prefenting the object, both vanith inftant taneously. Thus a man accustomed to to bacco, feels, at the end of the ufual interval, a confufed pain of want, which in its first appearance points at nothing in parti cular, though it foon fettles upon its accu ftomed object. The fame may be observed in perfons addicted to drinking, who are often in an uneafy reftless state before they think of their bottle. In pleafures indulged regularly and at equal intervals, the appetite, remarkably obfequious to cuftom, returns regularly with the usual time of gratification; and a fight of the object in the interim, has fcarce any power to move it. This pain of want arifing from habit, seems directly oppofite to that of fatiety. Singular it must appear, that frequency of gratification fhould produce effects fo opposite as are the pains of excefs and of want..

The appetites that refpect the preservat tion and propagation of our fpecies, are attended with a pain of want fimilar to that occafioned by habit. Hunger and thirst are uneafy fenfations of want, which always precede the defire of eating or drink

ing

ing and a pain for want of carnal enjoy ment precedes the defire of a proper object The pain being thus felt independent of an object, cannot be cured but by gratification... An ordinary paffion, in which defire precedes the pain of want, is in a different condition. It is never felt but while the object is in view; and therefore by removing the object out of thought, it vanisheth with its defire and pain of want*.

Thefe natural appetites above mentioned, differ from habit in the following particular, They have an undetermined direction toward all objects of gratification in general; whereas an habitual appetite is directed upon a particular object. The attachment we have by habit to a particular woman, differs widely from the natural paffion which comprehends the whole sex; and the habitual relish for a particular dish, is far from being the fame with a vague appetite for food. Notwithstanding this difference, it is still remarkable, that nature hath inforced the gratification of certain natural

1

See chap. 2. part 3.

appetites

appetites effential to the fpecies, by a pain of the fame fort with that which habit produ ceth.

The pain of habit is lefs under our power, than any other pain for want of gratification. Hunger and thirst are more eafily endured, especially at first, than an unusual intermiffion of any habitual pleasure. We often hear perfons declaring, they would forego fleep or food, rather than snuff or any other habitual trifle. We must not however con

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clude, that the gratification of an habitual appetite affords the fame delight with the gratification of one that is natural. Far from it: the pain of want only is greater. A

The flow and reiterated acts that produce a habit, ftrengthen the mind to enjoy the habitual pleasure in greater quantity and more frequency than originally; and by this means a habit of intemperate gratification is often formed. After unbounded acts of intemperance, the habitual relifh is foon reftored, and the pain for want of enjoyment re turns with fresh vigor.

The causes of the pleasant emotions hitherto in view, are either an individual, fuch

as

as a companion, a certain dwelling-place, certain amusements, &c.; or a particular fpecies, fuch as coffee, mutton, or any particular food. But habit is not confined to these. A conftant train of trifling diverfions, may form fuch a habit in the mind, as that it cannot be eafy a moment without amusement. Variety in the objects prevents a habit as to any one in particular; but as the train is uniform with refpect to amusement in general, the habit is formed accordingly; and this fort of habit may be denominated a generic habit, in oppofition to the former, which may be called a specific habit. A habit of a town-life, of country-sports, of folitude, of reading, or of bufinefs, where fufficiently varied, are inftances of generic habits. It ought to be remarked, that every specific habit hath a mixture of the generic. The habit of one particular fort of food, makes the taste agreeable; and we are fond of this tafte where-ever found. A

man deprived of an habitual object, takes up with what most resembles it: deprived of tobacco, any bitter herb will do, rather than want. The habit of drinking punch,

makes

makes wine a good resource. 10 Auman accultomed to the sweet society and comforts of matrimony, being unhappily deprived of his beloved object, inclines the fooner to a fecond choice. In general, the quality which the moft affects us in an habitual object, produceth, when we are deprived of it, a strong appetite for that quality in any other object.

The reasons are affigned above, why the causes of intense pleasure become not readily habitual. But now I must observe, that thefe reafons conclude only againft fpecific habits. With regard to any particular object that is the cause of a weak pleasure, a habit is formed by frequency and uniformity of reiteration, which in the cafe of an intenfe pleasure cannot obtain without fatiety and difguft. But it is remarkable, that fatiety and disgust have no effect, except as to that thing which occafions them. A furfeit of honey produceth not a loathing of fugar; and intemperance with one woman, produceth no difrelifh of the fame pleasure with others. Hence it is eafy to account for a generic habit in any strong pleasure.

The