and disclose the various sources of fallacy, whether arising from the nature of man in general, from the peculiarities of classes or individuals, from the vagueness of words and ideas used in daily intercourse, or from false systems of philosophy. Logic also teaches us what is the real object or objects of all philosophy; and in addition to the lofty purposes above enumerated, which regard discovery and judgment, it likewise instructs us in the arts of retaining and communicating truth. Here, it will be allowed, is enough to constitute one leading branch of the sciences, and therefore we may divide them into the Physical, the Mental, and the Logical. The noblest specimen of universal logic which has ever been presented to the world, is to be met with in the two grand works of Bacon-on the Advancement

3 The Idola Tribus, Specus, Fori, and Theatri of Bacon. * Another classification, which seems to have been but little attended to, is that of Bacon, who divides all philosophy into three parts-de Numine, de Natura, de Homine. It belongs properly to a treatise on logic to discuss at length the merits of this and other classifications; suffice it to observe, that although we consider Bacon's system decidedly superior to the one mentioned in the commencement of this Chapter, the physical, practical, logical, which is adopted by Locke; yet we by no means. think it so true to nature as that brought forward in the text. The following objection at once presents itself. Man is composed of mind and body; and although we should grant that his mind were altogether different from that of the brutes, yet his bodily structure is surely very similar, as we know from comparative anatomy. But according to the arrangement of Bacon, the physiology of man would belong to a different leading class from that of animals, which are comprehended under the term Natura.

of Learning, and the Novum Organum. After these, may be mentioned the third and fourth book of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.

Dismissing the physical and the logical sciences, as foreign to our present purpose, let us turn our attention to the mental. These may be properly divided into two principal branches, the pure and the mixed; the former being purely speculative, the latter partly speculative, partly practical. The one is commonly called metaphysics, or the philosophy of the human mind, and has in view two objects: first, to consider the nature of mind or spirit as a substance distinct from matter; secondly, and more particularly, to examine the phenomena or appearances which mind presents, to analyse and classify these, and to discover the general laws according to which they arise and succeed each other. This science, as we see, is in itself purely speculative, though remotely it may lead to most important practical applications.

The second branch of the mental sciences is of a mixed nature, combining practice with speculation, and to this the term moral may well be applied."

This being the first occasion on which the term moral occurs, it may be well to mention the various significations which have been given to the word, and particularly to determine in what sense it is used throughout the present work. No less than four different meanings have been attached to this term. In the first and most extensive sense, it signifies mental, and is opposed to physical, as when the sciences are divided into the physical and the moral. Secondly, in a less extended sense, it means the active powers of man, or those mental powers which are imme

It admits of several subdivisions, to be mentioned presently; but before entering upon these, I shall here take the opportunity of pointing out what may be called a new science, a general doctrine of human happiness. It has been remarked by Bacon,6 that the partitions of the sciences are not similar to diverse lines, which meet at an angle, but rather to the branches of trees, which are joined in one trunk, this trunk being whole and continuous for a certain space ere it split into branches. Before pursuing

diately connected with action; and here it is opposed to the intellectual. The assemblage of these active powers is what the French call caractère. Thirdly, in a sense still less extensive, it signifies those qualities in which virtue resides, or those connected with duty; and then it is opposed to vicious.

Lastly, it sometimes means merely one kind of virtues, those comprehended under the general term chastity; and in this case it is opposed to immoral. A very moral man often implies one who is strict merely in this particular. In the first Book of this inquiry, which treats of Moral Science in general, the word is used in the second sense above mentioned; and in the following Book, which discourses of Ethics, it is employed in the third and more limited signification. Moral science, then, in the widest sense here given to it, is that which has for its object so to regulate the thoughts, feelings, and actions of men, as to produce the greatest possible sum of human happiness.

Hence thoughts, feelings, and actions are the constant subjects of moral science, and the human mind as the source of thought, feeling, and action. It differs from pure metaphysics in this, that the bare knowledge of the mind, not its regulation, is the object of the latter. Moral qualities differ from the intellectual in this, that the former are immediately connected with the regulation of thought, feeling, and action, and hence with human happiness; whereas the intellectual are connected immediately with bare knowledge, not with regulation or practice.

6 De Augm. Scient. lib. iii. cap. 1.

his primary division through all its ramifications, he therefore lays down one universal science as the mother of all the rest, to be considered, in the career of knowledge, as a portion of the common way previous to its separation. This he calls philosophia prima, and it is to be made up of axioms not peculiar to any one science, but belonging equally to

many.

Following in the steps of this great master, I shall venture to propose a general science of human happiness, or, should we think fit to express it by one word, the term Eudemonology' naturally presents itself. In subjects of this nature, however, learned words ought to be avoided as much as possible. This doctrine will comprehend axioms and principles not peculiar to any one of the moral sciences, but applicable alike to many; and if properly founded, will serve as a perpetual guide to conduct us through the intricate maze of each of these sciences in particular. In the First Book of this inquiry an attempt will be made to fix some of the leading principles of this general doctrine; but in the mean time we must pursue our classification, which these observations have interrupted.

The mixed mental, or moral sciences, consider man in two points of view in the one, they look upon him simply as an individual, or else as belonging to the great family of mankind; in the other, as a member of a civil community. In the former light, he is merely a citizen of the world; in the

7 From the Greek Evògiμovía, happiness.

latter, he is a citizen of a state. Hence a wellmarked distinction between the cosmopolite and the civil sciences. To the former belong, 1. Morals, properly so called, or Ethics, which treats of human duty; 2. Natural Theology, which discourses of the being and attributes of Deity, and the duties we owe to him, so far as these can be discovered without the aid of Revelation; 3. Criticism, or the science of taste, inasmuch as it can be reduced to general principles. The civil part, on the other hand, comprehends, 1. Politics, or the science of government; 2. Jurisprudence, or the science of law, civil as well as criminal; 3. Political Economy, or the science of national wealth.

Having marked out the place which properly belongs to morals or ethics in the great body of the sciences, and having seen how it is related to the rest, to some remotely, to others nearly, we must now proceed to consider it more particularly. The object of this branch of philosophy is human duty, and it treats of right and wrong, moral obligation, merit and demerit, virtue and vice. It is especially conversant about certain sentiments of our nature to which the epithet moral has generally been applied, the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation which arise on considering the characters and actions of ourselves. and others. There is no subject which more constantly presses itself upon our notice than this. It

8 Legislation is, properly speaking, an art, not a science. It applies to practice the principles derived from many sciences, from morals, politics, jurisprudence, and political economy.