being clected by the people. Such was the form of government of Massachusetts.

This variety in the constitutional forms of the colonial governments created a different degree of dependence on the Crown; the charter governments had the sole right of enacting laws, provided these were not at variance with the fundamental principles of English Law. In all the others it was necessary that the acts of the Colonial Legislature be ratified by the King before they acquired the efficacy of laws: in all of which, even at this period, we perceive the separate constitutional existence of the Colonies, by virtue of respective constitutional organization, rights, and obligations, being governed by Thirteen Colonial Governments, instituted at different times and invested with highly discrepant powers. As the relation of the Colonies to each other at this period of their history precludes the possibility of a doubt as to their territorial separation and constitutional independence of each other, we pass on to another era in their history, which, if possible, more pointedly declares their separate existence; for we now view them approaching each other, in order to obviate the evils evident to their then separate condition, by propositions, the object of which was to unite themselves in a confederacy.

The first attempts to unite the infant colonies took place in the year 1643, when a union of those of New-England was effected under the title of "The United Colonies of New-England." We deem it unnecessary to enter into the details of this union; suffice it that we point to the fact that it was purely federal in its nature; each colony retaining entire jurisdiction within its territorial limits. Indeed one fact transpired in the organization of this confederacy which can not be known without forcing conviction upon the mind as to the separate existence of the Colonics; as also, the love of State independence which pervaded even these infant political bodies. We are informed that upon the instance of Massachusetts, Rhode-Island was excluded from this union; that subsequently, upon her petitioning in 1648 to be received as a member, she was given to understand that her wish would be complied with, provided she would first consent to be incorporated with Plymouth Colony; that this condition being indignantly rejected by her, she consequently never became a member of this confederacy. This union remained in force for upwards of thirty years, when a dissolution of the respective charters of the Colonies dissolved it.

The Colonies remained divided until the year 1755, at which time commenced the war commonly called the French War. The Colonies having received orders from the mother country to repel the invasion of that people on the river Ohio, to accomplish which a union was recommended, and a Convention held at Albany, in which it was resolved that a union should be formed, which should be authorized to make general laws for the general welfare of the Colonies, with a President to be appointed by the Crown. This proposition, proving unacceptable to Connecticut, jealous of the power

of the greater Colonies, as also to the mother country, equally jealous lest this union, at some future day, might become the means of the Colonies' asserting their independence, it necessarily fell to the ground.

No further attempt was made to unite the Colonies until the year 1765, when the arbitrary measure of the Stamp Act threw the whole country into alarm for their liberty. Some of the Colonial Legislatures passed resolutions asserting their exclusive right to tax the people of the Colonies. One of the Colonies annulled that obnoxious law by seizing all the stamped paper within its territory. Massachusetts recommended a Convention of the Colonies, which afterwards took place; in which the Legislatures of Massachusetts, Rhode-Island, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, as also part of Maryland, Delaware, and South-Carolina, were represented by their respective delegates. Having declared the rights and grievances of the Colonies, adopted a petition to the King, as also a memorial to each House of Parliament, this body adjourned.

In 1774, Parliament having passed the celebrated Boston Port Bill, resolutions were passed by the Legislatures of Virginia and Massachusetts, recommending that a Congress should meet annually to consult upon the interests of the Colonies, which afterwards met the approbation of all the Colonies, Georgia alone excepted. Delegates having been appointed by the different Legislatures, this body met in September, 1774, in the city of Philadelphia, each colony having an equal voice in its deliberation-which fact stamps its confederate nature. Having passed a declaration of right, a petition to the King, and an address to the people of England, as also having recommended that another Congress should meet on the 10th of May succeeding, it dissolved itself.

Agreeable to the recommendation of the late Congress a new Congress meets in the following year, 1775. The Declaration of Independence now supervenes, and it becomes necessary to form new governments, both for the Union and the different Colonies. A committee had been previously nominated to form a Constitution, which, having been presented and discussed, eventually became "the Articles of Confederation," and was, before the 1st of March, 1781, ratified by all the Colonies, or now perhaps more properly, by all the States, these having become so by their Declaration of Independence, which was afterwards fully sustained. Of the purely confederate character of this Union, as declared by the title, there can exist but little doubt in the minds of those who are acquainted with the embarrassments of the first general government of these States, and of the cause of those embarrassments; for such was the jealousy of the States relative to their rights as sovereign and independent communities, and so sparingly did they divest themselves of certain prerogatives which were to be assigned to the general government about to be created, that this alone became the chief cause of the premature decay, and subsequent abolition of that government. The strongest evidence, however, of its confederate character was

the inability of this General Government to act upon the people of the States otherwise than through the authority of the State Legislatures-the characteristic feature of a confederacy, and an evil which has proved the bane of every confederacy which has ever existed. These State governments carrying the laws of their federal head into operation, only so far as agreeable to their peculiar interests.

But here we conceive that it can not but prove profitable that we recapitulate what we have collected from the impartial page of history, even at the hazard of repetition, in order to obtain more definite views, before investigating the nature of the present Union, as established by the Constitution of 1787. Our historical references we think fully bear us out in the following conclusions; to wit, that the present United States was "originally patented" into two portions; that these were afterwards divided into twelve distinct governments, and subsequently into thirteen; that these were separate and independent political bodies, possessing dissimilar forms of governmentnamely, the charter, the proprietary, the royal, and the mixed government-that they remained separate until the year 1743, when a partial union took place, embracing only the Colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth Colony, Connecticut, and New-Haven; that the Colony of Rhode-Island refused to purchase membership by the relinquishment of her separate condition; that this union having been dissolved, another attempt was made in the year 1755 to establish another, which proves abortive, the small Colony of Connecticut fearing for her independence when associated with her more powerful sister colonies; that from this period to the ratification of "the Articles of Confederation," the Colonies had no connection with each other, other than through the medium of resolutions of their respective Legislatures, and the appointment of commissioners to carry those into execution; from all of which there can exist not the slightest doubt as to the independent existence of the Colonies up to this period of their history. That they were not compounded into one homogeneous mass by "the Articles of Confederation," both the title and history of this document amply attests, each State possessing equal weight in the then Congress of the General Government, which could act upon the people of the States only through the intervention of the State Legislatures, which feature necessarily stamped its confederate characters. If its confederate nature was not subsequently annulled in the Convention of 1787, which framed the present Constitution of the United States, it is evident that there ought not to exist two opinions as to the nature of the present United States government. Unhappily, however, there does exist great discrepancy of opinion as to its character, and that, too, among individuals of esteemed authority, and whe, it might be said without arrogance upon our part, ought to be better informed, seeing that the history of the Constitution is accessible to all. On the one side are those, who, urged by a spirit of nationalism, are straining every nerve to break through those lines of demarcation which exist between

the States, and who would thus consolidate these originally sovereign and independent bodies into one common mass and entirely subjecting them to the will of the created government, namely, their General Government; thus elevating the creature over the creator, the subordinate and derivative government over the sovereign parties, namely, the States, by which that government was created; while on the other hand, there are those, who, with more reason, inculcate that the very existence of the present government essentially depends upon the preservation of its confederate character, whereby alone the rights and liberties of the people of a minority of the States can be preserved.

The advocates of these adverse theories of the United States Government are to be found in the territorial divisions of the Union. The consolidated form is strenuously maintained by those who have all to gain by this amalgamation of the people of the States, and no less deprecated by others who feel that their most vital interests would necessarily fall a sacrifice to this innovation in the fundamental principles of the government. By virtue of a dense population and consequently an overwhelming representation in the general Council of the States-namely, in Congress, the States situated north of the river Potomac, feel that they have nothing to fear in the consolidated form of government, as their agents would direct the action of the government, and would, of course, act agreeably to their interests; while the people of the Southern portion of the Union, weak in the particular of representation, must ever resist a doctrine which teaches, that the interest of the majority of the people of the States, expressed by the votes of their representation in Congress, is paramount to all those constitutional restraints which secure the liberty and prosperity of the minority. Such being the feature which an interested majority would introduce into the Constitution, if only by precedent, it becomes the duty of every intelligent and patriotic citizen to examine this document itself, and satisfy himself as to its nature, and ascertain whether it erects a national, or federal, or confederate government, the former of which alone would justify many of the acts of the General Government.

Before entering into the merits of the question before us, we shall profit by pausing to examine into the state of parties, which obtained during the period which immediately preceded the convocation of the Convention, whose labors eventuated in the adoption of the present Constitution of the United States. Admonished by the imbecility of the General Government, as organized under "the Articles of Confederation," as evinced by a limited public credit, owing either to inability or indifference on the part of the State governments, in furnishing their apportioned pecuniary supplies-by a crippled commerce, attributable to the wants of a common head to regulate this interest, which, by being thus rendered permanent and uniform throughout the States, would elicit the confidence of other nations, and give rise to advantageous treaties. Admonished by these and other embarrassments,

many intelligent and patriotic statesmen thought that they perceived in these exigencies an imperious necessity for an extension of the powers of the proposed government; and that to such an extension of power as would result in the erection of an energetic and consolidated government. These readily perceived that a government which could not operate upon the citizen, otherwise than through the intervention of sovereign States, with whom it might too often become a matter of opinion whether they would or would not enforce the laws of their General Government, upon their respective citizens; to all such it became evident that a government thus conditioned, must, of necessity, suffer its acts to sink into insignificance by repeated neglect and even infractions of its laws, or be involved in interminable disputes with its constituents, the sovereign States, which instituted it, thus defeating the object of its creation, namely, "to establish justice and insure domestic tranquillity."

From the above conjuncture of affairs, arose that party whose suggestions all tended to break through those distinctions which subsisted between the people of the States, as members of sovereign and independent communities, and to erect upon the broad foundation of nationalism thus laid, a “strong, energetic, and consolidated government, which was alone deemed by them competent to accomplish a permanent union of the States." Actuated by such laudable views, Messrs. Hamilton and Randolph, the champions of this party, each submitted the outlines of such a constitution as they deemed the exigencies of the government, under the articles of confederacy, demended. That of the former advocating the election of the President during good behavior; the investing the Executive of the Union with the powers of appointing the governors of the different States, who should also be invested with a veto upon the legislative acts of the same, together with many other features not in accordance with the feelings of State supremacy which actuated the majority of the members of the Convention, was sufficient to dismiss this draft of a constitution from the consideration of that body. That of his associate, Mr. Randolph, was less exceptionable, limiting the election of the President, as it did, to a term of years. There were, however, in his draft, features highly repugnant to the feelings of the friends of the individuality of the States. The more effectually to break through those lines of distinction which it was deemed desirable to constitute between the States and the government about to be created, it was proposed that the Senate, which now represents the people of the States, as members of sovereign and independent bodies politic, should be elected by the House of Representatives of Congress, which, representing, as it does, the people of the States, and not the State Legislatures, was readily perceived to be a means of compounding the people of the States into one common mass, which little accorded with the discrepant interests of those whom the Convention represented, that is, of the States; hence arose another party in the Convention, which maintained that all the difficulties under which the then existing