where the ends are not mutual (as here they are), the king for the people, and the people for the king; and where the end is not partial but adequate (as this is not). Lastly, the end is more valuable; how? 'Qua finis'-' as it is the end’ in the intention of the efficient, not always in the nature of the things. If the Observer had argued thus,—the public tranquillity of king and people is the end of government, therefore more valuable,—his inference had been good; but as he argues now, it is a mere paralogism: which I will clear by some instances. The tutor is elected for the preservation of his pupil, yet the pupil qua talis' is less honourable. The Angels are "ministering spirits" for the good of man- [Heb. i. 14.] kind; are men therefore more honourable than Angels? The redemption of the world is the end of Christ's Incarnation; is the world therefore more excellent than Christ? Whether the Observer cite Machiavel true or false, I [Machiavel.] neither know nor regard. Such a character might fit Cæsar Borgia, a new intruder; but not King Charles; who derives his royalty from above a hundred kingly predecessors', whom malice itself cannot charge with one drop of guiltless blood, nor with the tear of an innocent; such a prince as Vespasian, of whom it is said, that "justis suppliciis illachri [See above in the Answ. to La Millet., vol. i. p. 74, Disc. i. Pt. i.] II. PART mavit et ingemuiti." But I offer two issues to the Observer out of these words of Machiavel, if he please to accept the challenge. First, that more noble worthies have been crushed to nothing by the insolency of the people (proportion for proportion), than by the power of kings; as in Athens, for instance, Socrates, Aristides, Themistocles, Alcibiades, and many more. The second, that gallant and virtuous. actions do not more often ingratiate men with the people, than a rolling tongue, a precipitate head, vain-glorious profusion, oily insinuations, feigned devotions, sufferings (though deserved) from superiors, and above all opposition to the present state. So that he that is a favourite to the king, is 'ipso facto' hated by the people or the major part; and to be slighted by the prince is frequently a ready way to Acts v. 37. be honoured by the people. Judas of Galilee was a great favourite of the commons; how did he endear himself? by seditious orations. Who more popular than Simon MaActs viii. gus? Tis μéyas”—“ some great one;" and this only with juggling. When Absalom sought to ingratiate himself with the vulgar, what course did he take? to be more eminent in virtue? no such thing; but ostentation, lying, flattery, and traducing the present state. Who hath not heard, how Pisistratus and Dionysius, two execrable tyrants, did cut and slash themselves, and persuaded the credulous multitude how it was done by the malignants for their zeal to the commonwealth, till by these arts they had first gotten a guard allowed for themselves, and after invaded the government. 9, 10. 2 Sam. xv. [1-6.] SECTION THE SEVENTH. Observ.-"To be delicia humani generis" is grown sordid with princes; to be public torments and carnificines, and to plot against those subjects whom by nature they ought to protect, is held Cæsar-like; and therefore bloody Borgia by mere treachery and cruelty hath gotten room in the calendar of witty and of spirited heroes. And our English Court of late years hath drunk too much of this state-poison; for either [Sueton., in Vespas., c. 15.] -Aristot., Rhet., i. 2.] |