say, let posterity have the choice of its own princes, and the institution of its own laws. Let us not imagine that political wisdom will die with the present age, or that mankind will in future be disqualified to make choice of their own chiefs. Let those who are the greatest patriots, and the wisest men, be successively advanced to the office of kingly power, and entrusted with the preservation of human liberty. Let not birth, the idol of fools, any longer confer the honours of society on the worthless, but let the mind only constitute the title of elevation to the man.

But though objections of this kind against an hereditary crown possess a plausibility and force which are instantly recognised by enlightened minds, the consequences drawn from them are by no means conclusive, nor will the experience of mankind render the adoption of another system worthy of an universal preference. It is indeed to the integrity and perpetuity of the royal power, that the security of our liberties is chiefly to be ascribed. An elective monarchy does not invariably secure a wise and pacific race of kings; but even the fortuitous productions of nature, through a long succession, may venture a comparison with the general proceedings of political ambition. But if the system of election secured to us more distinguished princes, it would probably involve us in consequences permanently hostile to our rights and liberties. If those, whom the people had entrusted with legislative power, retained among them. selves the right of elevating our chief magistrate to the throne, the greatest bulwark that secures our freedom would be demolished, and the people would become defenceless in the midst of foes. Nobles of the highest rank expecting sometime to sway the sceptre of official power, or else allied to those who swayed it, would identify themselves with its high prerogatives, and connive at its encroachments on public liberty. Thus the power of the nation would be divided, and civil broils or aristocratic domination would ultimately be the fatal issue. Instead of those intrigues of court, or corrupt manoeuvres of ministerial profligacy, which though highly criminal do not impede the public good, but arrest our attention only to be censured and forgotten; we should often hear, perhaps, that some wealthy commoner or potent peer had not only gained preponderance in the senate, but was exerting his utmost efforts to overturn the ruling power. Fleets seduced by his connexions, or troops enlisted under his banner, would instantly fill the empire with consternation, and terminate the peace of social life. And though the violence of actual warfare might not result from those commotions, confidence would cease, commerce would be interrupted, tranquillity would be lost in agitation, justice would be swayed by the violence of partyrage, and a dismal train of consequences would in quick succession follow.'

Having enumerated some prerogatives of the crown which seem to be almost incompatible with the liberties of the people, Mr. F. observes that

The constitution, however, possesses in itself those counteractive principles by which even these mighty prerogatives themselves must

be governed; and if its appointed guardians would be vigilant and faithful in the preservation of so invaluable a trust, the crown could never invade the privileges of the people, nor become in a serious manner injurious to the public good.”

After having inveighed strongly against our late protracted warfare, our excessive expenditure, the inroads that have been recently made on our constitutional liberties, and the corruption arising out of our borough-system, he thus proceeds:

It is this radical corruption, indeed, whose operation though fatal can be ascertained only by the lapse of time, that aggravates public vicissitudes, and renders our prospects dismal and foreboding. If its secret devastations are suffered to continue without a speedy and effectual interruption, our liberties will soon degenerate into despotism or aristocracy on the one hand, and involve us in the horrors of vassalage or revolution on the other, Let the true friends of Britain, therefore, arm themselves with patriotic virtue, rally around the standard of public liberty, and resolve to rescue her noblest rights from the devouring jaws of these rapacious monsters. Let every one maintain his own integrity, oppose encroachments in every form, contend for an equality of elective rights, and restore the legislative system to its equitable independence and pristine purity. Thus the balance of the constitution will be restored; the inroads of time will be repaired; Britain will survive the ruin of despotic kingdoms; and the liberty of our descendants will remain immoveable as the flinty rock.'

If the author endeavours to work on our feelings while he pleads for reforms, he is at the same time anxious to satisfy our reason that they are become indispensible, and that it will be dangerous any longer to delay them; and hitherto he has not gone without the pale of the constitution. In stating the considerations which mitigate the lot of the poor under a free government, he makes this application to his own country:

Such a degree of equal liberty is happily, with but few excep. tions, enjoyed in Britain. Both the humble cottage and the splendid mansion securely defend the persons of their inhabitants. No one can innocently be dragged into the service of his wealthy neighbour, or with impunity be bought and sold. Every man is the proprietor of his own person, and if punctual in his observance of established laws, can neither be arrested in his pursuit of good, nor limited in the course of his own movements. It is a lamentable fact, indeed, that some grievous encroachments on British liberty are still allowed to annoy our peace, and to impede the progress of national felicity.'

In the latter part of the paragraph, he alludes to the practice of balloting for the militia, and of impressing seamen; on which, in the sequel, he severely animadverts. To render his readers duly sensible of the abuses which have crept into our constitution, and aware of the dangers by which it is beset, he

by no means deems it necessary to conceal from them the excellence that it still possesses: indeed, he seems fondly to set it forth, and to court rather than shun opportunities of doing it this justice.

Throughout this volume, Mr. F. not only asserts and maintains the principles with which he commenced, but inculcates on all occasions the great importance and dignity of our nature, and shews, in various ways, that the true happiness of man arises from the pursuits of virtue and knowlege. Our present life he considers as only a stage on which we are trained for a more elevated sphere of action: every system of government, therefore, and every institution that can militate against this object, he treats as being in contravention to the high destiny of man and to the will of the Supreme. Pursuing this cheering theory, he is the advocate of every establishment and of every art that can improve and advance the human mind, and the determined adversary of every regimen which tends to lower and degrade our species. Sound judgment, close reasoning, and fervid language, appear in the discussion of the various topics which are treated in this volume. Between some of them, it is true, we do not perceive any very intimate connection; nor could we assign a satisfactory reason for their being introduced into the places in which they stand: but still they are subjects of great interest and importance, are happily illustrated, and judiciously discussed. We cannot peruse the work without feeling our ardour quickened, and our attachment increased to all that is good and praiseworthy; the observations which are here made on the several subjects of man's duties in a state of nature, on the necessity of reforming our criminal. code, on the equality of the human race, on the advantages of free inquiry, on the questions connected with religious liberty, on the means of improving the individual and society, have all eminently this tendency. These topics are closely connected with the welfare of man; and the views here given of them proceed from an enlightened mind, and are for the most part strictly appropriate : but the work will receive no praise from those who profit by corruption and abuse, or from those who prefer subversion to reform. The matter of this volume does not indeed possess a claim to originality, but it boasts of higher excellence; it is founded on a judicious selection; it is a well chosen assortment of reflections, maxims, and rules which have obtained the suffrages and sanction of wise men in all ages.

On one great constitutional point, however, Mr. Finch is heterodox: but, though he declaims eloquently, our own orthodoxy remains unshaken. He is hostile to our hereditary nobility;

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nobility; and, considering the order as injurious to society, he would abolish it. Our limits do not permit us to copy the whole passage from which the ensuing extract is taken:

In our own nation, indeed, we are honoured with some hereditary peers whose transcendent excellence of mind and character dignifies their titles, renders them the glory of their species, and gives them an indisputable claim to be regarded as the pillars of our most iuvaluable rights. Yet alas! how many others are there, equally distinguished by hereditary honours, who, instead of attending to their country's welfare, delight in the most irrational frivolities, and are emulous only to excel grooms in their knowledge, or surpass coach men in the dexterity of the whip. The senseless amusements of the turf, and the infamously disgraceful scenes of pugilism, are their element. You perceive them manifesting the utmost profuseness in the patronage of vulgarity, meanness, and folly; and being preeminent only in those things which even barbarians themselves would have wisdom sufficient to reprobate. Yes, to the sorrow and disgrace of Britain, many individuals of this description are allowed to rank themselves among the noble Lords of the empire, and to retain the honour of being still dignified with the titles and prerogatives of earls or of dukes! While the nation is involved in the most unexampled difficulties while sorrow beyond calculation threatens to become the portion of every class, these nobles, whose elevated rank should have been assiduously employed for the public welfare, are pursuing a course of the most thoughtless and criminal infatuation, are corrupting the morals of society- and rapidly fa cilitating our national downfall! One consideration alone can alleviate the painful emotions which arise from the observance of their absurd and vitiated career; that, if long continued, it will tear away the veil from hereditary honours-convince mankind of their extreme absurdity -- withdraw that homage which elevated rank has so long usurped-prepare hereditary distinctions for a noiseless grave-and accelerate the arrival of that day, when political influence and honour will be re-established only on the true basis of personal merit.'

It is not on account of any benefit which their privileges confer on the individuals who constitute this order, that we dispute the expediency of abolishing it: we contend for it as an essential branch of the constitution. If the nobles are removed, we must cease to have an hereditary monarch; without this intermediate body, the executive power cannot be constituted as it now is; and an hereditary chief magistrate could not well stand with an elective senate. If the nobles are removed, therefore, a republic must follow. Whatever may be thought of the British constitution, it must be admitted that the materials of which it is composed are well assorted, and that it hangs well together.

On the several subjects of religious establishments, religious liberty, and the civil rights of men of different religious per

suasions,

suasions, the views of this writer are enlarged and generous. Treating of these subjects, he says:

It is evident that the public welfare could not be promoted by the abolition of ecclesiastical establishments under every form. Á measure of this description would not only be repugnant to the principles as well as to the interests of a large and respectable portion of the community, but it would likewise in a serious manner injure a numerous body of enlightened men, without imparting to the public in general any conceivable, much less an equivalent advantage! and must therefore, even though effected by a majority in the legislature, produce a dangerous ferment in the public mind, and occasion animosities and strifes more violent than what are supposed to render the measure at all expedient. Whatever a future change in the public mind may render advisable with regard to the support of religion by the state, it would in existing circumstances be the height of political madness, to withdraw from the established ministers of religion the means of their support, and to leave the continuance of a religious system totally dependent on the public choice, and entirely unassisted by established laws. Though religion might have flourished in the absence of that protection which it has received from the state, if no institution had ever been adopted for its encouragement; the actual existence of such a patronage for a period so extended, having superseded other systems of support, and identified itself with the habits of society, renders its continuance under the sanction of established laws in many respects necessary, and obliges us to conclude that it can be safely withdrawn only in consequence of a change in the public sentiments, or by the gradual substitution of other measures.

It may indeed be strenuously and with great plausibility maintained, that as true religion can result only from the exercise of private judgement, it is a subject in which the magistrate has no right to interfere, and that his patronage as well as his opposition ought to be decidedly deprecated. But though every friend to the liberty and happiness of mankind, and to the honour and interests of religion, should reprobate and oppose all attempts to make the church an engine or even an ally of the state; yet, it is surely allowable for the legislature to establish laws to protect and encourage the interests of religious truth, provided the laws which they institute for that purpose do not encroach on the rights of conscience, nor deprive any part of the community of their civil honours. If the legislature, virtually representing the majority of the nation, may lawfully establish general rules, and constrain the whole community to observe them, provided no demands are imposed on the minority who may deem them inexpedient, but what the majority in like manner voluntarily impose on themselves; so this prerogative, under the same restrictions, may be equitably extended to every subject which can be deemed essential to the public welfare, whether in politics, philosophy, or religion.'

In sketching what a religious establishment ought to be in a country like our own, Mr. Finch's model certainly differs

materially