in its nurfe's face; and it must be sensible of this intuitively, for it has no other means of knowledge. I have no occafion to affirm, that these particulars are clearly apprehended by the child. and diftinct perceptions, perience are requifite.

To produce clear reflection and exBut that even an

infant, when afraid, must have some notion of its being in danger, is extremely evident.

That we should be conscious intuitively of a paffion from its external expreffions, is conformable to the analogy of nature. The knowledge of this language is of too great importance to be left upon experience. To reft it upon a foundation fo uncertain and precarious, would prove a great obstacle to the formation of focieties. Wifely therefore is it ordered, and agreeably to the fyftem of Providence, that we should have Nature for our inftructor.

Manifold and admirable are the purpofes to which the external figns of paffion are made fubfervient by the author of our nature. What are occafionally mentioned above,

VOL. II.

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any

above, make but a part. Several final cau fes remain to be unfolded; and to this talk I apply myself with alacrity. In the first place, the figns of internal agitation that are displayed externally to every spectator, tend to fix the fignification of many terms. The only effectual means to ascertain the meaning of doubtful word, is an appeal to the thing it reprefents. Hence the ambiguity of words expreffive of things that are not objects of external fenfe; for in that cafe an appeal is denied. Paffion, ftrictly speaking, is not an object of external fenfe but its external figns are; and by means of these figns, paffions may be appealed to, with tolerable accuracy. Thus the words that denote our paffions, next to those that denote external objects, have the most distinct meaning. Words fignifying internal action and the more delicate feelings, are lefs diftinct. This defect with respect to internal action, is what chiefly occafions the intricacy of logic. The terms of that science are far from being fufficiently afcertained, even after the care and la

bour

bour bestowed by an eminent writer *: to whom however the world is greatly indebted, for removing a mountain of rubbish, and moulding the fubject into a rational and correct form. The fame defect is remarkable in criticism, which has for its object the more delicate feelings. The terms that denote these feelings, are not more distinct than those of logic. To reduce this science of criticism to any regular form, has never once been attempted. However rich the ore may be, no critical chymist has been found to give us a regular analysis of its constituent parts, and to distinguish each by its own name.

In the fecond place, fociety among individuals is greatly promoted by this univerfal language. The distance and referve that strangers naturally difcover, fhow its utility. Looks and geftures give direct accefs to the heart; and lead us to felect with tolerable accuracy the perfons who may be trufted. It is surprising how quickly, and

Locke.

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for

for the most part how correctly, we judge of character from external appearances.

”

Thirdly, after focial intercourse is com→ menced, these external figns contribute above all other means to the ftricteft union, by diffufing through a whole affembly the feelings of each individual. Language no doubt is the most comprehenfive vehicle for communicating emotions: but in expedition, as well as in the power of conviction, it falls fhort of the figns under confideration; the involuntary figns efpecially, which are incapable of deceit. Where the countenance, the tones, the geftures, the actions, join with the words, in communicating emotions, thefe united have a force irrefiftible. Thus all the agreeable emotions of the human heart, with all the focial and virtuous affections, are, by means of thefe external figns, not only perceived but felt. By this admirable contrivance, focial intercourse becomes that lively and animating amufement, without which life would at best be infipid. One joyful countenance fpreads chearfulness inftantaneously through a multitude of fpectators.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, diffocial paffions being hurtful by prompting violence and mischief, are noted by the most confpicuous external figns, in order to put us upon our guard. Thus anger and revenge, especially when fuddenly provoked, difplay difplay themselves on the countenance in legible characters *. The external figns again of every paffion that threatens danger, raife in us the paffion of fear. Nor is this paffion occafioned by consciousness of danger, though it may be infla

* Rough and blunt manners, are allied to anger by an internal feeling, as well as by external expreffions resembling in a faint degree thofe of anger. Therefore fuch manners are eafily heightened into anger; and favages for that reafon are prone to anger. Thus rough and blunt manners are unhappy in two refpects. They are first readily converted into anger: and next, the change being imperceptible, becaufe of the fimilitude of external figns, the perfon against whom the anger is directed is not put upon his guard. It is for thefe reafons a great object in fociety, to correct fuch manners, and to bring on a habit of fweetnefs and calmnefs. This temper has two oppofite good effects. Firft it is not cafily provoked to wrath. Next the interval being great betwixt it and real anger, a perfon of this temper who receives an affront, has many changes to go through before his anger be inflamed. These changes have each of them their external fign, and the offending party is put upon his guard, to retire, or to endeavour a reconciliation.

med