cordingly; and the fewer the good threads, the more highly do we prize them. Thus it appears, that rarity is essential to the growth of moral sentiment.

In the second Part of this Book, when treating of Practical Morality, we shall arrive at the same conclusion in a different way, and each proof being independent, the one will corroborate the other. In the mean time, enough has probably been said to put this question in a tolerably clear point of view. But it may be that some will call Rarity a very poor foundation for moral sentiment; and so, in truth, it would be, were it to stand alone; but when duly combined with Utility, so far from being poor or unsafe, it is a broad and solid basis. For we shall find, in the second Part of this Book, that the effect produced upon us by rarity is perfectly agreeable to the most farsighted views as to the real purpose of moral sentiment; and though this effect be not first owing to reason, it is strictly conformable to that faculty, and may be strengthened by it on subsequent reflection. This much, however, must be allowed, that since the emotion of wonder, which springs from rarity, is of an exciting nature and warms the whole soul, and since it is roused not only by rare moral qualities, but also by rare talents, or even beauty, it may sometimes so captivate the affections as to overpower the judgment, and thus pervert, not merely stimulate, moral sentiment. Admiration for what is rare is, therefore, a copious source of fallacy and danger, whenever it escapes from the salutary guidance of utility; and if, without the one, moral sentiment would be null, or at best weak, cold, and powerless in practice,

without the other it would have no good basis, but would be variable, whimsical, and depraved. But observations on the causes which may pervert our sense of right and wrong belong properly to the following Section. Having, in the present, traced the origin of moral sentiment, we have next to inquire what are the secondary causes by which it is subsequently propagated, strengthened, modified, or perverted.

SECTION II.—On the Secondary Causes of Moral Sentiment.

THOUGH the causes stated in the preceding Section are sufficient to account for the origin of moral sentiment, yet, in order to explain all the phenomena connected with it, we must have recourse to other and secondary causes, which subsequently come into operation. These causes are various, but most, if not all of them may be comprehended under five general heads; 1. Education; 2. The Presence in the Mind of some Strong Passion or Emotion; 3. Complexity of Action; 4. Local and Temporary Utility; 5. The Formation of General Rules.

I. EDUCATION.

1. The first and most important of these secondary causes is education, or early custom. This engenders habits not only of acting, but even of thinking and feeling; in other words, creates a tendency to the repetition of certain thoughts, feelings, and actions; and herein lies the whole efficacy of education.

Now the influence of education depends upon two grand principles of human nature, Association, and the imitative principle, or the principle of Example.5 This is sometimes called sympathy, but the latter term having been employed in the preceding Section in a more restricted sense, I shall continue to use it as before, to signify the principle by which we participate in the weal and woe of others. In reality, this is but one form of the more general principle of imitation, by which we catch not only the feelings, but also the opinions, and even the outward ways of those with whom we associate. Mirth begets mirth; laughter, laughter; sorrow, sorrow; languor, languor; courage, courage; fear, fear; despondency, despondency; applause, applause; disfavour, disfavour; and the opinions and actions of one man have also a manifest influence upon those of another. This principle, as might be supposed, acts with the greatest force when large bodies of men are brought toge her, as in an army, a meeting for political or religious purposes, or even in a theatre or other place of public amusement. Those sudden emotions of courage, and those no less sudden fears, which determine victory or defeat; the rapid and tumultuous movements of large popular assemblies; the bursts of applause which gladden, or the groans and hisses which dismay an actor, are all propagated like wild-fire on the principle of imitation. Nay, the communication of opinion has sometimes been almost as rapid as that

5 It may be observed that the term imitation does not here necessarily imply intention.

of emotion. This has been particularly seen in revolutionary times, when some great changes have unsettled the minds of men, and prepared them for further changes. Without the principle in question, it would be utterly impossible to account for those sudden and simultaneous conversions from one political creed to another, by which nearly a whole people has been affected; for we cannot imagine that reason could operate thus quickly and universally. Never, perhaps, was there witnessed so sudden and general a change of opinion as during the French Revolution. Let us attend to the celebrated author of the Vindicia Gallicæ, whose object was to defend that great event against the attacks of Burke, by no means to run it down. "Doctrines were universally received in May, which, in January, would have been deemed treasonable, and which, in March, were derided as the visions of a few deluded fanatics." Will any one say that this change was brought about by mature reflection rather than by imitation?

This principle, which is of such importance in war and civil politics, which determines the victory or the defeat of armies as if by magic, and precipitates revolution by inflaming the minds of men, is for ever at work in private life, though it may be silently and imperceptibly. In the child, however, the principle is so strong that every one must have remarked it; for he acts

"As if his whole vocation
Were endless imitation."

6 Vindicia Gallicæ, p. 38. See also my Disquisition on Government, p. 3, 4.

Can we then suppose that in morals alone this principle has no influence? On the contrary, that influence is felt and acknowledged by every one, for it is universally allowed that morals are better taught by example than precept. Nor does the example of others influence our actions alone, or our practical morality, but it extends to our moral sentiments. When the child listens to those around him who are relating some act of virtue or of vice, does he not mark the words employed, as well as the emphasis, the tone, the gesture, and the expression of countenance with which those words are accompanied? The terms of approbation and disapprobation are not usually pronounced with an indifferent accent or air, but with the signs of some emotion; and this, being readily communicated to the youthful mind, becomes his first lesson in morality. He feels a sentiment in some degree corresponding to that of his elders, who here are really his instructors, though they may not be aware of the moral education they are giving; and when similar occasions arise, his mind is prepared for similar sentiments. Thus, example, and especially early example, is at least one way in which moral sentiment is communicated.

The effect of example is greatly assisted by another principle, that of association. When two states of mind have frequently occurred together, the presence of the one is apt instantly to call up the other without any effort on our part, and even in spite of our will. This principle being now so well understood, it is unnecessary to dwell upon it here; but I may remark, that since any thought or conception suggests any