wine. She exports these to the extent of about six hundred millions of dollars. It is highly improbable that the opening of her ports to other nations could cause any great increase of consumption of her products upon their part; while the products which she produces for herself at no advantage or at a disadvantage come probably to three thousand millions. Evidently she could not obtain any considerable increase of the articles she produces at a disadvantage, except by paying out of her accumulations of treasure. M. Bastiat thought she would get the needed treasure from Peru; but this only shows that his education had been neglected in the branch of arithmetic. The whole of the annual production of precious metals added to the whole of the large amount accumulated by France during the whole period of her existence would not suffice to purchase abroad for a single year the commodities which France makes for herself at more or less disadvantage, compared with this, that, or the other foreign country. As he suggests, she might import treasure from Peru, and this would suffice to buy this article, or it would suffice to buy that article, or it would suffice to buy the other article; but when it comes to adding all the articles together, the insufficiency of the proposed resource becomes so manifest as to be ridiculous. It is the fallacy of division fooling with the lives and fortunes of thirty-four millions of people.

Chapter XV. is the "Little Arsenal of the Free-Trader." These are short sentences embodying the fallacies already sufficiently answered.

Chapter XVI. proposes a number of funny absurdities, which M. Bastiat imagines to be of the same nature as protectionist arguments; but which only show that he either did not understand or did not choose to understand the protectionist arguments.

To work with the left hand rather than the right, to prevent the use of machinery, to dull the axes, to fill up canals, etc., etc., would not increase the gross annual product. To employ a portion of the population upon industries in which

the nation stands at no advantage, or even at disadvantage, when the whole population cannot be employed upon the industries in which it has an advantage, or cannot be so employed without throwing away the natural advantage, would increase the gross annual product. That is just what M. Bastiat did not know; and that is why his teachings should not have been offered to the American people.

Chapter XVII.,-"Supremacy by Labor."

It is impossible to do justice to the sophistry of this chapter without quoting. It says:

"As, in time of war, supremacy is obtained by superiority in arms, can, in time of peace, supremacy be secured by superiority in labor?

"This question is of the greatest interest, at a time when no one seems to doubt that, in the field of industry, as on that of battle, the stronger crushes the weaker.

"This must result from the discovery of some sad and discouraging analogy between labor, which exercises itself on things, and violence, which exercises itself on men; for how could two things be identical in their effects, if they were opposed in their nature?

"And if it be true that, in manufacturing, as in war, supremacy is the necessary result of superiority, why need we occupy ourselves with progress, or social economy, since we are in a world where all has been so arranged by Providence that one and the same result, oppression, necessarily flows from the most antagonistic principles ?

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Referring to the new policy towards which commercial freedom is drawing in England, many persons make this objection, which I admit occupies the sincerest minds: 'Is England doing anything more than pursuing the same end by different means? Does she not constantly aspire to universal supremacy? Sure of the superiority of her capital and labor, does she not call in free competition to stifle the industry of the Continent, reign as sovereign, and conquer the privilege of feeding and clothing the ruined peoples?'

"It would be easy for me to demonstrate that these alarms are chimerical; that our pretended inferiority is greatly exaggerated; that all our great branches of industry not only resist foreign competition, but develop themselves under its influence; and that its infallible effect is to bring about an increase in general consumption, capable of absorbing both foreign and domestic products."

This is the language of the Anti-Corn-Law League, of the Cobden Club, of the Manchester manufacturers, of the spider to the fly.

Labor in its nature is opposed to war. Labor produces; war destroys. Labor employs itself on things; war employs itself upon persons. Opposite causes cannot produce identical effects. Does this, O reader, persuade you that there is no valid analogy between the struggles of opposing armies for the possession of a province, and the struggles of competing industries for the possession of a market? To seriously ask the question would be to insult you; and yet the trash is persuasive to the hasty reader. When he pauses for a moment and reads again he sees that he is trifled with.

That which moves to war is the desire to overcome an opponent. That which moves to industrial competition is the desire to overcome an opponent, — to overcome one who prevents your selling as much or as dearly as you would. The causes are similar. It is only the methods of procedure which differ. The paragraph about manufacturing, supremacy, Providence, oppression, and antagonistic principles is a similar logical puzzle, which any intelligent reader can solve for himself. It assumes that there are antagonistic principles wherever the methods of procedure, the instruments used to obtain the end, are dissimilar. The paragraph commencing, "It would be easy for me to demonstrate," is a bundle of assertions, pure and simple. There is not a particle of argument in it. The "proof" comes afterwards and consists in this :

"If we see in any product but a cause of labor, it is certain that the alarm of the protectionists is well founded. If we consider iron, for instance, only in connection with the masters of forges, it might be feared that the competition of a country where iron was a gratuitous gift of nature would extinguish the furnaces of another country, where ore and fuel were scarce.

"But is this a complete view of the subject? Are these relations only between iron and those who make it? Has it none with those who use it? Is its definite and only destination to be, produced? And if it is useful, not only on account of the labor which it causes, but on account of the qualities which it possesses, and the numerous services

for which its hardness and malleability fit it, does it not follow that foreigners cannot reduce its price, even so far as to prevent its production among us, without doing us more good, under the last statement of the case, than it injures us under the first?

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Foreign superiority prevents national labor only under some certain form, and makes it superfluous under this form, but by putting at our disposal the very result of the labor thus annihilated."

This is wonderful! What earthly relevancy has the second paragraph? Is not French iron hard and malleable? The French have iron in either case. The only question is whether they shall have it at one price made at home or at another price made abroad; and in a former chapter M. Bastiat put the price at twelve francs for French and eight francs for English iron. But he argues that to procure the English iron, France will have only to "detach" from her general labor a smaller portion than she would require to produce it herself. France would save one third of the labor before used in making iron. The careful reader will see that he assumes that the whole labor power of the country is employed in either case; while the fact is, and must be, that the whole is not employed in either case. Even when France makes her own iron, every industry within her borders is limited by the limits of the field of employment. There are so many desires known to her people which they have found out means of gratifying with such expenditure of effort as they are willing to pay,so many and no more. Their desires even are not infinite; but even if they were, the desires they know how to gratify without more exertion than they are willing to make, are very far from infinite; they are quite limited. Their aggregate of these constitutes the field of employment, outside of which there are always (except during periods of abnormal excitement and perhaps even then) many unemployed persons, `many half employed persons, many persons helping others to do what they can well enough do alone. This unemployed labor is constantly striving to find something to do, and the unemployed capital of the country is constantly striving to find something to do,- some means of gratifying a desire at such price as the community will be willing and able to pay.

The community, then, does not "detach" a portion of its previously employed labor to make iron, but a portion and only a portion of its previously unemployed or half employed labor, and the then more fully employed labor has the means of buying from all the other industries; their field of employment is increased. According to M. Bastiat's philosophy, if iron and its products should suddenly be rained down out of the sky already shaped for use, the United States would immediately have set free an amount of labor that would produce "something else" to the value of, say, three hundred millions of dollars. But "everything else" for which the people have a desire is already produced to a somewhat greater extent than can be sold, as is evidenced by the existing surplus stocks of commodities. The total industry of the community is kept up by motives, and one of these motives is the desire for iron. The immediate effect, then, of iron dropping down ready fashioned from the skies would be to diminish the field of employment to the extent of, say, three hundred millions; but as iron is only a means towards procuring other things, notably, food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, the getting iron for nothing might make it possible to procure a greater supply of food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, with the same effort, and the ultimate result might be that as great or even a greater field of employment would be found. in producing a greater supply. But meanwhile, during the growth of a larger demand for food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, between two and three millions of people would have to go without food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, or squeeze them by competition out of the balance of the community. The immediate effect would certainly be a great diminution of the effective demand of the community for food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, a glut. There would be much more of all these than the community as a whole had means of buying. There would be a period of distress and depression, and political economy does not perhaps, at present, possess the means of saying how long such depression would continue, nor even of saying decisively that it would not end in a permanent deterioration of