bankers in London, in the neighborhood of the bank, though it was lawful, have not found it useful to issue their own notes. The banking privilege of the Bank of England accordingly conisted simply in the privilege of issuing notes for circulation while that privilege was forbidden by law to all other corpora tions and all large partnerships and associations. This privilege was restrained in 1826, so as not to prohibit banking companies except within the distance of sixty-five miles of London; and, at the same time, notes of the bank were made a tender in payment of all debts, except by the bank itself. This provision may be considered as a new privilege; but it does not belong the original and essential idea of banking. Mr. McCulloch remarks, and truly, that all that gov ernment has properly to do with banks is only so far as they are banks of issue. Upon the same principle, the banks of other countries of Europe are incorporated, with the privilege to issue and circulate notes as their distinctive character." Now, how is it in our own country? When our State legislatures have undertaken to restrain banking, the great end in view has been to prevent the circulation of notes. I may on this point refer to the statute-books of Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, for restraining unauthorized companies from issuing notes of circulation. Not unlike is the statute of Ohio, imposing a punishment for unauthorized banking. Her law defines, in the first place, what constitutes a bank, namely, the issuing of notes which pass by delivery, and which are intended for circulation as cash. That is the true definition of a bank, as we understand it in this country. I would also refer to the laws of other States, Maryland, New Jersey, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, all to the same effect. The law of the State of Alabama herself is much more important, in this view of the case, than that of any other State. The constitution of the State of Alabama was established in 1819; the law creating the Bank of Alabama was passed in 1823. The constitution and this law are all the authorities from which the inference has been drawn as to the policy of the State of Alabama. Did she suppose that, by this law, she • Here Mr. Webster explained the character of the banks of France, Belgium, and some other countries. was establishing such a monopoly of the purchase of bills of exchange as has been contended for in this case? Certainly not. For, by a law passed afterwards, she restrained the circulation of unauthorized bank-notes; that is, notes not issued by some authorized bank. But did she also restrain dealings in exchange? She did no such thing. Nor is there any thing either in the constitution or the laws of the State of Alabama which shows that by banking she ever meant more than the circulation of bills as currency. There is nothing, therefore, in any law or any policy of Alabama against the purchase of bills of exchange by others as well as by the Bank of Alabama. She has prohibited by law other transactions, which are clearly banking transactions; but she has not touched this. If even her banking policy includes as well buying exchange as circulation, and she guards against competition in the one and leaves the other open, who can say, in the face of such evidence, that it is her policy to guard against what she leaves free and unrestrained? Is there any thing in the constitution, or any ground in the legislation of Alabama, to sustain the allegation which has been made of her policy? If not, is the existence of such a policy to be established here by construction, and that construction far-fetched? And here I rest my argument on this case, which has been discussed by others so ably, as not to justify my occupying the time of the court by going further into it. The learned counsel on the other side, in the course of his argument of yesterday, alluded to the newspapers, which, he said, had treated the decision of the court below scornfully. I was sorry to hear it; for the learned judge has acted, in his decision, I have no doubt, under a high sense of duty. I have been told, but I have not seen it, that a press in this city, since this case has been under consideration in this court, has undertaken to speak, in a tone somewhat approaching to that of command, of the decision upon it to be expected from this court. Such conduct is certainly highly discreditable to the character of the country, as well as disrespectful and injurious to the court. A learned gentleman on the other side said, the other day, that he thought he might regard himself, in this cause, as having the country for his client. He only meant, doubtless, to express a strong opinion, that the welfare of the country required the case to be decided in his favor. I agree with the learned gentleman, and I go, indeed, far beyond him in my estimate of the importance of this case to the country. He did not take pains to show the extent of the evil which would result from undoing the vast number of contracts which would be affected by the affirmation here of the judgment rendered in the court below, because his object did not require that; his object was to diminish the prospect of mischief, not to enlarge it. For myself, I see neither limit nor end to the calamitous consequences of such a decision. I do not know where it would not reach, what interests it would not disturb, or how any part of the commercial system of the country would be free from its influences, direct or remote. And for what end is all this to be done? What practical evil calls for so harsh, not to say so rash, a remedy? And why now, when existing systems and established opinions, when both the law and the public sentiment, have concurred in what has been found, practically, so safe and so useful; why now, and why here, seek to introduce new and portentous doctrines? If I were called upon to say what has struck me as most remarkable and wonderful in this whole case, I would, instead of indulging in expletives, exaggerations, or exclamations, put it down as the most extraordinary circumstance, that now, within a short month of the expiration of the first half-century of our existence under this Constitution, such a question should be made; that now, for the first time, and here, the last place on earth where they might be expected, such doctrines as have been heard in its support should be brought forward. With all the respect which I really entertain for the court below, and for the arguments which have been delivered here, I must say that, in my judgment, the decision now under revision by this court is, in its principle, anti-commercial and anti-social, new and unheard of in our system, and calculated to break up the harmony which has so long prevailed among the States and people of this Union. It is not, however, for the learned gentlemen nor for myself to say here that we speak for the country. We advance our 132 THE UNITED STATES BANK AGAINST PRIMROSE. sentiments and our arguments, but they are without authority. It is for you, Messrs. Chief Justice and Judges, on this as on other occasions of high importance, to speak and decide for the country. The guardianship of her commercial interests; the preservation of the harmonious intercourse of all her citizens; the fulfilling in this respect of the great object of the Constitution, are in your hands; and I am not to doubt that the trust will be so performed as to sustain at once high national objects and the character of this tribunal. THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY AND THE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUNG.* INTRODUCTORY NOTE. THE heirs at law of the late Stephen Girard, of Philadelphia, instituted a suit in October, 1836, in the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting as a court of equity, to try the question of the validity of his will. In April, 1841, the cause came on for hearing in the Circuit Court, and was decided in favor of the will. The case was carried by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, at Washington, where it was argued by General Jones and Mr. Webster for the complainants and appellants, and by Messrs Binney and Sergeant for the validity of the will. The following speech was made by Mr. Webster in the course of the trial at Washington. A deep impression was produced upon the public mind by those portions of it which enforced the intimate connection of the Christian ministry with the business of instruction, and the necessity of founding education on a religious basis. This impression resulted in the following correspondence : "WASHINGTON, February 13, 1844. "SIR: Inclosed is a copy of certain proceedings of a meeting held in reference to your argument in the Supreme Court of the case arising out of the late Mr. Girard's will. In communicating to you the request contained in the second resolution, we take leave to express our earnest hope that you may find it convenient to comply with that request. "We are, Sir, with high consideration, yours, very respectfully, "HON. DANIEL WEBSTER." P. R. FENDALL, HORACE STRINGFELLOW, WILLIAM RUGGLES, JOEL S. BACON, THOMAS SEWALL, WILLIAM B. EDWARDS, Committee. A Speech delivered in the Supreme Court at Washington, on the 20th of February, 1844, in the case of François Fénelon Vidal, John F. Girard, and others, Complainants and Appellants, against The Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Philadelphia, the Executors of Stephen Girard, and others, Defendants. |