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LIFE OF LORD NELSON.

CHAPTER I.

1801.

THE attack made by the British upon a Danish 40-gun frigate, the Freja, to enforce the right of searching neutral ships for contraband of war, led to animosity between England and Denmark. The taking of Malta by the British, incensed Paul, the Emperor of all the Russias, and induced him to lay an embargo upon British shipping in his ports, amounting to not less than 200 sail. A convention being entered into between Russia and Sweden, agreeing to an armed neutrality on the part of these powers, Denmark joined the confederacy. This brought matters to a crisis. The three Northern Powers, under the influence of France, thus directed against the naval supremacy of England, rendered no inconsiderable effort necessary; and Sir Hyde Parker, with a competent force was dispatched to the Baltic with Lord Nelson, as second in command. Negotiations, presently to be noticed, failing to effect a reconciliation, an attack upon Copenhagen was made.

Few battles recorded in the naval annals of Great Britain have more redounded to the credit of those engaged, than the Battle of Copenhagen. It was wisely planned, bravely fought, and success was followed by the exhibition of distinguished humanity. In Clarke and McArthur's Life of Lord Nelson, the secret orders issued by the Admiralty to Sir Hyde Parker,

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the Commander-in-chief, have been printed. Properly to estimate the following letters, it is necessary to repeat this

statement:

"The Right Honourable Henry Dundas, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, having, in his letter of yesterday's date, signified to us his Majesty's pleasure, that whether the discussion, supposed to be now pending with the Court of Denmark, should be terminated by an amicable arrangement, or by actual hostilities, the Officer commanding the fleet in the Baltic should, in either case (as soon as the fleet can be withdrawn from before Copenhagen consistently with the attainment of one or the other of the objects for which he is now instructed to take that station), proceed to Revel; and if he should find the division of the Russian navy, usually stationed at that port, still there, to make an immediate and vigorous attack upon it, provided the measure should appear to him practicable, and such as in his judgment would afford a reasonable prospect of success in destroying the arsenals, or in capturing or destroying the ships, without exposing to too great a risk the fleet under his command.

"And Mr. Dundas having further signified to us his Majesty's pleasure, that, consistently with this precaution, the said Officer should be authorized, and directed to proceed successively, and as the season and other operations will permit, against Cronstadt, and in general, by every means in his power to attack, and endeavour to capture or destroy any ships of war, or others, belonging to Russia, wherever he can meet with them, and to annoy that Power as far as his means will admit in every manner not incompatible with the fair and acknowledged usages of war. And that with respect to Sweden, should the Court of Stockholm persist in her hostile engagements with that of Petersburgh against this country, the same general line of conduct, as hath been stated with respect to the ships and ports of the latter should govern the said Officer commanding the fleet in his proceedings against those of Sweden; but that, in the contrary supposition (conceived not to be impossible) of this power relinquishing her present hostile plans against the rights and interests of this country, and of her renewing, either singly or in concert with

Denmark, her ancient engagements with his Majesty, it will in such case be the duty of the said Officer to afford to Sweden every protection in his power against the resentment and attacks of Russia; and Mr. Dundas having also signified that his Majesty, being no less desirous of bringing the existing dispute with Sweden to this latter issue, than he has shewn himself so disposed with respect to Denmark, and upon the same principles, it will therefore be requisite that the said Officer commanding in the Baltic should make such a disposition of his force as may appear best adapted to facilitate and give weight to the arrangement in question, provided it should be concluded with the Court of Denmark, within the forty-eight hours allowed for this purpose, and the proposal of acceding to it, which will be made to that of Sweden, should be entertained by the latter. You are, in pursuance of his Majesty's pleasure, signified as above mentioned, hereby required and directed to proceed, without a moment's loss of time, into the Baltic, and to govern yourself under the different circumstances before stated to the best of your judgment and discretion in the manner therein pointed out, transmitting from time to time to our Secretary, for our information, an account of your proceedings, and such information as you may conceive to be proper for our knowledge. Given under our hands and seals, the 15th of March, 1801.

"ST. VINCENT.

"T. TROUBRIDGE. "J. MARKHAM."1

Sir Hyde Parker consulted with Lord Nelson on the operations intended to be pursued; and the following letter, in consequence of this consultation, is printed from Nelson's own autograph draft, which differs somewhat, though in no essential particulars, from that which has been given in the work above referred to:

"My dear Sir Hyde,

"St. George, March 25, 1801.

"The conversation we had yesterday, has naturally, from its importance, been the subject of my thoughts; and the

'Clarke and McArthur, Vol. ii. p. 259.

more I have reflected, the more confirmed I am in opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy. They will every day and hour be stronger; we never shall be so good a match for them as at this moment-the only consideration in my mind is, how to get at them with the least risk to our ships.

"By Mr. Vansittart's account, the Danes have taken every means in their power to prevent our getting to attack Copenhagen by the passage of the Sound. Cronenburg has been strengthened, the Crown Islands fortified (on the outermost 20 guns pointing mostly downwards), only 800 yards from very formidable batteries placed under the citadel, supported by 5 sail of the line, 7 floating batteries of 50 guns each, besides small craft, gun-boats, &c. &c.; also, that the Revel squadron of 12 or 14 sail of the line are soon expected, as also 5 sail of Swedes. It would appear by what you have told me of your instructions that Government took for granted that you would find no difficulty in getting off Copenhagen, and that in the event of the failure of a negotiation, that you might instantly attack, and that there would be scarcely a doubt but that the Danish fleet would be destroyed, and the capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to reason and its true interest. By Mr. Vansittart's account, their state of preparation far exceeds what he conceives our Government thought possible, and that the Danish Government is hostile to us in the greatest possible degree; therefore, here you are, with almost the safety, certainly the honour of England, more entrusted to you than ever yet fell to the lot of any British officer. On your decision depends, whether our country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her head higher than ever. Again do I repeat, never did our country depend so much on the success or defeat of any fleet as on this. How best to honour our country and abate the pride of her enemies by defeating their schemes, must be the subject of your deepest consideration, as Commander-in-chief, and if what I have to offer can be the least useful in forming your decision, you are most heartily welcome.

"I shall begin with supposing that you are determined to enter by the passage of the Sound, as there are those that think if you leave that passage open that the Danish fleet

may leave Copenhagen and join the Dutch or French. I own I have no fears on that subject, for it is not likely that whilst the capital is menaced with an attack, that 9000 of her best men would be sent out of the kingdom. I will suppose that some damage may arise amongst our masts and yards, but perhaps not one but can be made serviceable again. You are now about Cronenburg, if the wind is fair, and you determine to attack the ships and Crown Islands, you must expect the natural issue of such a battle-ships crippled-perhaps one or two lost, for the wind which carries you in will most probably not bring out a crippled ship. This mode I call taking the bull by the horns. This will not prevent the Revel ships or Swedes from coming down and forming a junction with the Danes. To prevent this from taking effect, in my humble opinion, a measure absolutely necessary, and still to attack Copenhagen, two modes are in my view-one to pass Cronenburg, taking the risk of damage, and to pass up the Channel, the deepest and the straitest above the middle grounds, and to come down the Gaspar, or King's Channel, to attack their floating batteries, &c. &c. as we find it convenient. It must have the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians, Swedes, and Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding Copenhagen. A passage also, I am pretty certain, could be found for all our ships to the north of Southolm, perhaps it might be necessary to warp a small distance in the very narrow part. Supposing this mode of attack ineligible, the passage of the Belt, I have no doubt, would be accomplished in four or five days, then the attack by Draco could be carried into effect, the junction of the Russians prevented, and every probability of success on the Danish floating batteries. What effect a bombardment might have I am not called upon to give an opinion, but I think the way would be cleared for the trial. Supposing us through the Belt, with the wind fresh westerly, would it not be feasible to either go with the fleet (or detach ten ships of two or three decks, with one bomb-two fire-ships, if they could be spared), to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment, with the remainder to attempt the business of Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest measures are

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