med by fuch consciousness. It is an instinctive paffion, which operating without reafon or reflection, moves us by a fudden impulse to avoid the impending danger *.

In the fifth place, these external figns are made fubfervient in a curious manner to the cause of virtue. The external figns of a painful paffion that is virtuous or innocent, and confequently agreeable, produce indeed a painful emotion. But this emo tion is attractive, and connects the spectator with the person who fuffers. Disagreeable paffions only, are productive of repulsive emotions involving the fpectator's averfion, and frequently his indignation. This artful contrivance makes us cling to the virtu ous and abhor the wicked.

Sixthly, of all the external figns of pasfion, those of affliction or distress are the most illuftrious with respect to a final cause; and deservedly merit a place of diftinction. They are illuftrious by the fingularity of their contrivance; and they are still more illustrious by the sympathy they inspire, a paffion to

See chap. 2. part 1. fect. 5.]

which human fociety is indebted for its greatest bleffing, that of fecuring relief in all cafes of diftrefs. A fubject fo interesting, ought to be examined with leifure and attention. The conformity of the nature of man to his external circumstances, is in every particular wonderful. His nature makes him prone to fociety; and his fituation makes it neceffary for him. In a folitary state he is the most helpless of beings; deftitute of fupport, and in his manifold diftreffes deftitute of relief. Mutual fupport, the shining attribute of society, being effential to the well-being of man, is not left upon reason, but is inforced even inftinctively by the paffion of fympathy. Here fympathy makes a capital figure; and contributes, more than any other means, to make life eafy and comfortable. But however effential fympathy be to comfortable existence, one thinking of it beforehand, would find difficulty in conjecturing how it could be raised by external signs of diftrefs. For confidering the analogy of nature, if these figns be agreeable, they must give birth to a pleafant emotion leading every beholder to be pleased

pleased with human misfortunes. If they be difagreeable, as they undoubtedly are, ought not the painful emotion they produce to repel the spectator from them, in order to be relieved from pain? Such would be the conjecture, in thinking of this matter beforehand; and fuch would be the effect, were man purely a selfish being. But the benevolence of our nature gives a very different direction to the painful paffion of fympathy, and to the defire involved in it. Far from flying from diftrefs, we fly to it in order to afford relief; and our fympathy cannot be otherwise gratified than by giving all the fuccour in our power *. Thus external figns of distress, though disagreeable, are attractive; and the fympathy they infpire us with is a powerful cause, impelling us to afford relief even to a stranger as if he were our friend or blood-relation.

This branch of human nature concerning the external figns of paffion, is fo finely adjusted to answer its end, that those who understand it the beft will admire it the

See chap. 2. part 7.

most,

most. These external figns, being all of them refolvable into colour, figure, and motion, should not naturally make any deep impreffion on a fpectator. And supposing them qualified for making deep impreffions, we have feen above, that the effects they produce are not what would be expected. We cannot therefore account otherwise for the operation of thefe external figns, than by afcribing it to the original conftitution of human nature. To improve the social state, by making us inftinctively rejoice with the glad of heart, weep with the mourner, and shun those who threaten danger, is a contrivance illuftrious for its wifdom as well as benevolence. With refpect to the external figns of diftrefs in particular, to judge of the excellency of their contrivance, we need only reflect upon feveral other means feemingly more natural, that would not have anfwered the end propofed. I am attracted by this amufing fpeculation, and will not afk pardon for indulging in it. We fhall in the first place reverse the truth, by putting the cafe that the external figns of joy were dif agreeable, and the external figns of distress agreeable.

VOL. II.

T

agreeable. This is no whimfical fuppofition; for these external figns, fo far as can be gathered from their nature, feem indifferent to the production of pleasure or pain. Admitting then the fuppofition, the question is, How would our fympathy operate? There is no occafion to deliberate for an anfwer. Sympathy, upon that fuppofition, would be not lefs deftructive, than according to the real cafe it is beneficial. We fhould be incited, to cross the happiness of others if its external figns were disagreeable to us, and to augment their diftrefs if its external figns were agreeable. I make a fecond fuppofition, That the external figns of diftrefs were indifferent to us, and productive neither of pleasure nor pain. This would annihilate the ftrongeft branch of fympathy, that which is raised by means of fight. And it is evident, that reflective fympathy, felt by thofe only who have more than an ordinary share of fenfibility, would be far from being fufficient to fulfil the ends of the focial ftate. I fhall approach nearer truth in a third fuppofition, That the external figns of distress being disagreeable, were

productive