As to Richard's being alone in the house, was not that known? As to the time of the murder, was not that known? So this information confirms what was known before, and fully confirms it. One word as to the interview between Mr. Colman and Phippen Knapp on the turnpike. It is said that Mr. Colman's conduct in this matter is inconsistent with his testimony. There does not appear to me to be any inconsistency. He tells you that his object was to save Joseph, and to hurt no one, and least of all the prisoner at the bar. He had probably told Mr. White the substance of what he heard at the prison. He had probably told him that Frank confirmed what Joseph had confessed. He was unwilling to be the instrument of harm to Frank. He therefore, at the request of Phippen Knapp, wrote a note to Mr. White, requesting him to consider Joseph as authority for the information he had received. He tells you that this is the only thing he has to regret; as it may seem to be an evasion, as he doubts whether it was entirely correct. If it was an evasion, if it was a deviation, if it was an error, it was an error of mercy, an error of kindness; an error that proves he had no hostility to the prisoner at the bar. It does not in the least vary his testimony, or affect its correctness. Gentlemen, I look on the evidence of Mr. Colman as highly important; not as bringing into the cause new facts, but as confirming, in a very satisfactory manner, other evidence. It is incredible that he can be false, and that he is seeking the prisoner's life through false swearing. If he is true, it is incredible that the prisoner can be innocent. Gentlemen, I have gone through with the evidence in this case, and have endeavored to state it plainly and fairly before you. I think there are conclusions to be drawn from it, the accuracy of which you cannot doubt. I think you cannot doubt that there was a conspiracy formed for the purpose of committing this murder, and who the conspirators were: That you cannot doubt that the Crowninshields and the Knapps were the parties in this conspiracy: That you cannot doubt that the prisoner at the bar knew that the murder was to be done on the night of the 6th of April: That you cannot doubt that the murderers of Captain White were the suspicious persons seen in and about Brown Street on that night: That you cannot doubt that Richard Crowninshield was the perpetrator of that crime: That you cannot doubt that the prisoner at the bar was in Brown Street on that night. If there, then it must be by agreement, to countenance, to aid the perpetrator. And if so, then he is guilty as PRINCIPAL. Gentlemen, your whole concern should be to do your duty, and leave consequences to take care of themselves. You will receive the law from the court. Your verdict, it is true, may endanger the prisoner's life, but then it is to save other lives. If the prisoner's guilt has been shown and proved beyond all reasonable doubt, you will convict him. If such reasonable doubts of guilt still remain, you will acquit him. You are the judges of the whole case. You owe a duty to the public, as well as to the prisoner at the bar. You cannot presume to be wiser than the law. Your duty is a plain, straight-forward one. Doubtless we would all judge him in mercy. Towards him, as an individual, the law inculcates no hostility; but towards him, if proved to be a murderer, the law, and the oaths you have taken, and public justice, demand that you do your duty. With consciences satisfied with the discharge of duty, no consequences can harm you. There is no evil that we cannot either face or fly from, but the consciousness of duty disregarded. A sense of duty pursues us ever. It is omnipresent, like the Deity. If we take to ourselves the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, duty performed, or duty violated, is still with us, for our happiness or our misery. If we say the darkness shall cover us, in the darkness as in the light our obligations are yet with us. We cannot escape their power, nor fly from their presence. They are with us in this life, will be with us at its close; and in that scene of inconceivable solemnity, which lies yet farther onward, we shall still find ourselves surrounded by the consciousness of duty, to pain us wherever it has been violated, and to console us so far as God may have given us grace to perform it. THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST WILLIAM D. PRIMROSE.* THE case of The Bank of the United States against William D. Primrose was brought up by appeal from the Circuit Court of Alabama, together with the cases of The Bank of Augusta against Joseph B. Earle, and The New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company also against Joseph B. Earle. The same principle was at issue in the three cases. The facts in the case of The Bank of the United States against William D. Primrose were as follows. "The Bank of The United States, incorporated by the legislature of the State of Pennsylvania, as the holders of a bill of exchange, protested for non-payment, for five thousand three hundred and fifty dollars, drawn by Charles Gascoigne, at Mobile, on the 14th of January, 1837, at four months, on J. and C. Gascoigne of New York, in favor of William D. Primrose, and by him indorsed, instituted, in October, 1837, an action. against the indorser of the bill, in the Circuit Court of the Southern District of Alabama. The agreed facts of the case which were submitted to the Circuit Court were as follows. "The plaintiffs are a body corporate existing under and by virtue of a law of the State of Pennsylvania, authorized by its charter to sue and be sued by the name of the President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of the United States, and to deal in bills of exchange; and composed of citizens of Pennsylvania, and of States of the United States other than the State of Alabama. The defendant is a citizen of the State of Alabama. George Poe, Jr. was the agent of the plaintiffs, resident in Mobile, and in the possession of funds belonging to the plaintiffs, intrusted to him for the sole purpose of purchasing bills of exchange. The said George Poe, Jr., as such agent, on the 14th day of January, 1837, purchased at Mobile the bill declared upon, and paid for the same in notes of the branch of the Bank of the State of Alabama at * An argument made in the Supreme Court of the United States, on the 9th of February, 1839. I Mobile. The defendant is the payee of the bill, and indorsed it to Į laintiffs, the present holders. The bill was presented at maturity to the acceptors, and duly protested for non-payment, and due and legal notice given to the defendant. "The question for the opinion of the court on the foregoing statement of facts is, whether the purchase of the said bill of exchange by the plaintiffs as aforesaid was a valid contract under the laws of Alabama. If the court be of opinion that the said contract was valid, and that the said plaintiffs, as holders of the said bill, acquired the legal title thereto by the said purchase, then judgment to be rendered for the plaintiffs for the sum of five thousand three hundred and fifty dollars, with interest at eight per cent. since the 30th of May, 1837, and ten per cent. damages. But if the court be of opinion that the said purchase was prohibited by the laws of Alabama, and the contract was therefore invalid and void, judgment is to be rendered for the defendant. "The Circuit Court of Alabama gave judgment for the defendant." The cause was transferred by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, and was tried in connection with the two others above named, in which the same question was raised. The case of The Bank of the United States against Primrose was argued by Mr. Sergeant and Mr. Webster for the plaintiffs in error. The cause was one of high importance, covering a vast variety of contracts entered into in the several States of the Union by the agents of corpora. tions established in other States. It was calledat, the time the "Great Appeal Case from Alabama." The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing the decision of the court below, was delivered by Chief Justice Taney, Mr. Justice Baldwin concurring in the judgment of the court, for reasons stated in an opinion of his own, and Mr. Justice McKinley dissenting. Mr. Webster's argument was as follows. THE record presents this case. The Bank of the United States is a corporation created by a aw of the State of Pennsylvania. By that act the bank, among other functions, possesses that of dealing in bills of exchange. In the month of January, 1837, having funds in Mobile, this bank, through the instrumentality of its agent, Mr. Poe, purchased a bill of exchange to remit to New York. This bill, drawn at Mobile upon New York, and indorsed by William D. Primrose, the defendant in this case, not having been paid either at New York or by the drawer, the Bank of the United States instituted this suit in the Circuit Court of Alabama, to recover the money due on the bill. In the court below, it was decided that the contract by Poe in behalf of the bank was void, on two grounds: First, because it was a contract made by the Bank of the United States, in the State of Alabama; whereas a bank incorporated by the State of Pennsylvania can do no act out of the limits of Pennsylvania. Secondly, because Alabama has a bank of her own, the capital of which is owned by the State herself, which is authorized to buy and sell exchange, and from the profits of which she derives her revenue; and the purchase of bills of exchange being a banking operation, the purchase of such bills by others, at least by any corporation, although there is no express law forbidding it, is against the policy of the State of Alabama, as it may be inferred from the provisions of the constitution of that State, and the law made in conformity thereto. It is admitted that the parties are rightfully in court. It is admitted, also, that the defendant is a citizen of Alabama, and that all the citizens who compose the corporation of the Bank of the United States are citizens of the State of Pennsylvania, or of some other State than Alabama. The question is, Can they, as a corporation, do any act within the State of Alabama? In other words, is there any thing in the constitution or laws of the State of Alabama which prohibits, or rightfully can prohibit, citizens of other States, or corporations created by other States, from buying and selling bills of exchange in the State of Alabama? In his argument, yesterday, for the defendant in this case, my learned friend asked certain questions which I propose to answer. * Can this bank, said he, transfer itself into the State of Alabama? Certainly not. Can it establish a branch in the State of Alabama, there to perform the same duties, and transact the same business, in all respects, as in the State of Pennsylvania? Certainly not. Can it exercise in the State of Alabama any of its corporate functions? Certainly it can. For my learned friend admits its right to sue in that State, which is a right that it possesses solely by the authority of the Pennsylvania law by which the bank is incorporated. We thus clear the case of some difficulty by arriving at this Mr. Vande Gruff. |