rence; but by a certain party in France, these men are looked upon as heroes, who exposed themselves to almost certain death to gain a patriotic end. Those who assassinated tyrants were by the ancients held in the highest honour; and Harmodius, Aristogiton, Brutus, who stabbed his friend, nay, Timoleon, who slew his own brother, were held up as bright examples to the world, and had statues raised to their memory. In this respect, moral sentiment has undergone a great change. The same may be said of suicide, which amongst the Romans was not only tolerated but praised; while those who in certain circumstances did not put an end to themselves, were branded as miserable poltroons, dead to every manly virtue. Most of the eminent men who were doomed to die by the first Cæsars, anticipated their fate by self-slaughter, and always were applauded for doing so; and the Emperor Otho is represented by Tacitus as having gained as much reputation by killing himself as he had lost by the murder of Galba. This too was at a time when his affairs were by no means desperate. Moreover the exposure of infants was practised, without remorse or obloquy, both by the Greeks and Romans.

12

In another branch of morals, that which regards the intercourse between the sexes, we find a very considerable diversity of sentiment, not only between past and present times, but between different nations

12 Duobus facinoribus, altero flagitiosissimo, altero egregio, tantumdem apud posteros meruit bonæ famæ, quantum malæ." Hist. lib. ii. cap. 4.

14

of our own day. To say nothing of certain practices now generally execrated, but which were tolerated by the most refined people of antiquity; we may remark that, from the earliest ages polygamy has been permitted in the east, while in Europe it has been generally forbidden. Abraham was married to his half-sister by the father; 13 and at Athens marriages of this sort were legal; but at Sparta, those with an uterine sister only were sanctioned, while in Egypt both were allowed. Even now the marriage of uncle and niece is not uncommon in some catholic' countries, particularly in Spain and Portugal, also in Savoy, but in protestant states it is generally, if not always, prohibited. In England a man may not wed a former wife's sister; but in America, such a connection is sanctioned and is by no means rare. These examples may suffice to show that the moral sentiments of mankind have not been quite so uniform as some would have us to believe; and at the same time, they prove that ethics is not a matter so very plain and simple, as to require no rule beyond the common sense or common feeling of the world.

After these observations, which go to prove the necessity of science in morals, it remains to be shown what are its leading divisions. And here again the same distinction presents itself, which we formerly mentioned as applicable to other sciences. Ethics naturally divides itself into two principal parts, the

13 Genesis, xx. 12.

14 See L'Esprit des Lois, liv. v. ch. v., and the authorities there quoted; Cornelius Nepos, Philo, Strabo, and Seneca.

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speculative and the practical, or the Theory of moral sentiments, and the Rule of action, or rule of life. This is a distinction of first rate importance, but strange to say it has been very little attended to. Almost all writers upon morals have mixed up the one with the other, and have confounded the two questions, the what is, and the what ought to be. Having discovered, or thought they had discovered, the nature and origin of our moral sentiments, they conceived they had nothing further to do; as if, why do we approve or disapprove, and why ought we to approve or disapprove, were one and the same question. But it is evident that the circumstances actually present to the mind, and which give rise to our moral sentiments, may or may not always be the same as those by which, on mature reflection, we consider · ourselves justified in awarding praise or blame. Thus suppose, merely for the sake of illustration, that most of the above sentiments could be traced to associations formed in childhood and early youth, would this be a sufficient reason to give to any one who asked us, why we approved or disapproved such and such actions? As assigning the actual cause, the answer might be correct enough, and so express a metaphysical truth; but it would not be a moral answer, that is, it would not shew that we were right in applauding or condemning. Here we see the dif ference between a metaphysical and a moral reason, or a speculative and a practical, and at the same time the propriety of the distinction above laid down. In saying that it has been scarcely at all attended to by writers on this subject, I must however except Sir James Mackintosh, who, in his Dissertation on the

Progress of Ethical Philosophy, has insisted strongly thereon, and considers that much of the obscurity which involves this subject has arisen from confounding two questions which ought always to have been kept separate. It may be true that actions ought to be called virtuous or vicious according to their general consequences; but does it therefore follow, that the view of these consequences is always present to the mind when it approves or disapproves? These it is clear are quite different inquiries. The second part, here termed the Rule of action, is what Sir James calls the Criterion of morality.

The speculative branch of morality naturally subdivides itself into two, in one of which we treat of the nature of the moral sentiments, and analyse them, supposing them susceptible of analysis; while in the other we trace the sources or causes from which they spring, in other words, their origin.

Practical morality also admits of a twofold division. The first part investigates the final cause of these moral sentiments, i. e. the purpose for which they seem to have been given us, or the object which they serve; the second considers on what occasions they ought to arise in order to fulfil that purpose, i. e. what is the quality of actions on account of which we are justified in approving or disapproving them, and in calling them virtuous or vicious. In short, this last part treats of the characteristic quality or qualities of Virtue and Vice. Each of these heads must be touched upon in order; but previously we must endeavour, according to promise, to fix some of the principles of the general science of human happiness.

BOOK I.

ON MORAL SCIENCE IN GENERAL, OR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HAPPINESS.

PART I.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE HUMAN MIND, AND

ON HUMAN HAPPINESS.

INCE we are constantly forming plans of happi

SINC

ness, and since there is nothing in which we feel so deep an interest, we can readily believe that enquiries into the sources thereof must have attracted the attention of mankind at a very early period. One of the principal objects of the Greek philosophers was to discover wherein lay the summum bonum, or chief good, which the wise man ought always to pursue. Various systems were formed, all of them imperfect, but all containing some truth, one placing the chief good in pleasure, another in the mere absence of anxiety; a third in active virtue, and a fourth in contemplation; while a fifth denied that there was any fixed good at all, and maintained that every thing depended upon individual opinion or humour. Some philosophers thought they could not be virtuous and happy but apart from the world; these said that we ought to place our happiness in nothing but what