ings in the court below after the overruling by the Supreme Court
of a demurrer to them, and as the Supreme Court of the State, in
deciding this case, did not take that right away, it follows that the
judgment of the state court was not final, and that this case must
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Clark v. Kansas City, 334.
5. A writ of error from this court to revise the judgment of a state court
can only be maintained when within the purview of section 709 of the
Revised Statutes. Capital National Bank v. Cadiz Bank, 425.

6. If the denial by the state court of a right under a statute of the United
States is relied on as justifying the interposition of this court, before
it can be held that the state court thus disposed of a Federal question,
the record must show, either by the words used or by clear and neces-
sary intendment therefrom, that the right was specifically claimed;
or a definite issue as to the possession of the right must be distinctly
deducible from the record, without an adverse decision of which the
judgment could not have been rendered. Ib.

7. Though a Federal question may have been raised and decided, yet if
a question, not Federal, is also raised and decided, and the decision
of that question is sufficient to support the judgment, this court will
not review the judgment. lb.

8. No Federal right was specially set up or claimed in this case at the
proper time or in the proper way; nor was any such right in issue
and necessarily determined; but the judgment rested on non-Federal
grounds entirely sufficient to support it. 1b.

9. The record discloses no Federal question asserted in terms save in the
application to the Supreme Court for a rehearing, when the sugges-
tion came too late. Ib.

10. The petition did, indeed, allege that the Capital National Bank was
organized under the banking act, and that a receiver was appointed,
who took possession of the bank's assets and of all trusts and money's
held by it in a fiduciary capacity, and the answer admitted these aver-
ments, respecting which there was no controversy; yet no right to
appropriate trust funds was claimed by defendant under any law of
the United States, nor was it asserted that any judgment which might
be rendered for plaintiff would be in contravention of any provision
of the banking act.
Ib.

11. California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, distinguished from this

12. The decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in this case rests on
grounds other than those dependent on Federal questions, if any such
questions were raised, and the writ of error must be dismissed. Chap-
pell Chemical &c. Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co. (No. 1), 465.

13. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in dismissing this case, said:
"The defendant, long after the time fixed by the rule of court, de-
manded a jury trial, and, without waiting for the action of the court
upon his motion, and indeed before there was any trial of the case

upon its merits and before any judgment, final or otherwise, was
rendered, this appeal was taken from what the order of appeal calls
the order of court of the 6th of February, 1896, denying the defend-
ant the right of a jury trial; but no such order appears to have been
passed. On the day mentioned in the order of appeal there was an
order passed by the court below fixing the case for trial, but there
was no action taken in pursuance of such order until subsequent to
this appeal. There is another appeal pending here from the orders
which were ultimately passed." Held, that no Federal question was
disposed of by this decision. Same v. Same (No. 2), 472.

14. The record does not contain the petition for the removal of this case
from the state court to the Circuit Court of the United States, nor
disclose the grounds on which it was founded, and this court does
not pass upon the question whether the state court lost jurisdiction
by reason of it. Same v. Same (No. 3), 474.

15. Reading the complaint and the answer in this case together, the ques-
tion whether the contract of the plaintiff was impaired by subsequent
state action appears on the face of the pleadings, and this court has
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. Columbia Water Power
Co. v. Columbia Electric Street Railway, Light & Power Co., 475.
16. Under Rev. Stat. § 709 there are three classes of cases in which the
final decree of a state court may be examined here: (1) where is
drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or authority
exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their
validity; (2) where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of,
or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, and the decision is in favor of their validity; (3) where any
title, right, privilege or immunity is claimed under the Constitution,
or any treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right,
privilege or immunity specially set up and claimed by either party
under such Constitution, statute, commission or authority, and in this
class the Federal right, title, privilege or immunity must, with pos-
sibly some rare exceptions, be specially set up or claimed to give this
court jurisdiction. Ib.

17. But where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
raised, and the decision is against it, or the validity of a state statute
is drawn in question, and the decision is in favor of its validity, if the
Federal question appears in the record and was decided, or if such
decision was necessarily involved in the case, and the case could not
have been determined without deciding such question, the fact that
it was not specially set up and claimed is not conclusive against a
review of such question here. Ib.

18. Whether the plaintiff had a legal title to the lands in question in this
case was purely a local issue, and whether the erection of a steam

plant by the defendant was an incident of its contract with the state
penitentiary is not reviewable here. Ib.

19. In view of the statute giving this court authority to reexamine the
final judgment of the highest court of a State, denying a right spe-
cially set up or claimed under an authority exercised under the
United States, this court has jurisdiction to inquire whether due
effect was accorded to the foreclosure proceedings in the Circuit
Courts of the United States, under which the plaintiff in error claims
title to the lands and property in question in this suit. Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati &c. Railway Co. v. Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 493.
20. Where a judgment is based upon a cause of action of such a nature
that it might work injustice to one party defendant, if it were to
remain intact as against him, while reversed for error as to the other
defendants, the power exists in the court, founded upon such fact of
possible injustice, to reverse the judgment in toto, and grant a new
trial in regard to all the defendants. Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Lansden, 534.

21. The motion in this case to dismiss or affirm was founded upon the
allegation that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State
rested on two grounds, one of which, broad enough in itself to sus-
tain the judgment, involved no Federal question. This court, while
declining to sustain the motion to dismiss, holds that there was color
for it, and takes jurisdiction of the motion to affirm. First National
Bank of Grand Forks v. Anderson, 573.

22. A decision by a state court of a Federal question will not sustain the
jurisdiction of this Court, if another question, not Federal, were also
raised and decided against the plaintiff in error, and the decision
thereof be sufficient, notwithstanding the Federal question, to sus-
tain the judgment; and much more is this the case where no Federal
question is shown to have been decided, and the case might have
been, as in this case it probably was, disposed of upon non-Federal
grounds. McQuade v. Trenton, 636.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 2, 3, 5;
HABEAS CORPUS, 3.

C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.

See CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL, 1.

D. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.

1. A Circuit Court of the United States, sitting in equity in the admin-
istration of civil remedies, has no jurisdiction to stay by injunction
proceedings pending in a state court in the name of a State to en-
force the criminal laws of such State. Harkrader v. Wadley, 148.
2. A suit against a marshal of the United States, for acts done in his
official capacity, is a suit arising under the laws of the United States;

and the joinder of another defendant, jurisdiction over whom is de-
pendent upon diversity of citizenship, does not deprive the marshal
of rights he would otherwise possess. Sonnentheil v. Christian Moer-
lein Brewing Co., 401.

E. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.

See LOUISIANA, LOCAL LAW of.

LEASE.

The provision in the act of the South Carolina legislature of December
24, 1887, that the right of the State to the five hundred horse power
of water retained for the use of the penitentiary should be "abso-
lute" authorized the leases of such portion thereof as was not re-
quired for the individual use of the penitentiary. Columbia Water
Power Co. v. Columbia Electric Street Railway & Light Co., 475.

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.

Three cheques were drawn in June, 1869, by authorized army officers
upon the Assistant Treasurer of the United States in New York, in
favor of Wardwell and in payment of his lawful claims against the
United States. These cheques, while in his possession, were lost or
destroyed, presumably in a depredation made on his house by hos-
tile Indians in 1872. Not having been presented for payment, the
amount of these cheques was covered into the Treasury in pursuance
of the statutes of the United States, and was carried to the account
of "outstanding liabilities." Wardwell having died, his adminis-
tratrix applied to the Treasury for payment of the cheques by the
issue of Treasury warrants, under the authority conferred by Rev.
Stat. §§ 306, 307, 308. This payment being refused, this suit was
brought in the Court of Claims in April, 1896, and the statute of
limitations was set up as a defence. Held, that the promise by the
Government contained in the statute to hold money so paid into the
Treasury was a continuing promise available to plaintiff at any time
she saw fit, to which full force should be given; that there was no
cause for a suit until after refusal of an application for a warrant,
and that then for the first time a claim for the breach of the contract
accrued, and the limitation, prescribed by Rev. Stat. § 1069, began
United States v. Wardwell, 48.

to run.

LOUISIANA, LOCAL LAW OF.

Certain real estate in Louisiana, consisting of five plantations standing in
the name of J. Morgan, was community property. His wife died in
1844, leaving two children as her heirs; and in 1858 Morgan conveyed

all the real estate to his children and grandchildren. He died in 1860,
and in 1872 his creditors took proceedings to set aside the conveyance
and to subject his interest in the property to the payment of his debts.
Their contention was sustained by this court in Johnson v. Waters, 111
U. S. 640. Then a receiver was appointed to take charge of both in-
terests in all the property. The portion to which this suit relates was
in the possession of Buckner, claiming under the conveyance made by
Morgan in 1858. The receiver threatening to eject him, Buckner, in
order to remain in possession, took a lease of the whole plantation
from the receiver. In 1891 it was decided in Mellen v. Buckner, 139
U. S. 388, that one undivided half of the plantation belonged to
Buckner, and that only the remaining half was subject to the debts of
Morgan, and that if the heirs should not desire a severance of their
portions, the whole should be sold and the proceeds divided in accord-
ance with the decree. The sale was made two years later. Buckner
paid the receiver rent for the whole plantation from 1881 to 1891, but
paid nothing thereafter. This action was commenced by the receiver
in a state court of Louisiana to recover from Buckner rent for one-half
of the estate for 1891 and 1892, and one half of the taxes thereon for
those years. Buckner in reply claimed the right to offset against the
receiver's demand one half of the rent which he had paid to him be-
tween 1884 and 1891, and asked for judgment against the receiver for
the surplus. The Supreme Court of Louisiana sustained the offset and
reserved to Buckner the right to recover the surplus. Held: (1) That
Buckner was entitled to set off against the rent unquestionably due
for the undivided half of the plantation for 1891 and 1892 one half
the amount paid by him for rent between 1884 and 1891; (2) that
he was not precluded from obtaining the benefit of this right in the
state courts by the fact that the receiver was an officer of the Federal
court, or by any proceedings had in that court, as the receiver volun-
tarily went into the state court; (3) that the jurisdiction of the state
court was clear, and its judgment is affirmed. Grant v. Buckner, 232.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1, 11, 12, 13.

NATIONAL BANK.

A national bank which, being authorized by the owner of notes in its pos-
session to sell them to a third party, purchases them itself and con-
verts them to its own use, is liable to their owner for their value, as
for a conversion, even though it was not within its power to sell them
as the owner's agent. First National Bank of Grand Forks v. Ander-
son, 573.