34

Lord Liverpool the Originator of the Currency Laws.

minister in order to become her instrument in the West by engaging England in "a hot war with France."

LORD LIVERPOOL AND LORD CASTLEREAGH.

At a later period England (Mr. PITT having succumbed under the blow given by the defeat at Wagram) "was in the hands" (the expression is that of Count Pozzo DI BORGO, in speaking of France) of two men not antagonists, but united by ties of friendship no less than by ties political, Lord LIVERPOOL and Lord CASTLEREAGH.

The former of these two men, who was honest, conscientious, and laborious, appeared to unite in himself all the qualifications which are possible in the politician and chief of a faction for the conduct of an affair of difficulty. But he, too, has been judged and condemned by the results. He repeated in 1815 the role of Mr. PITT in 1793 and 1803; as also that of Mr. Fox in 1806; that is to say, he made war with France without motive, without pretext, and without form.

I cannot, however, pass over in silence, even in a sketch like the present, one part of his antecedents, which is unknown or almost unknown to contemporaries, but which has for me a gravity it is impossible to exaggerate. He had the mind of a doctrinaire, and his theories bore on monetary questions. It is to him that England and the world are principally indebted for those frightful monetary laws which are alone sufficient for the extinguishment of the modern system. His idea was, that England being the richest country in the world had to employ as a means of circulation the most precious of metals. He worked with so much assiduity to propagate his idea (see his "Letter to the King") and to make partisans, that he obtained the assent of a majority of his colleagues, when the project was put an end to by an unexpected opposition, for the sake of which I cite the incident, which to me appears made for supporting the thesis I maintain.

Lord CAMDEN was President of the Council; he was the son of Lord Chancellor CAMDEN, who had said that an English judge ought not to sit at a Cabinet Council, because he could not there hold up his head. He declared against the new project, "because," said he, "it infringes the law I am here to uphold." "To restrict the circula"tion to a single metal," he added, "would be to violate the right "which every Englishmen possesses of choosing for his payments "between two metals."

The antecedents of Lord LIVERPOOL, therefore, gave no promise either of his respect for, or his knowledge of law, at an epoch when the first qualifications of a man placed at the head of the affairs of a nation ought to have been a clear sight and an upright heart.

Lord CASTLEREAGH, by his antecedents, was a man to be put aside, not to be selected for treating these affairs; he would have been so if the idea of choice had existed, or if any qualifications for a ministerial post had been regarded beyond parliamentary influence.

Quadruple Treaty against Russia in 1814.

35

The son of a parvenu,* attractive in his person and manners, his career had been in Ireland, and his work there had been to extinguish the Parliament of that country by intrigue and corruption.

At the first Congress of Vienna, in 1814, he was at one and the same time Minister for Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary of England, It was thus that he became connected with Prince TALLEYRAND. yielded to the influence of his genius, and associated himself with his plan for the deliverance of Europe. Not only had he the merit of accepting the views of the French Plenipotentiary, but he had also that of causing them to be appreciated by his chief, Lord LIVERPOOL, and by the other members of the Cabinet. Sweden and Austria likewise adhered to it; and at Vienna these four Powers bound themselves by a secret treaty to concert for thwarting the alliance, also secret but well understood by TALLEYRAND, of Russia and Prussia; and with that object to maintain the Ottoman Empire. The secret alliance of the four Powers had as a patent result the granting of a separate constitution to Poland.

Russia finding herself thus suddenly deprived of a portion of the advantages which she counted on deriving from the wars of the Revolution, determined to continue them, and the conferences were broken up by the news of the disembarkation of NAPOLEON on the coast of Provence. This operation was only effected by the concurrence and connivance of certain ministers of France and England. The communication of the plan of escape which had been sent from Rome to the Court of the Tuileries was suppressed, and the English cruiser on the coasts of the isle of Elba was opportunely kept at a distance,

.

Lord CASTLEREAGH instantly fell again into the hands of the Emperor ALEXANDER, and the war recommenced.

It was nevertheless not an easy thing to engage the nation again to break the peace, and it was not without great trouble that the war was got up; the fourth without motive and without necessity, in the space of twenty-two years.

I am writing this letter far from any library where I might find the annals of the English Parliament. I cannot therefore quote the debates in the House in support of what I advance. But the avowal of Lord CASTLEREAGH himself, in his letter above cited to Count NESSELRODE, amply suffices. Here are the words of it:

"I hope you will be satisfied with our proceedings in Parliament. "It required some management to embark the country heartily in a new war under all the embarrassment of a Congress and of the escape from "Elba. You may rely upon it that it has been well done, and that we "shall not be wanting to our Allies and the good cause."†

* Lord Castlereagh's grandfather, whose real name was Gregor and not Stewart, was the son of a pedlar who came from Galloway in Scotland, and settled in the North of Ireland. He, the grandfather, married a Miss Orr, to whom a Mr. Stewart, a distant relative in India, bequeathed considerable property. Mr. Gregor, the pedlar's son, thereupon dropped his own patronymic and assumed that of Stewart, and, through his wife, claimed relationship with the Stewarts of Garlies in Galloway, who were allied to the Royal House of Scotland. + "Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh." Third Series, vol. ii., p. 365.

ENGLAND EFFACED BY THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

From the diplomatic correspondence of the time, we discover the nature of the skilful manoeuvre by which the English nation was drawn by its Government into this new war. It consisted in excluding the question of war or peace from the debates in England in both the Houses of Parliament, and even in the Cabinet, in order to leave the decision of it to the Congress which was sitting at Vienna.

The first act of NAPOLEON BONAPARTE after he had taken possession of the Tuileries was to address letters to the PRINCE REGENT of ENGLAND and the Emperor of AUSTRIA, to announce to them, with his return to France, his desire to preserve the state of peace, and his resolution to respect the rights of other nations.

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The PRINCE REGENT refused to receive the letter; and that of M. DE CAULAINCOURT to Lord CASTLEREAGH, which accompanied it, was sent by him to Vienna, as may be seen by his reply to M. DE CAULAINCOURT of the 8th of April, 1815, in which he expresses himself as follows: "I am to acquaint your Excellency that the PRINCE REGENT "has declined receiving the letter addressed to him, and has at the 66 same time given me his orders to transmit the letters addressed by "your Excellency to me, to Vienna, for the information and con"sideration of the Allied Sovereigns and Plenipotentiaries there as"sembled."

Such a step could not have been taken if the Constitution of Great Britain had not been abrogated as regards the functions of the Privy Council. Under no circumstances whatever could the state of peace have been changed to that of war, according to the law, without a decision taken by that Council. The letter of M. DE CAULAINCOURT would, therefore, have been communicated to it, and it would have considered its contents in a manner wholly different from that in which it was treated by the Congress of Vienna.

The Congress resolved "that no answer should be given, and that "the proposition should in no way be taken into consideration." These expressions are taken from a despatch addressed to the English Secretary of State by the British representative at Vienna. This document has this character, that the signer of it transmits to the person who was his chief, not the assurance that he had fulfilled his instructions, but the resolutions which had been taken by a foreign body. To prove that he had correctly interpreted these resolutions he concludes thus:

"In order to be assured that I have advanced nothing in this despatch "which does not accord with the views of the Cabinets of the Allied "Sovereigns, I have acquainted the Plenipotentiaries of the high "Allied Powers with the contents thereof, and I have the honour to "inform you that the sentiments contained in it entirely coincide with "those of their respective courts."**

The Powers assembled at Vienna had already issued a "Declaration,' which was published on the news of the disembarkation of BONAPARTE in France, and a few days before his arrival at Paris. In this docu

* The Earl of Clancarty to Viscount Castlereagh, Vienna, May 6, 1815.

Wars a Consequence of " Diplomacy."

37

ment they declared that "NAPOLEON BONAPARTE has placed himself "without the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy "and disturber of the tranquillity of the world he had rendered him"self liable to public vengeance."

In accordance with the line which I have traced for myself I have only to consider the war of 1815 in its legal aspect. But, before doing so, I desire to call attention to what may be learned from the events which followed.

This war had as a result the placing of France in one of those positions from which a nation seldom recovers. I allude to the fact of a change of dynasty by foreign intervention. The man in whose power it was to form a new dynasty was exiled, while the ancient royal line thus introduced, never recovered its ascendency over the nation.

The possibility of which I am speaking with regard to NAPOLEON is based on the fact, that he was a man of genius, and had it at heart to accomplish great acts. At St. Helena he declared that he had had two great objects in view, namely, the abolition of permanent armies and permanent embassies; objects which he would have been able to attain had he been allowed to remain peaceably established in France. It is necessary to observe that the combination of these two ideas places this plan in a category totally different from those propositions of "disarmament," which, from time to time, are announced as being the order of the day. BONAPARTE comprehended that wars were a consequence of "Diplomacy," and that "Diplomacy" is the result of permanent embassies; that so long as these exist "Diplomacy" will exist, whether secret or public it matters little; for we have arrived at such a point that what could be done formerly only by keeping it a secret, can now be accomplished in sight of the world.

Another word of the Emperor at St. Helena shows in its true light the resolution which the Allied Powers took of making his deposition a condition of peace with France. I refer to his prophecy that in the end Europe would become either Cossack or Republican. His apprehension of the power and designs of Russian was real and sincere, as he had proved on more than one occasion when he was at the height of his power. It is very easy then to comprehend that whilst Russia desired that he should escape from the isle of Elba, as a means of dissolving the quadruple alliance, it was equally necessary for her not to allow him to remain on the throne. He was an obstacle which had to be removed for ever from her path.

At the second Congress of Vienna Russia dictated the law. France was put to ransom, one part of which (one hundred millions of francs) was remitted on condition of TALLEYRAND being dismissed from the Foreign Affairs Office to be replaced by the Governor of Odessa.* England concerted secretly with Russia to obtain the incorporation of Poland. Prussia was elevated to a Power of the first class by the dismemberment of all her neighbours, and thus, to use the expression of Sir ROBERT WILSON, "NAPOLEON bequeathed Europe to ALEXANDER.Ӡ NAPOLEON disappeared, leaving certainly a name behind him, but a

*The Duc de Richelieu.

"Europe in 1817.”

38 How the Council would have dealt with the Return from Ella.

name fit only to be employed to maintain a great imposture, which had to be created in order to lead France into her present position, and so to prepare the domination in Europe of Russia. When a Sovereign bearing the name of NAPOLEON occupied the Tuileries anew, we began to hear the "NAPOLEONIC ideas" talked of; but those which I have mentioned formed no part of them.

It remains for me to consider how the Privy Council must have acted with respect to the return of NAPOLEON from the isle of Elba; that is to say, how the English Government must in that case have conducted itself according to the Law of Nations.

From the moment that NAPOLEON was peaceably established on the throne, England ought to have seen in him only the sovereign of an independent country, and she had no motive for making war on him, unless, in his capacity as ruler of France, he had refused to accept and respect the treaties which France had signed.

This maxim will be received generally as correct; but it may be said, as happened in 1815, that the case of NAPOLEON was an exception. The Allied Sovereigns, at the time they proclaimed the Sovereign accepted by France, an outlaw and exposed to public vengeance, professed that they had no intention of opposing the right which that nation had of choosing its own form of government. (Despatch of Lord CLANCARTY of May 6th, 1815).

With regard to this objection, the legal answer would be, that there can be no exceptional cases. But my hypothesis is this, that NAPOLEON would never have existed if the means of preventing a war from becoming a political measure had not been abrogated; means which the British Constitution contained.

Let us however suggest another hypothesis. Let us suppose that the Privy Council had been reinstated in its vigour on the occasion of the return of BONAPARTE. The case which would have been submitted to it must have been that which we find in the despatch of Lord CLANCARTY; that NAPOLEON was an enemy of the general peace, and that no confidence could be placed in the asssurance he might give of his intentions. Such would have been the accusation. The proofs would have been furnished by citing the wars that he had made and the conquests he had achieved. But such an argument would have compelled the Privy Council, in its character as a judicial body, to examine the past transactions so introduced into the question. The documents of the time, as we know them now, would have been brought before it. The accusation of the Government would have failed, because the proofs by which it was sought to be supported would have been reduced to nothing. With regard to the transactions between France and England, it would have been perceived that the charge of not having kept faith, and of failing in sincerity in making professions of peace, applied only to the English Government itself.